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INTRODUCTION 
In May 2011, the U.S. Supreme Court set the stage for a 
potentially remarkable shift in California criminal justice policy when 
it upheld a federal district three-judge court1 order in Brown v. Plata2 
requiring the State3 to significantly reduce its prison population. By the 
time the Supreme Court stepped in, California prisons held nearly 
twice as many people as they were designed to house, despite a 
decades-long prison construction boom.4 The Supreme Court ruled that 
this overcrowding subjects prisoners to conditions horrific enough to 
constitute cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth 
Amendment and ordered the State to reduce its prison population to no 
more than 137.5 percent of design capacity.5 The Court gave the State 
 1. Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), a district court judge, before 
whom a prison conditions case is pending, may request the appointment of three-judge 
court, under 28 U.S.C.A. § 2284, if she believes that a prison release order should be 
considered as a remedy in the case. 18 U.S.C. § 3226(a). Only three-judge courts have the 
authority to issue prison release orders. Id. In Plata v. Brown, two district court cases were 
consolidated, and in each of those cases the respective district court judge independently 
requested a three-judge court be appointed. 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1921. The Chief Judge of the 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit convened a three-judge court as prescribed by 18 
U.S.C. § 3226(a) composed of the district court judges from the two consolidated cases and 
a third Ninth Circuit judge. Id. 
 2. 131 S. Ct. 1910 (2011). 
 3. “The State” refers to the defendants in the Plata litigation: Governor Brown and the 
California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. 
 4.  See SARA ABARBANEL, ET AL., REALIGNING THE REVOLVING DOOR: AN 
ANALYSIS OF CALIFORNIA COUNTIES’ AB 109 2011–2012 IMPLEMENTATION PLANS (2013), 
available at http://www.law.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/child-
page/183091/doc/slspublic/Realigning%20the%20Revolving%20Door%20with%20updates
%20for%2058%20counties%20080113.pdf (“California has had prison overcrowding issues 
since the inception of its prison system. The State created its prison system in 1851, and by 
1858, six hundred prisoners were housed in an institution with only sixty-two cells.”) (citing 
Kara Dansky, Understanding California Sentencing, 43 U.S.F. L. REV. 45, 52–53 (2008)); 
see also Sharon Dolovich, Exclusion and Control in the Carceral State, 16 BERKELEY J. 
CRIM. L. 259, 331 (2011); CAL. DEP’T OF CORR. & REHAB., CALIFORNIA PRISONERS, 
PRISON FACILITIES, available at http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/Facilities_Locator/index.html 
(demonstrating California’s massive prison construction between the mid-1970s through the 
2000s). 
 5. 131 S. Ct. at 1923 (“For years the medical and mental health care provided by 
California's prisons has fallen short of minimum constitutional requirements and has failed 
to meet prisoners’ basic health needs. Needless suffering and death have been the well-
documented result.”). “Design capacity” is the number of people each prison was 
constructed to house. In its initial population-reduction order, the district court calculated 
design capacity “based on one inmate per cell, single bunks in dormitories, and no beds in 
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two years to shed approximately 33,000 prisoners.6 
In years past, California might have responded by building more 
prison space. After all, the Plata order only required the State to reduce 
overcrowding, not necessarily to reduce the actual numbers of people 
imprisoned.7 The State could theoretically “reduce” its prison 
population to 137.5 percent of capacity by increasing capacity rather 
than reducing the number of prisoners. 
Given fiscal realities, however, that was not a politically viable 
option. At the time the Supreme Court decided Plata, a twenty-five 
billion dollar annual budget deficit,8 fallout from the international 
financial crisis and the housing market collapse had left California’s 
state and local governments on the brink of fiscal disaster.9 Instead of 
undertaking new prison construction it could not afford, the State’s 
plan to comply with the Plata order centered on “Realignment,”10 a 
legislative package drafted and pushed through the Legislature by 
Governor Edmund G. Brown Jr.’s administration.11 Described by 
space not designed for housing.” See Defendant’s Motion to Vacate or Modify Population 
Reduction Order at 8, Plata v. Brown, 922 F. Supp. 2d 1004 (E.D. Cal. 2013) (No. 01-1351). 
 6. California state prisons were designed to hold 79,858 prisoners. However, they 
housed approximately 143,000 prisoners at the time of the Plata decision, which ordered 
California to reduce its prison population by approximately 33,000 prisoners to 137.5 
percent of design capacity, or approximately 109,800 prisoners. Id. at 1943–47; State 
Responds to Three-Judge Court’s Order Requiring a Reduction in Prison Crowding, CDCR 
TODAY (June 7, 2011), http://cdcrtoday.blogspot.com/2011/06/state-responds-to-three-
judge-courts.html [hereinafter State Responds to Three-Judge Court’s Order]. 
  7. Plata, 131 S. Ct. at 1941. 
 8. EDMUND G. BROWN JR., 2011–12 GOVERNOR’S BUDGET SUMMARY, TO THE 
CALIFORNIA LEGISLATURE, REGULAR SESSION 2011–12 at 4 (Jan. 10, 2011), available at 
http://www.ebudget.ca.gov/2011-12-EN/pdf/BudgetSummary/FullBudgetSummary.pdf 
[hereinafter 2011–12 GOVERNOR’S BUDGET SUMMARY] (“California is projected to face a 
budget gap of $25.4 billion in 2011–12. This gap is made up of a current-year shortfall of 
$8.2 billion and a budget-year shortfall of $17.2 billion.”).  
 9. See CAL. LEG. ANALYST’S OFFICE, THE 2011–12 BUDGET: CALIFORNIA’S FISCAL 
OUTLOOK (Nov. 10, 2010), available at 
http://www.lao.ca.gov/reports/2010/bud/fiscal_outlook/fiscal_outlook_2010.aspx 
[hereinafter THE 2011–12 BUDGET: CALIFORNIA’S FISCAL OUTLOOK]. The state budget 
situation has improved considerably since the Supreme Court’s Plata ruling. See THE 2013-
14 BUDGET: CALIFORNIA’S FISCAL OUTLOOK, CAL. LEG. ANALYST’S OFFICE (Nov. 2012), 
available at http://www.lao.ca.gov/reports/2012/bud/fiscal-outlook/fiscal-outlook-2012.pdf. 
As discussed in more detail later in this Article, in September 2013 the California legislature 
allocated hundreds of millions of dollars in new funding to marginally increase prison 
capacity, through contracting with a private prison company and other measures, as part of 
the State’s ongoing efforts to meet the 137.5 percent cap.  
 10. The official title of the act is the “2011 Realignment Legislation addressing public 
safety.” A.B. 109, 2011–2012 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2011).  
 11. See S.B. 105, 2013–2014 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2013) (introduced Aug. 27, 2013); 
MAC TAYLOR, LEG. ANALYST’S OFFICE, ADDRESSING THE FEDERAL COURT PRISON 
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various commentators as “the biggest penal experiment in modern 
history”12 and as one of the most significant criminal justice reforms in 
California since statehood,13 Realignment diverted tens of thousands of 
people annually14—who previously would have been sent to state 
prison for specified non-serious, non-violent, non-sex offenses—to 
local supervision in county jails and alternative custody programs.15 In 
a codified statement of legislative intent, the Legislature declared that 
criminal justice policies relying on building more prisons “are not 
sustainable, and will not result in improved public safety,” and 
encouraged counties to employ community-based rehabilitative 
alternatives to incarceration for the realigned population.16 The State 
assured the public and the federal courts that Realignment would 
reduce the prison population over the initially imposed two-year time 
period through attrition; by sending fewer new prisoners in to replace 
those being released at the normal conclusion of their sentences, the 
POPULATION CAP (Sept. 4, 2013) at 2, available at 
http://lao.ca.gov/handouts/crimjust/2013/Federal-Court-Population-Cap-090413.pdf 
(describing S.B. 105 as the Governor’s plan to addressing the prison population cap) 
[hereinafter ADDRESSING THE FEDERAL COURT PRISON POPULATION CAP]. 
  12. See, e.g., Joan Petersilia and Jessica Greenlick Snyder, Looking Past The Hype: 10 
Questions Everyone Should Ask About California’s Prison Realignment, 5 CAL. J. POL. 
POL’Y 266, 266 (2013), available at 
http://www.bscc.ca.gov/download.php?f=/Looking_Past_The_Hype_Petersilia.pdf 
 13. See, e.g., Warren, Roger, Viewpoints: Realignment can Boost Public Safety, 
SACRAMENTO BEE (Nov. 13, 2011), available at 
http://www.courts.ca.gov/partners/documents/realignmentpublicsafety.pdf. The author is a 
retired 20-year veteran of Sacramento County trial court and is President Emeritus of the 
National Center for State Courts; see also DEAN MISCZYNSKI, PUB. POLICY INST. OF CAL., 
RETHINKING THE STATE-LOCAL RELATIONSHIP: CORRECTIONS 5 (Aug. 2011), available at 
http://www.ppic.org/content/pubs/report/R_811DMR.pdf (“California is changing the way it 
manages its adult prisons and jails more comprehensively than at any time since 
statehood.”). 
 14. California Realignment Dashboard, CHIEF PROBATION OFFICERS OF CAL., 
http://www.cpoc.org/assets/Realignment/dashboard.swf (last updated Mar. 16, 2014) 
(showing that, between October 2011 and September 2013, over 60,000 individuals who 
would have been sent to state prison prior to Realignment were instead diverted to local 
custody). 
 15. See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 17.5(a), 1170(h) (West 2013); J. Richard Couzens and 
Tricia Bigelow, Felony Sentencing After Realignment at app. 1 (Mar. 4, 2014), available at 
http://www.courts.ca.gov/partners/documents/felony_sentencing.pdf (showing a list of the 
realigned offenses). There are fifty-nine crimes that are not defined in the Penal Code as 
serious  or violent  offenses, but are still served in state prison rather than in local custody. 
See AB 109 Crime Exclusions List (July 22, 2011), available at 
http://www.cmhda.org/go/portals/0/cmhda%20files/committees/forensics/1107_forensics/ab
_109_crime_exclusion_list_(7-22-11).pdf (listing the non-serious, non-violent crimes that 
must still be served in state prison). 
 16. CAL. PENAL CODE § 17.5(a) (West 2013). 
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prison population would drop enough to satisfy the Plata order.17  
As it turned out, the State was wrong.18 At the time this Article 
was finalized—nearly a year after the deadline originally set by the 
court order—the State had still failed to sufficiently reduce its prison 
population.19 After several intervening extensions, in December 2013 
the three–judge court issued a new order requiring the State to comply 
by February 2016, with intermediate benchmark requirements.20 As of 
April 14, 2014, the prison population was approximately 502 inmates 
above first benchmark deadline of June 30, 2014, which requires the 
population to be no higher than 143 percent of design capacity.21 
This Article analyzes the impact of the Plata decision and 
Realignment at the three-year mark to assess whether California is 
undergoing a criminal justice paradigm shift or, if instead, it is merely 
shifting some of the state’s mass incarceration problem from prisons to 
jails. We argue that the answer to that question is still unfolding and 
will turn upon whether California’s political leaders are willing to 
reform some of the harsh sentencing laws that caused the prison 
overcrowding in the first place. We further argue that the most 
significant political obstacle to such reform is opposition from the same 
law enforcement interests that have obstructed legislative attempts to 
reform the state’s sentencing laws for more than four decades.  
The Article begins in Section I with an historical overview of the 
prison and incarceration boom of the past forty years, explaining how 
 17. The Cornerstone of California’s Solution to Reduce Overcrowding, Costs, and 
Recidivism, CAL. DEP’T OF CORR. & REHAB., http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/realignment/ 
(describing Realignment as “the cornerstone of California’s solution for reducing the 
number of inmates across the state’s prisons to 137.5 percent of design capacity by June 27, 
2013, as ordered by the Three-Judge Court and affirmed by the U.S. Supreme Court”). 
 18. See Declaration of James Austin in Support of Plaintiffs’ Statement in Response to 
October 11, 2012 Order Regarding Population Reduction at 2, Plata v. Brown, 922 F. Supp. 
2d 1004 (E.D. Cal. 2013) (No. 01-1351). 
 19. See Weekly Report of Population as of Midnight April 16, 2014, CAL. DEP’T OF 
CORR. & REHAB. (Apr. 16, 2014), available at 
http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/Reports_Research/Offender_Information_Services_Branch/Weekly
Wed/TPOP1A/TPOP1Ad140416.pdf (showing that the state is still above the court ordered 
level of 137.5 percent capacity). 
 20. Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Defendants’ Request for Extension of 
December 31, 2013 Deadline, Plata v. Brown, 922 F. Supp. 2d 1004 (E.D. Cal. 2013) (No. 
01-1351); Opinion Re: Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Defendants’ Request for 
Extension of December 31, 2013 Deadline, Plata v. Brown, 922 F. Supp. 2d 1004 (E.D. Cal. 
2013) (No. 01-1351). 
 21. See DEP’T OF FINANCE, SENATE BILL 105 INTERIM REPORT at 3 (Apr. 1, 2014), 
available at http://www.dof.ca.gov/budget/historical/2014-15/documents/SB-105_Report-
Final.pdf [hereinafter SENATE BILL 105 INTERIM REPORT]. 
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California’s prisons became so dangerously overcrowded in the first 
place.  
In Section II, we describe the  Supreme Court’s 2011 Plata ruling, 
the litigation leading up to it, and the State’s initial attempts to build its 
way out of the over-crowding problem.  
In Section III we describe the Realignment legislation, including 
its remarkable statement of legislative intent. We identify three 
significant and related problems that have thwarted that legislative 
intent and Realignment’s potential to usher in a new criminal justice 
paradigm.22 First, we argue that the legislation left counties too much 
discretion to incarcerate the “realigned” population in local jails rather 
than embrace the legislation’s focus on evidence-based alternatives to 
incarceration. Second, the legislation failed to include sufficient 
evaluation and accountability mechanisms. Third, the state formula for 
determining how realignment funding would be allocated to the various 
counties failed to sufficiently incentivize counties to incarcerate less. 
Fourth, the Realignment legislation did nothing to address the problem 
of excessive pre-trial incarceration in county jails. We argue that 
because of these shortcomings Realignment in its current form has not 
only failed to solve the prison overcrowding problem, but is also 
exacerbating preexisting jail overcrowding problems that may lead to 
further litigation and federal court intervention. We propose reforms 
that can reduce pressure on local jail populations and incentivize 
counties to utilize evidence-based alternatives to incarceration that 
have been demonstrated to reduce crime by reducing recidivism.23 
In Section IV, we set out several significant political, legislative 
and litigation-related developments that have occurred during the three 
years since the Legislature enacted Realignment. We first discuss the 
State’s retreat from its initial insistence that Realignment alone would 
be enough to solve the prison overcrowding problem.24 The State has 
now explicitly acknowledged to the three-judge court and to the public 
that, in fact, Realignment will never suffice to reduce the prison 
population to 137.5 percent of design capacity.25 We next describe a 
 22. See infra Section III.C. 
  23. Id. 
 24. See State Responds to Three-Judge Court’s Order, supra note 6 (California 
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation Secretary Matthew Cate stating, “AB 109 is 
the cornerstone of the solution [to address overcrowding], and the Legislature must act to 
protect public safety by funding Realignment.”). 
 25. See Defendant’s Response to October 11, 2012 Order to Develop Plans to Achieve 
Required Prison Population Reduction at 1, Plata v. Brown, 922 F. Supp. 2d 1004 (E.D. Cal. 
2013) (No. 01-1351); Defendant’s Motion to Vacate or Modify Population Reduction Order, 
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new legislative package the State enacted in September 2013, SB 105, 
to supplement Realignment in reducing the prison population.26 SB 105 
includes the possibility of new funding that might help incentivize 
counties to make greater use of alternatives to incarceration and send 
fewer people to state prison.27 The bill’s predominant thrust, however, 
is to increase the State’s prison capacity through mechanisms that 
include new authority and funding to contract with private in-state and 
out-of-state prisons.28 We then discuss the Plata three-judge court’s 
February 2014 order granting another extension of the deadline for the 
State to meet the 137.5 percent population cap, giving the State until 
February 2016.29 Unlike previous extensions, this order includes 
significant new enforcement provisions the federal courts have never 
before imposed in the long course of the Plata litigation. Perhaps most 
significant is the appointment of a Compliance Monitor, who has the 
authority to order prisoners released prior to the end of their sentences 
if the State fails to meet intermediate population reduction 
benchmarks.30 In addition, the State stipulated that it would not appeal 
any further orders of the three-judge court or the Compliance Monitor; 
this concession by the State is especially significant given the previous 
course of this decades-long litigation with multiple trips to the U.S. 
Supreme Court.31 
In Section V, we argue that Realignment alone cannot shift the 
criminal justice paradigm in California because it does not address a 
fundamental cause of prison and jail over-crowding: the State punishes 
far too many non-serious, non-violent offenses as felonies, and imposes 
excessive sentences for them. We propose reforming sentencing laws, 
supra note 5 at 2. See also Three-Judge Court Updates, CAL. DEP’T OF CORR. & REHAB., 
http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/News/3_judge_panel_decision.html (compiling updated figures). 
This stark admission that Realignment alone was not going to be sufficient to meet the 
court’s population cap requirement confirmed what the plaintiffs experts had already known 
to be true. See Declaration of James Austin in Support of Plaintiffs’ Statement in Response 
to October 11, 2012 Order Regarding Population Reduction, supra note 18, at 2. 
 26. S.B. 105, supra note 11; CAL. GOV’T. CODE §§ 19050.2, 19050.8; CAL. PENAL 
CODE. §§ 1233.1, 1233.3, 1233.4, 1233.9, 2910, 2915, 6250.2, 11191, 13602; 2012 Cal. 
Stat. § 15, ch. 42 (Cal. 2013). 
 27. S.B. 105, supra note 11. 
 28. Id. 
 29. See Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Defendants’ Request for Extension 
of December 31, 2013 Deadline, supra note 20, at 2. This order is discussed in more detail 
below. 
 30. Id. at 2; Opinion Re: Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Defendants’ 
Request for Extension of December 31, 2013 Deadline, supra note 20, at 3. 
 31. Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Defendants’ Request for Extension of 
December 31, 2013 Deadline, supra note 20, at 3–4. 
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including reducing the penalties for low-level non-violent drug and 
property crimes, and explain the dramatic and sustainable impact these 
sentencing reforms would have on prison and jail populations.32 We 
argue that these reforms are possible only if the State can overcome 
political obstacles, most significantly an oppositional and influential 
law enforcement lobby.33 Two recent legislative examples are 
presented which demonstrate that—despite pressures of the Plata 
litigation and widespread public support for these reforms—lawmakers 
have continued, even after Realignment, to capitulate to the well-
organized law enforcement lobby that has repeatedly defeated criminal 
justice reform legislation over the past 40 years.34  
 Finally, we conclude by arguing that even if the State can comply 
with the three-judge court’s order, California prisons will still be 
overflowing with tens of thousands more incarcerated than they were 
designed to house. The 137.5 percent target represents only the 
minimum prison population reduction necessary to satisfy the federal 
court mandate. It is far from clear that this reduction will improve 
conditions enough to end constitutionally prohibited cruel and unusual 
punishment.35 Even if so, this is a low bar. The standards for sound 
criminal justice policy, effective corrections management, and basic 
good government should be higher than simply meeting the bare 
minimum required by the U.S. constitution. Complying with Plata 
ought to be the beginning, not the end, of the conversation about 
reforming the state’s criminal justice policies.  
I. FROM REHABILITATION TO RETRIBUTION: FORTY YEARS 
OF TOUGH–ON–CRIME POLICIES 
Over the past four decades, the United States has become the 
world’s largest jailer.36 With less than five percent of the world’s 
  32. See infra Section V.A. 
 33. See infra Section V.B. 
 34.  Id. 
 35.  See infra note 380.   
 36. See James P. Lynch & William Alex Pridemore, Crime in International 
Perspective, in CRIME AND PUBLIC POLICY 5, 27 (James Q. Wilson & Joan Petersilia eds., 
2d ed. 2010) (“In terms of population-based incarceration rates, the United States is clearly 
the most punitive nation in the world.”); CONNIE DE LA VEGA ET AL., CRUEL AND 
UNUSUAL: U.S. SENTENCING PRACTICES IN A GLOBAL CONTEXT 9 (May 2012), available 
at http://www.usfca.edu/law/clgj/criminalsentencing_pr/ (This comprehensive comparative 
analysis of sentencing and carceral practices in the U.S. and the rest of the world found that 
“the United States has the largest prison population in the world and the highest 
incarceration rate in the world. Never before have so many people been locked up for so 
long and for so little as in the United States.”). 
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population,37 the United States incarcerates nearly twenty-five percent 
of the world’s prisoners.38 The United States has more people in its 
prisons and jails than all of Europe combined, and more than China—
which has about one billion more people than the United States.39 
Harsh drug law enforcement and sentencing over the four decades—
since President Richard Nixon’s declaration of the “war on drugs”40—
has been a driving force in the U.S. incarceration explosion.41 There are 
 37. In 2012, the population of the U.S. was 313,914,040 people or 4.45 percent of the 
worldwide population, totaling 7,046,368,812 people. See Population (Total), THE WORLD 
BANK, available at http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL (last visited Jan. 2, 
2014) (Population figures are based on “(1) United Nations Population Division. World 
Population Prospects, (2) United Nations Statistical Division. Population and Vital Statistics 
Report (various years), (3) Census reports and other statistical publications from national 
statistical offices, (4) Eurostat: Demographic Statistics, (5) Secretariat of the Pacific 
Community: Statistics and Demography Programme, and (6) U.S. Census Bureau: 
International Database.”). 
 38. See ROY WALMSLEY, WORLD PRISON POPULATION LIST 3 (9th ed. Apr. 2012), 
available at http://www.idcr.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2010/09/WPPL-9-22.pdf 
(demonstrating that the U.S. houses approximately 23 percent of the world’s incarcerated 
population). 
 39. The U.S. incarcerates approximately 2.29 million people as compared to both 
China and all of Europe combined, which incarcerate approximately 1.65 million and 1.85 
million people respectively. Id. at 4–6. Moreover, in 2012 China had a population of 
approximately 1.35 billion, which is over a billion more people than the approximately 
313.9 million people in the U.S. the same year. See THE WORLD BANK, supra note 37. 
 40. See The New Public Enemy No. 1, TIME, June. 28, 1971 at 20. See also RUTH 
WILSON GILMORE, GOLDEN GULAG: PRISONS, SURPLUS, CRISIS, AND OPPOSITION IN 
GLOBALIZING CALIFORNIA, University 18–19 (2007) (“Drug commitments to federal and 
state prisons surged 975 percent between 1982 and 1999, even though according to the 
Bureau of Justice Statistics, illegal drug use in the U.S. declined drastically starting in the 
mid-1970s.”); E. ANN CARSON & WILLIAM J. SABOL, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 239808, 
PRISONERS IN 2011 6 (Dec. 2012), available at 
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/p11.pdf (showing an increase in imprisonment rates 
from 470 per 100,000 in 2000 to a high of 506 per 100,000 in 2007 and 2008 and back down 
to 492 per 100,000 in 2011); ALLEN J. BECK & PAIGE M. HARRISON, U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, NCJ 188207, PRISONERS IN 2000 1 (Aug. 2001), available at 
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/p00.pdf (showing an increase in incarceration rates 
of people held in state or federal prisons from 292 per 100,000 in 1990 to 477 per 100,000 in 
2000); ROBYN L. COHEN, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PRISONERS IN 1990 2 (May 1991), 
available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/p90.pdf (showing an increase of 
incarceration rates from 139 per 100,000 in 1980 to 293 per 100,000 in 1990). 
 41. See Lynch & Pridemore, supra note 36, at 44 (“The aggressive stance that the 
United States has taken toward drug crime is also a major contributor to the prison 
population. The United States is more likely to treat drug activity as a crime than most other 
nations, more likely to sentence convicted persons to prison, and more likely to require 
offenders to serve more time. Other nations may be similar to the United States in one of 
these aspects, but none is as punitive in all of these respects.”). See also id. at 40–42; DE LA 
VEGA ET AL., supra note 36, at 8 (“[T]he United States is an outlier among countries in its 
sentencing practices . . . . The number of prisoners serving LWOP sentences is more than 
41,000 in the United States. In contrast there are 59 serving such sentences in Australia, 41 
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now over 500 percent more people in jail and prison in the United 
States than in 1980.42 
During this same time period, California enacted some of the most 
draconian sentencing and parole regimes in the country.43 California’s 
prison population increased by more than eight-fold from 
approximately 21,000 in the mid-70s to 171,000 at its peak in 2008,44 
and the number of state prisons increased from twelve to the thirty-four 
operating today.45 As with mass incarceration nationwide, drug 
sentencing has been an overwhelming factor in California’s prison 
overcrowding crisis. In 1970, approximately five per 100,000 
Californians were incarcerated in state prisons on drug convictions; by 
the late 1990’s, that number had increased more than ten-fold.46 Not 
in England and 37 in the Netherlands.”). 
 42. See CARSON & SABOL, supra note 40, at 1 (showing approximately 1.6 million 
prisoners under state and federal jurisdiction at year-end 2011); PAIGE M. HARRISON, U.S. 
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PRISONERS IN CUSTODY OF STATE OR FEDERAL CORRECTIONAL 
AUTHORITIES, 1977–98 (Sept. 1, 2000), 
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/index.cfm?ty=pbdetail&iid=2080 (showing approximately 319,600 
prisoners under state and federal jurisdiction at year-end 1980). 
 43. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 667(b); 1170(a)(1); 1170.12 (West 2013). 
 44. See infra Figure 2. See also CAL. DEP’T OF CORR. & REHAB., REP., HISTORICAL 
TRENDS: INSTITUTION AND PAROLE POPULATION 1976–1996, at 1a (Sept. 1997), available 
at  
http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/reports_research/offender_information_services_branch/Annual/HI
ST2/HIST2d1996.pdf (reporting a total prison population of 21,088 individuals as of Dec. 
31, 1976) [hereinafter HISTORICAL TRENDS: INSTITUTION AND PAROLE POPULATION 1976-
1996]; CAL. DEP’T OF CORR. & REHAB., CORRECTIONS YEAR AT A GLANCE 12 (Fall 2011), 
available at  
http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/News/docs/2011_Annual_Report_FINAL.pdf (showing that the 
total adult prison population peaked in 2008 with 171,161 prisoners). 
 45. See Sharon Dolovich, supra note 4, at 331; CAL. DEP’T OF CORR. & REHAB., MAP 
OF CALIFORNIA’S CORRECTIONAL AND 
REHABILITATION INSTITUTIONS (Feb. 2014), available at 
http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/map/docs/Correctional-and-Rehabilitation-Institutions-with-Parole-
Regions.pdf (showing that there are 34 state-level adult prisons in California). 
 46. See CAL. DEP’T OF CORR. & REHAB., CALIFORNIA PRISONERS 1970 AND 1971: 
SUMMARY STATISTICS OF FELON PRISONERS AND PAROLEES 14 (1971), available at 
http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/Reports_Research/Offender_Information_Services_Branch/Annual/
CalPris/CALPRISd1970_71.pdf (data for 1970); CAL. DEP’T OF CORR. & REHAB., 
CALIFORNIA PRISONERS AND PAROLEES 2000: SUMMARY STATISTICS ON FELON 
PRISONERS AND PAROLEES, CIVIL NARCOTIC ADDICT INPATIENTS AND OUTPATIENTS AND 
OTHER POPULATIONS, at tbl.9, available at 
http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/Reports_Research/Offender_Information_Services_Branch/Annual/
CalPrisArchive.html (documenting changes in California’s inmate population over the 
years). See also SASHA ABRAMSKY, SACRAMENTO’S K-STREET LOBBYISTS: THE CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE INNER CIRCLE 2 (2011), available at 
http://pubs.mantisintel.com/Sacramento's_K_Street_Lobbyists.pdf (commissioned by the 
Center on Juvenile and Criminal Justice (CJCJ) as part of CJCJ’s Interest Groups and 
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surprisingly, all of this came at significant social and financial cost.47 
Unequal treatment in the criminal justice system—especially in 
drug law enforcement—has a ripple effect extending beyond 
courtrooms and prisons and is one of the primary drivers of racial 
inequality in California and the nation.48 A higher proportion of blacks 
are incarcerated in California today than were in Apartheid South 
Africa.49 Latinos are now the fastest-growing and largest group 
incarcerated in California state prisons.50 California over-relies on its 
criminal justice system—especially the selective yet excessive use of 
incarceration—to address complex economic, mental health, drug 
addiction, and other social problems that can never be solved simply by 
locking more people behind bars for longer and longer periods of 
time.51 
To house this explosion in the numbers of people incarcerated in 
the state, California undertook what government analysts called “the 
biggest prison building project in the history of the world.”52 Between 
Criminal Justice Policy project). 
 47. See, e.g., CALIFORNIA BUDGET PROJECT, STEADY CLIMB: STATE CORRECTIONS 
SPENDING IN CALIFORNIA, BUDGET BACKGROUNDER 1 (2011), available at 
http://www.cbp.org/pdfs/2011/11-014_Corrections_Spending_BB.pdf.  
 48. See MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE 
AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS 6–7 (2010). 
 49. African Americans are incarcerated at a rate of approximately 2,130 per 100,000 in 
California prisons; this figure does not include those incarcerated in county jails or federal 
prisons located in California. See CAL. DEP’T OF CORR. & REHAB., CALIFORNIA PRISONERS 
AND PAROLEES 19 (2009) [hereinafter CDCR Estimates and Statistical Analysis], available 
at 
http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/Reports_Research/Offender_Information_Services_Branch/Annual/
CalPris/CALPRISd2009.pdf (48,990 African Americans were incarcerated in CDCR 
intuitions at year-end 2009); Profile of General Population and Housing Characteristics: 
2010 (California), U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
http://factfinder2.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml?src=bkmk 
(there were approximately 2,299,072 African Americans in California in 2010); Section IV: 
Global Comparisons, Crime and incarceration around the world: U.S. vs. South Africa, 
PRISON POLICY INITIATIVE, http://www.prisonpolicy.org/prisonindex/us_southafrica.html 
(under Apartheid, South African black were incarcerated at a rate of approximately 851 per 
100,000). 
 50. See CDCR Estimates and Statistical Analysis, supra note 49 (“Hispanics” make up 
39.3 percent of the CDCR institution population, while whites, blacks and others represent 
25.6 percent, 29.0 percent, and 6.1 percent respectively). 
 51. See GILMORE, supra note 40, at 7, 87–127. See generally ALEXANDER, supra note 
48§. 
 52. See GILMORE, supra note 40, at 5, 27 (2007) (citing CARY J. RUDMAN & JOHN 
BERTHELSEN, AN ANALYSIS OF THE CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS’ 
PLANNING PROCESS: STRATEGIES TO REDUCE THE COSTS OF INCARCERATING STATE 
PRISONERS (1991)) (addressing the questions of “how, why, where and to what effect one of 
the planet’s richest and most diverse political economies has organized and executed a 
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1984 and 2005, the State built twenty-three new major prison facilities, 
costing between $280 million and $350 million each,53 to 
accommodate an immense increase in the size of California’s 
incarcerated population, despite steady decreases in the crime rate,54 
and in the face of mounting scientific evidence suggesting that 
increasing the rate of incarceration does not substantially reduce 
crime.55 In fact, crime rates for 2010/2011 were approximately the 
same as they were in 1960.56 Yet, the State’s correctional population 
increased 217 percent per capita during the same period, from 21,660 
(138 per 100,000 people) in 1960 to 162,598 individuals (426 per 
100,000 people) in 2010/2011.57 Building and staffing all these prisons 
was enormously expensive. Corrections spending increased from 
approximately $1 billion (4.1 percent of the State’s general fund 
allocation) in fiscal year 1984–85 to $9.7 billion (10.7 percent of the 
State’s general fund allocation) in fiscal year 2008–09.58 
In addition to the drug war itself, this massive prison growth was 
fueled by some of the most draconian sentencing and parole regimes in 
the country. When California adopted the Uniform Determinate 
Sentencing Law in 1976, the State Legislature explicitly shifted the 
focus of incarceration away from rehabilitation and toward 
prison-building and-filling plan that government analysts have called ‘the biggest . . . in the 
history of the world.’  ” ). 
 53. Id. at 7. Gilmore notes that the State had previously built only twelve prisons 
between 1852 and 1964, and that in addition to the twenty-three major facilities referenced 
here, the State had also added thirteen small (500 bed) community corrections facilities, five 
prison camps and five mother-prisoner centers. Id. 
 54. See infra Figure 2 (demonstrating that reported crimes in California have steadily 
declined over the past three decades while incarceration rates have steadily increased). See 
also GILMORE, supra note 40, at 7 (“The California state prison population grew nearly 500 
percent between 1982 and 2000, even though the crime rate peaked in 1980 and declined, 
unevenly but decisively, thereafter.”). 
 55. See Rucker Johnson & Steven Raphael, How Much Crime Reduction Does the 
Marginal Prisoner Buy? 55 J.L. & ECON. 275, 302–10 (2012). The question of whether and 
how incarceration rates affect crime is, of course, a complicated one that has been the 
subject of much scholarly debate. See, e.g., ALFRED BLUMSTEIN & JAMES Q. WILSON, PEW 
CTR. ON THE STATES, THE IMPACT OF INCARCERATION ON CRIME: TWO NATIONAL 
EXPERTS WEIGH IN (Apr. 2008), available at http://www.pewstates.org/research/reports/the-
impact-of-incarceration-on-crime-85899374230. 
 56. In 2010/2011 there were 3,203 reported crimes per 100,000 Californians, as 
compared to 1960 when there were 3,474 reported crimes per 100,000 Californians. See 
infra Figure 1 and Table 1. 
 57. Id. 
 58. See CAL. LEG. ANALYST’S OFFICE, HISTORICAL DATA (Sept. 2012), available at 
http://www.lao.ca.gov/PolicyAreas/state-budget/historical-data (reporting annual budgets, 
including corrections allocations, from 1984–85 through 2012–13). 
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punishment.59 Reinforced over decades, the State’s system of 
determinate sentencing prescribes significant sentence enhancements 
for prior convictions, sharply limits judicial discretion to determine 
sentence length, requires judges to impose a fixed sentence from three 
defined terms (a lower, middle and upper) for felony offenses 
depending on the presence of mitigating or aggravating factors, and 
makes post-release supervision automatic for virtually everyone who 
finishes a prison sentence.60 
California voters have been equally aggressive in increasing 
criminal penalties. Between 1972 and 1994, voters enacted numerous 
state ballot initiatives ratcheting up sentencing laws, including 
Proposition 17 (1972, death penalty); Proposition 7 (1977, murder 
penalty); and Proposition 115 (1989 “Crime Victim Justice Reform 
Act”).61 In 1982, voters enacted Proposition 8, the Victims’ Bill of 
Rights.62 In addition to changing the rules of evidence to make 
prosecutions and convictions easier, Prop. 8 increased sentences for 
persons with prior convictions and limited plea-bargaining and bail for 
specified crimes.63 
Most notorious is California’s “Three Strikes” law.64 Enacted by 
voters in 1994, the law mandates a double sentence for anyone 
convicted of a felony having previously suffered one prior serious or 
violent felony conviction and a sentence of 25-years-to-life for most 
persons convicted of a felony having previously suffered two previous 
 59. The Uniform Determinate Sentencing Act, Senate Bill 42 passed 1976 and effective 
1977, specified that “the purpose of imprisonment for crime is punishment.” CAL. PENAL 
CODE § 1170(a)(1) (West 2013). See also Joan Petersilia, California’s Correctional 
Paradox of Excess and Deprivation, 37 CRIME & JUST. 207, 210 (2008); VANESSA BARKER, 
THE POLITICS OF IMPRISONMENT: HOW THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS SHAPES THE WAY 
AMERICA PUNISHES OFFENDERS 201 n.19 (2009) (collecting sources). 
 60. See Petersilia, supra note 59, at 253–54. Since the enactment of Realignment, those 
released from prison whose current convictions were for non-serious, non-violent felonies 
and who are not deemed high risk sex offenders are placed in post-release community 
supervision, where they are supervised locally by county probation. See infra Section III.A. 
Individuals released from prison who do not qualify for PRCS remain in the traditional 
state-run parole system.  
 61. See CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, INITIATIVES BY TITLE AND SUMMARY YEAR, available 
at http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/ballot-measures/pdf/initiatives-by-title-and-summary-
year.pdf.  
 62. Id. 
 63. See BARKER, supra note 59, at 47–84 (describing the shift in California 
correctional policy beginning in 1967, with the Reagan-Deukmejian Penalty Package, 
Senate Bill 85–87, from a rehabilitative to a retributive model largely justified by a focus 
upon victims and mandating and stiffening penal sanctions). 
 64. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.12 (West 2004). 
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serious or violent convictions.65 The law also eliminated probation for 
many individuals with prior convictions and substantially increased the 
sentences for second offenses.66 Although twenty-six other states and 
the federal government enacted their own versions of three strikes 
laws, California, until recently,67 remained among the very small 
minority imposing life sentences regardless of the severity of the third, 
or “triggering,” felony.68 Despite its proponents’ contentions, in the 
seventeen years that followed its enactment, the Three Strikes law had 
no demonstrable effect on violent crime levels.69 It did, however, have 
a sizable effect on incarceration rates. Notwithstanding decreasing 
crime rates—and California Department of Corrections and 
Rehabilitation (“CDCR”) data demonstrating that longer prison terms 
fail to reduce recidivism or crime rates70—there were approximately 
 65. Id. §§ 667, 1170.12. On March 7, 1994, the California Legislature amended 
California Penal Code § 667, to include the language known colloquially as the “Three 
Strikes Law.” Eight months later, as a sign of the general populace’s support, the California 
voters codified nearly identical language at California Penal Code § 1170.12 through 
Proposition 184. Further discrepancies between the two statutes have been resolved by the 
Courts, such as § 1170.12’s failure to include all qualifying prior out-of-state felonies. See 
People v. Hazelton, 926 P.2d 423 (Cal. 1996). 
 66. Id.  
 67. See Prop. 36, The Three Strikes Law, Repeat Felony Offenders, Penalties, Initiative 
Statute, CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE (2012), available at 
http://voterguide.sos.ca.gov/propositions/36/title-summary.htm [hereinafter Prop. 36]. 
 68. See JOHN CLARK, JAMES AUSTIN & D. ALAN HENRY, “THREE STRIKES AND 
YOU’RE OUT”: A REVIEW OF STATE LEGISLATION, RESEARCH IN BRIEF (NAT’L INST. OF 
JUSTICE) at 7–9 (Sept. 1997), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles/165369.pdf. See 
also Petersilia, supra note 59, at 210. 
 69. MIKE MALES, CTR. ON JUVENILE & CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STRIKING OUT: 
CALIFORNIA’S “THREE STRIKES AND YOU’RE OUT” LAW HAS NOT REDUCED VIOLENT 
CRIME: A 2011 UPDATE 2 (2011), available at 
http://www.cjcj.org/files/Striking_Out_Californias_Three_Strikes_And_Youre_Out_Law_
Has_Not_Reduced_Violent_Crime.pdf. 
 70. The California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation’s data show that 
people serving one, two, or three years have nearly the same recidivism rates. See 
HISTORICAL TRENDS: INSTITUTION AND PAROLE POPULATION 1976–1996, supra note 44, at 
12. Meanwhile, New York and New Jersey have significantly reduced their prison 
populations and continued to lower their crime rates. See JAMES AUSTIN & MICHAEL 
JACOBSON, HOW NEW YORK CITY REDUCED MASS INCARCERATION: A MODEL FOR 
CHANGE? 6 (Jan. 2013), available at 
http://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/publications/How_NYC_Reduced_Mass_In
carceration.pdf (“New York is one of the first states to significantly reduce its entire 
correctional population. . . . This reduction occurred as the crime rate sharply declined in 
New York, showing that increasing imprisonment or other forms of correction are not 
needed to enjoy a lower crime rate.”); Brief for Center on the Administration of Criminal 
Law and 30 Criminologists as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellees, Schwarzenegger v. 
Plata, 130 S. Ct. 3413 (2010) (No. 09-1233) (“New Jersey likewise experienced declining 
crime rates contemporaneously with declining prison populations: the crime rate there fell 
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33,000 second strikers and 9,000 third strikers in prison by 2012, at 
significant taxpayer expense.71 
Table 1 and Figures 1 and 2 below illustrate crime and 
incarceration trends over time in California.72 First, Table 1 compares 
17% from 2000 to 2008, while the number of offenders sentenced to prison declined by 
7%.”); Craig Haney, Prison Effects of in the Age of Mass Incarceration, THE PRISON J. 15 
(Jan. 25, 2012), available at 
http://tpj.sagepub.com/content/early/2012/09/11/0032885512448604 (finding that 
imprisonment has a “criminogenic”—crime producing—effect; moreover, the more time 
served the more likely one is to offend again). 
 71. See Declaration of James Austin in Support of Plaintiffs’ Statement in Response to 
October 11, 2012 Order Regarding Population Reduction, supra note 18. Analysts have 
documented wide disparities in Three Strikes charging decisions from county to county. A 
2005 report from the non-partisan California Legislative Analyst’s Office (LAO) found that 
Kern County was over 13 times more likely to send an arrestee to state prison with a strike 
enhancement than San Francisco County. See A Primer: Three Strikes—The Impact After 
More Than a Decade, CAL. LEG. ANALYST’S OFFICE (Oct. 2005), 
http://www.lao.ca.gov/2005/3_strikes/3_strikes_102005.htm [hereinafter A Primer: Three 
Strikes] (“Based on discussions with representatives of the courts and district attorneys’ 
offices, we conclude that local county justice systems have developed various strategies for 
handling their Three Strikes caseloads, based on different policy priorities and fiscal 
constraints. Thus, the manner in which the law is implemented at the local level by 
prosecutors and judges varies across counties. In some counties, for example, prosecutors 
seek Three Strikes enhancements only in certain cases, such as for certain types of crimes 
that are particular problems in their county or where the current offense is serious or violent. 
In other counties, prosecutors seek Three Strikes enhancements in most eligible cases. 
Similarly, judges vary in how often they dismiss prior strikes, based on discretion afforded 
to them under the Romero decision. In addition, variation in the application of Three Strikes 
not only exists across counties, but can also occur within counties. In particular, prosecution 
practices change over time as counties experience turnover of district attorneys and judges 
and as they develop new methods for handling Three Strikes cases.”). See also Ina Jaffe, 
Cases Show Disparity Of California’s 3 Strikes Law, NPR (Oct. 30, 2009), 
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=114301025; MEGAN BERWICK, 
RACHEL LINDENBERG, & JULIA VAN ROO, WOBBLERS & CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN 
CALIFORNIA A STUDY INTO PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION 1 (Mar. 20, 2010), available at 
http://ips.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/shared/DA%20Discretion%20Final%20Report.pdf 
(“This study confirms that there is wide variation among California counties in the 
percentages of wobblers charged as misdemeanors.”). 
 72. Data are based on crimes that are reported to sheriffs’ and police departments. 
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS, available at 
http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/ucr. Crime rates in recent years may be inflated as a 
result of increased smartphone and tablet theft. See, e.g., Don Thompson, California bill to 
deter smartphone thefts advances; mandates built-in shut-off technology, U.S. NEWS & 
WORLD REPORT, May 8, 2014, available at 
http://www.usnews.com/news/technology/articles/2014/05/08/california-smartphone-kill-
switch-bill-advances  (describing smartphone and tablet theft as a “crime wave sweeping” 
California); Rolfe Winkler, Fighting the iCrime Wave, Device theft has exploded. New 
solutions are on the way. Is the industry doing enough about ‘Apple picking’?, WALL 
STREET J, Jul. 27, 2014, available at 
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10000872396390443931404577550823904439852 
(“Police across the nation are fighting surges in mobile phone and tablet thefts.”).    
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the overall state population, crime rates, and the per capita prison 
population in 1960 with 2010 figures. Next, Figure 1 provides a 
breakdown of California crime rates from 1960 to 2010. Finally, Figure 
2 demonstrates the state’s crime rates and prison population from 1980 
to 2010. As shown, over time California continued to incarcerate 
increasing numbers of people in prison despite decreasing crime rates. 
 
Table 1. 1960 and 2010 Comparisons 
 1960 2010/11 
% 
Change 
California Population 15,717,204 37,253,956 137% 
Crime Rate (crimes per 
100,000) 
3,474 3,203 -8% 
    
Prison Population 21,660 162,598 651% 
 Rate Per 100,000 138 436 217% 
Parole Population 8,511 103,828 1,120% 
Rate Per 100,000 54 279 415% 
    
What the California Prison Population Would Be Based on 1960 Crime 
and Incarceration rates Applied to 2010 California Population 
51,340 prisoners 
What the California Parole Population Would Be Based on 1960 Crime 
and Incarceration rates Applied to 2010 California Population 
20,173 parolees 
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II. BREAKING POINT: THE FEDERAL COURTS STEP IN 
By 2006, California’s prisons were operating at nearly double 
their capacity.73 In 2007, the Little Hoover Commission74 found that:  
California’s correctional system is in a tailspin that threatens public 
safety and raises the risk of fiscal disaster. The failing correctional 
system is the largest and most immediate crisis facing policy-
makers. For decades, governors and lawmakers fearful of appearing 
soft on crime have failed to muster the political will to address the 
looming crisis. And now their time has run out.75 
 73.  See Coleman v. Schwarzenegger, 922 F.Supp.2d at 888 (E. D. Cal. 2009). 
 74. The Little Hoover Commission is a statutorily-created state agency tasked with 
“promoting economy, efficiency, and improved service in the transaction of the public 
business in the various departments, agencies, and instrumentalities of the executive branch 
of the state government, and in making the operation of all state departments, agencies, and 
instrumentalities, and all expenditures of public funds, more directly responsive to the 
wishes of the people as expressed by their elected representatives.” Cal. Gov't. Code §§ 
8501, 8521.  
 75.  LITTLE HOOVER COMM'N, SOLVING CALIFORNIA'S CORRECTIONS CRISIS: TIME IS 
RUNNING OUT (Jan. 25, 2007) at i, [hereinafter LITTLE HOOVER COMM'N] available at 
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At the time the Little Hoover Commission sounded that alarm, the 
federal courts were about to intercede in a dramatic fashion. Two class-
action lawsuits on behalf of California prisoners, Coleman v. Wilson 
and Plata v. Davis, had been slowly wending their way through the 
courts; Coleman was originally filed in 1990 and Plata in 2001.76 In 
2007 the cases were consolidated before a three-judge district court, 
which was convened to consider a population reduction order pursuant 
to the PLRA.77 On August 4, 2009, the three-judge court found that 
overcrowding in California’s prisons created conditions that violated 
the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual 
punishment: 
The state's prisons have become places of extreme peril to the 
safety of persons they house, while contributing little to the safety 
of California's residents. California spends more on corrections 
than most countries in the world, but the state reaps fewer public 
safety benefits. Although California's existing prison system serves 
neither the public nor the inmates well, the state has for years been 
unable or unwilling to implement the reforms necessary to reverse 
its continuing deterioration. . . . The massive 750% increase in the 
California prison population since the mid–1970s is the result of 
political decisions made over three decades, including the shift to 
inflexible determinate sentencing and the passage of harsh 
mandatory minimum and three-strikes laws, as well as the state's 
counterproductive parole system. . . . The convergence of tough-on-
crime policies and an unwillingness to expend the necessary funds 
to support the population growth has brought California's prisons to 
the breaking point. . . . California's prisons remain severely 
overcrowded, and inmates in the California prison system continue 
to languish without constitutionally adequate medical and mental 
health care. . . . Where the political process has utterly failed to 
protect the constitutional rights of a minority, the courts can, and 
must, vindicate those rights.78 
The three-judge court ordered the State to submit a plan that would 
reduce its prison population to 137.5 percent of design capacity within 
http://www.lhc.ca.gov/studies/185/Report185.pdf. 
 76.  Originally filed as Coleman v. Wilson, 912 F. Supp. 1282 (E. D. Cal. 1995); Plata 
v. Davis, 329 F. 3d 1101 (2003).  
 77.  See supra note 1; See also Motion to Convene the Three-Judge Panel, Coleman v. 
Schwarzenegger, 922 F. Supp. 2d 882 (E.D. Cal. 2006) (No. 01-1351) (filed Nov. 13, 2006); 
Order Granting Plaintiffs’ Motion to Convene Three-Judge Court, Coleman v. 
Schwarzenegger, 922 F. Supp. 2d 882 (E.D. Cal. 2006) (No. 01-1351) (filed July 23, 2007). 
 78. Coleman, 922 F.Supp.2d at 887-888 (internal quotations and citations omitted, 
emphasis in original). 
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two years.79 
A. The State’s Response: Increase Capacity by Building More 
Prisons 
The State’s initial political and legal response to the population 
reduction order was to enact AB 900, a massive $7 billion prison and 
jail construction bond.80 AB 900 was described by the New York 
Times as, “the largest single prison construction program in the 
nation’s history.”81 AB 900 also included “prison reform” measures 
requiring: additional rehabilitation and treatment services for prisoners 
and parolees; expanded substance abuse treatment services in prisons; 
prisoner assessments to aid in reentry and reduce recidivism; and 
increased day treatment and crisis care services for parolees with 
mental health problems.82   
After the passage of AB 900 the Plata Receiver, appointed by the 
federal court to oversee healthcare at CDCR facilities, modified the 
prison construction plan to include the creation of 10,000 specialized 
medical and mental health beds.83 But the State, under the leadership of 
then-Attorney General Edmund G. Brown Jr., reneged on this plan and 
changed its position in the middle of the 2008 Coleman/Plata trial, 
abandoning the 10,000 specialized bed plan.84 The broader prison 
 79.  Id. at 1003-4. 
 80.  See A.B. 900, 2007-2008 Leg. Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2007) (signed by Governor 
Schwarzenegger May 3, 2007); see also See Order Granting Plaintiffs’ Motion to Convene 
Three-Judge Court, Coleman v. Schwarzenegger, 922 F. Supp. 2d 882 at 8 (E.D. Cal. 2006) 
(No. 01-1351) (“The Court acknowledges that the State has recently attempted to take action 
to reduce prison crowding through Assembly Bill 900 . . . Even assuming that the provisions 
of this legislation were to be timely implemented, however–which the Court has doubts 
about given the history of delays in this case, the highly controversial and political nature of 
the subject matter, and the conflicts that may sometimes arise between meeting 
constitutional standards and the tough-on-crime approach to law enforcement espoused by 
some members of the California Legislature–it is unclear whether the legislation would 
reduce the impacts of overcrowding in any meaningful way.”); see also Andy Furillo, 
Prison Expansion Plan Shrinks, SACRAMENTO BEE, June 18, 2008 (“The Schwarzenegger 
administration offered the AB 900 construction plan as its main line of defense against a 
legal motion filed by inmates rights lawyers to cap the state’s prison population.”). 
 81.  Jennifer Steinhauer, California to Address Prison Overcrowding With Giant 
Building Program, NY TIMES, Apr. 27, 2007, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/27/us/27prisons.html?_r=0. 
 82.   See A.B. 900, 2007-2008 Leg. Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2007). 
 83.  See Order at 4, Coleman v. Schwarzenegger, 922 F. Supp. 2d 882 (E.D. Cal. 2008) 
(No. 01-1351) (filed Feb. 26, 2008) (“The Receiver in Plata has begun to implement three 
separate but related construction projects: . . . The construction of approximately 5,000 
additional CDCR medical beds and approximately 5,000 CDCR mental health beds.”). 
 84.  See Plata, 131 S. Ct. at 1938. (“At the time of the [three-judge] court’s decision 
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expansion plan was also halted, largely a result of the state’s budget 
crisis.85 In addition, Brown was running for Governor on a platform 
that attacked the Receiver and the specialized building plan as wasteful 
and too fancy for prisoners.86 By failing to build new prison beds—as a 
result of fiscal and political delays—the State severely undermined its 
primary defense to the population reduction order.87 
the State had plans to build new medical and housing facilities, but funding for some plans 
had not been secured and funding for other plans had been delayed by the legislature for 
years. Particularly in light of California’s ongoing fiscal crisis, the three-judge court deemed 
‘chimerical’ any ‘remedy that requires significant additional spending by the state.’ Events 
subsequent to the three-judge court's decision have confirmed this conclusion. In October 
2010, the State notified the Coleman District Court that a substantial component of its 
construction plans had been delayed indefinitely by the legislature.”) (citing v. 
Schwarzenegger, 922 F. Supp. 2d 882, 954 (E.D. Cal. 2009)) (internal citations omitted); 
Transcripts of Proceedings, Tuesday, November, 18, 2008 at 2403, Coleman v. 
Schwarzenegger, 922 F. Supp. 2d 882 (E.D. Cal. 2008) (No. 01-1351) (former 
Assemblyman and Riverside County District Attorney Rodric Pacheco testified that the 
Plata Receiver never received the money necessary to implement his construction plan); id. 
at 2462 (former Assemblyman Todd Spitzer testified, “[T]hat AB 900 could not be 
implemented because the Attorney General [Edmund G. Brown Jr.] had not issued a clean 
bond opinion on AB 900” and did not try to persuade the Legislature to move forward); id. 
at 2464 (former Assemblyman Spitzer also testified that the Legislature failed to pass the 
clean-up legislation that was necessary to fund AB 900 because the Receiver’s request for 
medical beds was part of the package); see also Andy Furillo, Prison Expansion Plan 
Shrinks, SACRAMENTO BEE, June 18, 2008. 
 85.  See MAC TAYLOR, LEG. ANALYST’S OFFICE, CALIFORNIA’S FISCAL OUTLOOK: 
LAO PROJECTIONS 2007-08 THROUGH 2012-13 (Nov. 14, 2007), available at 
http://www.lao.ca.gov/2007/fiscal_outlook/fiscal_outlook_07.aspx (since the time the 2007–
08 Budget Act was enacted in August 2007, “the 2007–08 budget situation has deteriorated 
by almost $6 billion. Under our forecast, absent corrective action, the state would end the 
current fiscal year with a $1.9 billion deficit. . . . In addition to a negative carry–in balance 
from 2007–08, we project the state will face an $8 billion operating shortfall in 2008–09.”). 
 86.  See, e.g., Jerry Brown, Jerry Brown: Prison Czar's Plan Unrealistic, Intrusive, 
SACRAMENTO BEE (Feb. 4, 2009), available at 
http://ag.ca.gov/newsalerts/speeches/release.php?id=1695 (“We don’t disagree that the state 
has to provide care that meets constitutional standards and is not cruel and unusual. But 
constitutional care doesn’t mean yoga rooms and music therapy.”). 
 87.  Coleman, 922 F.Supp. 2d at 952 (“In the first place, AB 900 construction has 
already been delayed for more than two years due to the absence of funding. . .. As far as we 
are aware, it remains the case today, eight months later, that there is no funding for AB 900 
and no ground has been broken on the AB 900–authorized re-entry facilities. Second, even if 
funding were secured in the near future, other practical concerns would lead to significant 
additional delays.”); id. 954 (“Because the fiscal crisis has required ‘severe and significant 
cuts to vital State programs,’ the state refused to enter into any agreement that would 
‘require[ ] the State to seek I–Bank funding, or any other additional funding not previously 
appropriated by the California Legislature.’ Although defendants did state that they would 
use a ‘significant’ but unspecified portion of the funds allocated by the legislature in AB 900 
‘to build appropriate beds for inmates with disabilities and/or other health needs,’ there is no 
indication as to when such funds will be made available; when construction might begin; or 
what part, if any, of the constitutional inadequacies in delivering medical and mental health 
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Even if the State had been able to increase bed capacity to the 
levels originally intended under AB 900, that action alone would 
almost certainly have been insufficient to remedy to the constitutional 
violations in CDCR facilities. As recounted in the August 2009 three-
judge court order, and again later in the 2011 U.S. Supreme Court 
opinion, overcrowding means that there is a shortage of resources 
necessary to address the fundamental needs of the incarcerated 
population.88 Said another way, prisons require more than just beds, 
they also require hospitals and staff—including specialized medical 
and mental health staff—to meet the medical and mental health needs 
care to California inmates might be remedied by such construction.”) (internal citations 
omitted); id. at 951 (E.D. Cal. 2009) (“[W]hat we must determine is not whether building 
prisons could solve the problem, but whether prison construction offers an actual, feasible, 
sufficiently timely remedy for the unconstitutional state of medical and mental health care in 
California's prisons. Here, California has no plans to construct additional prisons in the near 
future and has not suggested that it does. As a result, we need not consider further the 
construction of additional prisons as an alternative remedy.”); id. at 953 (“ [W]e conclude 
that neither the Receiver's medical facility construction plans nor the proposed AB 900 in-
fill beds—prison expansion—can remedy the constitutional violations at issue in Plata and 
Coleman. Like the AB 900 re-entry facilities, these proposed facilities will not be realized at 
any point in the near future. Furthermore, their funding is threatened by the present fiscal 
crisis, and the proposed construction would in any event likely fall far short of remedying 
the problems created by the crowding of California's prisons.”). 
 88.  Plata, 131 S. Ct. at 1939 (“[A]bsent a reduction in overcrowding, any remedy 
might prove unattainable and would at the very least require vast expenditures of resources 
by the State. Nothing in the long history of the Coleman and Plata actions demonstrates any 
real possibility that the necessary resources would be made available.”); id. at 1938 
(“Construction of new facilities, in theory, could alleviate overcrowding, but the three-judge 
court found no realistic possibility that California would be able to build itself out of this 
crisis. . . . even if planned construction were to be completed, the Plata Receiver found that 
many so-called ‘expansion’ plans called for cramming more prisoners into existing prisons 
without expanding administrative and support facilities. The former acting secretary of the 
California prisons explained that these plans would ‘compound the burdens imposed on 
prison administrators and line staff’ by adding to the already overwhelming prison 
population, creating new barriers to achievement of a remedy.”) (emphasis added) (internal 
quotations and citations omitted); Coleman, 922 F. Supp. 2d at 954-55 (“On a more 
fundamental level, the AB 900 in-fill construction plan ‘essentially is a prison expansion 
measure which increases the number of prison cells without addressing the fundamental 
structural issues that have caused the crisis and that have created unconstitutional conditions 
within the prisons.’ ‘[t]he so-called “in-fill” beds will cause more problems than they will 
solve. Many of California's prisons are so big that they are effectively unmanageable. 
Wardens and other administrators spend much of their time responding to crises, rather than 
fulfilling their responsibilities to provide adequate medical and mental health care. Unless 
these in-fill beds stand alone with their own administrative and support facilities, adding 
thousands of additional prisoners to already overburdened facilities will only compound the 
burdens imposed on prison administrators and line staff.’. . . Thus, while the construction of 
in-fill beds would reduce the use of ‘bad beds,’ the principal effects of the overcrowding in 
California's prisons would remain unaddressed.”) (internal citations omitted). 
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of the prisoners they house.89 
B. The U.S. Supreme Court’s Decision in Brown v. Plata90 
On May 23, 2011, in Brown v. Plata,91 the U.S. Supreme Court 
agreed that overcrowding in California’s prisons created conditions that 
violated the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual 
punishment.92 The Court upheld the three–judge court’s order requiring 
the CDCR to decrease overcrowding to no more than 137.5 percent of 
design capacity,93 amounting to a reduction of approximately 33,000 
prisoners,94 by December 31, 2013.95 These numbers did not account 
 89.  Coleman, 922 F.Supp. 2d at 962 (“The evidence establishes that ‘[r]educing the 
population in the system to a manageable level is the only way to create an environment in 
which other reform efforts, including strengthening medical management, hiring additional 
medical and custody staffing, and improving medical records and tracking systems, can take 
root in the foreseeable future.’ Other forms of relief are either unrealistic or depend upon a 
reduction in prison overcrowding for their success. Accordingly, we find, by clear and 
convincing evidence, that no relief other than a prisoner release order is capable of 
remedying the constitutional deficiencies at the heart of these two cases.”) (internal citations 
omitted); Plata, 131 S. Ct. at 1938 ( “[A]bsent a population reduction, continued efforts by 
the Receiver and Special Master would not achieve a remedy.”); id. at 1939 (“Without a 
reduction in overcrowding, there will be no efficacious remedy for the unconstitutional care 
of the sick and mentally ill in California's prisons.”). 
 90. For a thorough and thoughtful analysis of the Supreme Court’s decision and the 
litigation leading up to it, see Ken Strutin, The Realignment of Incarcerative Punishment: 
Sentencing Reform and the Conditions of Confinement, 38 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1313, 
1324–38 (2012) (because prison overcrowding resulted in Constitutionally inadequate 
medical and mental health conditions, the Court ordered the CDCR to reduce overcrowding 
as a mechanism for remedying the medical and mental health violations). See also, JOAN 
PETERSILIA, SARA ABARBANEL, JOHN S. BUTLER, MARK FELDMAN, MARIAM HINDS, 
KEVIN E. JASON, CORINNE KEEL, MATT J. OWENS, AND CAMDEN VILKIN, VOICES FROM 
THE FIELD: HOW CALIFORNIA STAKEHOLDERS VIEW PUBLIC SAFETY REALIGNMENT (Jan. 
1, 2014), at 12–16, [hereinafter VOICES FROM THE FIELD], available 
at http://www.law.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/child-
page/183091/doc/slspublic/Petersilia%20VOICES%20no%20es%20Final%20022814.pdf. 
 91. 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1923, 1947 (2011). 
 92. Id. 
 93. Design capacity is not a static concept; as the CDCR constructs new housing, the 
institutions’ design capacity increases. For example, as of December 5 2012, CDCR 
institutions were designed to hold 79,756 people; however, they were actually holding 
119,741 or 150.1 percent of design capacity. See Status Report at Exhibit A, Plata v. Brown, 
922 F. Supp. 2d 1004 (E.D. Cal. 2013) (No. 4271-1). 
 94. See State Responds to Three-Judge Court’s Order supra, note 6 (stating that at the 
time of the Supreme Court’s decision there were approximately 143,000 prisoners in the 
CDCR’s 33 facilities, which were designed to hold 79,8588 individuals); Plata, 131 S. Ct. at 
1943–47 (holding that the CDCR must reduce its prisoner population to 137.5 percent of 
design capacity). 
 95. See Plata, 131 S. Ct. at 1923, 1947; Opinion and Order Denying Defendants’ 
Motion to Vacate or Modify Population Reduction Order at 2, Plata v. Brown, 922 F. Supp. 
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for the 8,883 prisoners then housed in four out-of-state private prisons 
on an emergency basis.96 
III. THE STATE’S INITIAL RESPONSE TO BROWN V. PLATA: 
PUBLIC SAFETY REALIGNMENT  
By 2011, when the Supreme Court decided Plata, the state’s 
finances were in far worse condition than when it had enacted AB 900 
two years earlier. Given new fiscal constraints, including a twenty 
billion dollar annual budget deficit,97 the State could not satisfy the 
Supreme Court’s order by simply building more prisons to increase 
overall capacity.98 Instead, the “cornerstone” of the State’s plan to 
2d 1004 (E.D. Cal. 2013) (No. 4271-1) (although the State originally had two years from 
time of the Supreme Court judgment to meet its goal, the three-judge court extended the date 
for compliance to December 31, 2013). See also See Declaration of James Austin in Support 
of Plaintiffs’ Statement in Response to October 11, 2012 Order Regarding Population 
Reduction, supra note 18, at 2 (showing that there were 8,883 CDCR prisoners house out-
of-state in December 2012). 
 96. The housing of prisoners in out-of-state prisons was permitted by a “state of 
emergency proclamation” issued by Governor Schwarzenegger in 2006 due to the level of 
crowding in the CDCR prisons. See Declaration of James Austin in Support of Plaintiffs’ 
Statement in Response to October 11, 2012 Order Regarding Population Reduction, supra 
note 18, at 2; Prison Overcrowding State of Emergency Proclamation, CAL. OFFICE OF 
GOVERNOR (Oct. 4, 2006), http://gov.ca.gov/news.php?id=4278. The proclamation allowed 
California inmates to be housed in out-of-state prisons. Id. However, the proclamation was 
terminated by the Governor in January 2013; thus, doing away with the State’s legal 
authority to keep prisoners in out-of-state facilities. See Proclamation Terminating the 
Prison Overcrowding Proclamation, CAL. OFFICE OF GOVERNOR (Jan. 8, 2013), available 
at http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/News/docs/3JP-docs-01-07-13/Terminating-Prison-
Overcrowding-Emergency-Proclamation-10-4-06.pdf. The Governor renewed the State’s 
legal authority to keep California prisoners in out-of-state facilities by signing SB 105 into 
law in September 2013. S.B. 105, supra note 11 (discussed infra in Section IV.A.). In 
addition, in its February 2014 Order, the three-judge court granted the State authority to 
maintain current levels of prisoners housed in out-of-state facilities. See Order Granting in 
Part and Denying in Part Defendants’ Request for Extension of December 31, 2013 
Deadline, supra note 20, at 2. The State was thus granted authority to send California 
prisoners out-of-state only to replace prisoners released from custody or returning to 
California, not to increase the total number of inmates house in out-of-state facilities. Id. 
 97. See THE 2011-12 BUDGET: CALIFORNIA’S FISCAL OUTLOOK supra note 9. 
 98. It is worth noting that as of 2013, with Proposition 30’s passage and increased 
revenues, along with many cycles of social service cuts, Governor Brown now says budget 
deficit is erased. See CAL. OFFICE OF GOVERNOR, 2013–14 GOVERNOR’S BUDGET 
SUMMARY 1 (Jan. 10, 2013), available at 
http://www.dof.ca.gov/documents/FullBudgetSummary_web2013.pdf [hereinafter 
GOVERNOR’S BUDGET]; Governor Brown Delivers 2013 State of the State Address, CAL. 
OFFICE OF GOVERNOR (Jan. 24, 2013), http://gov.ca.gov/news.php?id=17906; CAL. LEG. 
ANALYST’S OFFICE, THE 2013–14 BUDGET: OVERVIEW OF THE GOVERNOR’S BUDGET 3, 5 
(Jan. 2013), available at http://www.lao.ca.gov/Publications/Detail/2681. As a practical and 
political matter, however, the State is unlikely to embark upon a new prison construction 
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comply with the Supreme Court’s Plata mandate was Realignment.99  
A. The Nuts and Bolts of Realignment100 
Realignment made three key changes to California’s criminal justice 
administration: 
 
1) Most individuals newly convicted of low-level, non-serious 
felonies stay at the county level. Most individuals sentenced for a 
non-serious, non-violent, non-sex-registerable felony offense (a 
“non-non-non”), and who have no such prior convictions, now 
remain under the jurisdiction of the county—in jail or under some 
other form of local supervision—rather than being sent to state 
prison.101 
2) Counties assume greater post-release supervision responsibilities. 
Starting October 1, 2011, those released from prison whose current 
convictions were for non-serious, non-violent felonies and who are 
not deemed high risk sex offenders102 are placed on a new form of 
local monitoring called “post-release community supervision” 
(“PRCS”) under the supervision of county probation.103 Technical 
violations by any individual on supervision, whether by a county or 
state agency, will be served in county jail and only new felony 
boom, as evidenced by the Governor’s proposed 2013 budget which provides only a 
minimal increase in funding for the CDCR. See id. 
 99. See State Responds to Three-Judge Court’s Order, supra note 6 (CDCR Secretary 
Matthew Cate stating “AB 109 is the cornerstone of the solution [to address overcrowding], 
and the Legislature must act to protect public safety by funding Realignment.”). See also 
Governor Brown Pledges State Support as Local Leaders Launch Realignment, available at 
http://gov.ca.gov/news.php?id=17245 (Quoting Governor Brown, “The U.S. Supreme Court 
has ordered California to reduce its prison population without delay and realignment is the 
most viable plan to comply with the Court’s order.”). 
 100.  For a detailed description of the Realignment legislation, see JOAN PETERSILIA, ET 
AL., VOICES FROM THE FIELD, supra note 90, at 23–25.  
 101. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170. 
 102. CDCR Parole completes a risk assessment for all persons who are required to 
register as sex offenders, pursuant to Cal. Penal Code § 290, in order to determine whether 
they are to be identified as “high risk sex offenders.” See Implementation of the Post Release 
Community Supervision Act of 2011, CAL. DEP’T OF CORR. & REHAB. (Aug. 29, 2011), 
available at http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/realignment/docs/PRCS-County.pdf. 
 103. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 3450–65. See id. § 3451 (providing that inmates released 
from state prison after October 1, 2011 for a non-violent, non-serious, nonsexual offense be 
supervised by the county for a period of not more than three years). Whether an individual is 
subject to Post Release Community Supervision is controlled by the individual’s most recent 
offense; prior serious, violent, or sex-related felony convictions other than the latest offense 
are not taken into account for purposes of assigning offenders to PRCS. 
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offenses will return an individual to state prison.104 Counties have 
broad discretion to sanction PRCS violators in jails or through non-
custodial alternatives, such as electronic monitoring or substance-
abuse treatment.105  
Realignment was prospective only from its October 1, 2011 
effective date and did not provide for the transfer or early release 
of any inmates already serving sentences in state prison. In 
addition, anyone on parole before October 1, 2011 remains under 
state jurisdiction until discharged by the CDCR.106 
3) The Legislature explicitly encouraged counties to use evidence-
based alternatives to incarceration. As we discuss further in Section 
V, infra, Realignment did not change the length of sentences that 
can be imposed for the “realigned” offenses, the applicability of 
sentencing enhancements, or the fact that these offenses remain 
felonies. But the legislation did encourage counties to develop 
community-based alternatives to incarceration for these low-level 
crimes, rather than simply incarcerating the realigned population in 
local jails for the same period of time they would have previously 
served in state prison.107 The legislation also granted county 
sheriffs additional discretion to manage their jail populations 
through use of intermediate alternative sanctions other than 
incarceration or traditional probation supervision.108  
 104.  See CAL. PENAL CODE § 3458 (“No person subject to this title shall be returned to 
prison for a violation of any condition of the person's postrelease supervision agreement.”); 
CAL. PENAL CODE § 3452(b)(3) (“An advisement that if a person breaks the law or violates 
the conditions of release, he or she can be incarcerated in a county jail regardless of whether 
or not new charges are filed.”); CAL. PENAL CODE § 3455(a)(1)-(2), (d) (limiting penalties 
for each PRCS violation to no more than 180 days in county jail.). 
 105. Id. § 3455 
 106. See id. § 3000.09. 
 107. See id. § 17.5(a). 
 108. See id. § 17.5(a)(3); id. § 1230.1(d) (explicitly providing that, “[c]onsistent with 
local needs and resources, the [Realignment implementation] plan may include 
recommendations to maximize the effective investment of criminal justice resources in 
evidence-based correctional sanctions and programs, including, but not limited to, day 
reporting centers, drug courts, residential multiservice centers, mental health treatment 
programs, electronic and GPS monitoring programs, victim restitution programs, counseling 
programs, community service programs, educational programs, and work training 
programs.”); id. § 1203.018 (authorizing counties to offer electronic monitoring for inmates 
being held in lieu of bail in county jail); id. § 3450 (authorizing a range of incarceration 
alternatives). 
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The legislative intent of Realignment implicitly acknowledged that 
counties are able to integrate public health and social services as 
part of rehabilitation and reentry in ways that the state cannot.109 
The legislation created a “split sentencing” option, which allows a 
judge to split the sentence for an eligible non-non-non defendant 
between jail time and a period of time in the community under the 
supervision of the county probation department.110 This concluding 
period served under probation is known as mandatory 
supervision.111 This practice safely reduces the jail population and 
gives counties an opportunity to supervise convicted individuals 
after their release.112 Realigned individuals serving their entire 
sentences in jail receive no post-release supervision at all.113 
B. Realignment’s Potential: A Paradigm Shift in How 
Government Addresses Low-level, Non-Violent Crime 
If Realignment did nothing more than move tens of thousands of 
prisoners from state-run prisons to county-run jails, few would suggest 
it represented a paradigm shift in criminal justice policy. The Governor 
and the Legislature made clear, however, that they intended 
Realignment to do far more than simply shift the location of 
incarceration for the specified low-level offenses.114 The legislation 
explicitly encourages counties to develop and implement programs 
 109. See, e.g., Marissa Lagos, Gov. Jerry Brown Promises Constitutional Amendment to 
Fund Realignment, SF GATE (Sept. 21, 2011),
http://blog.sfgate.com/nov05election/2011/09/21/gov-jerry-brown-promisesconstitutional-
amendment-to-fund-realignment/ (“The governor and other supporters believe that city 
police and county sheriffs, probation departments and social service programs will do a 
better job helping low-level offenders stay out of trouble.”). See also What They’re 
Saying…, CAL. DEP’T OF CORR. & REHAB., http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/realignment/what-
theyre-saying.html (compiling comments from local government officials from around the 
state concurring that local governments can do a better job than the State, including San 
Mateo County Sheriff Greg Munks who explained “[k]eeping individuals closer to the 
community, keeping them closer to their families, and connecting them with community-
based resources that they’re going to need to be successful when they get out, because they 
are going to get out.”). 
 110. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170(h)(5)(B). 
 111. See Mandatory Supervision: The Benefits of Evidence Based Supervision under 
Public Safety Realignment, CHIEF PROBATION OFFICERS OF CAL. ISSUE BRIEF (Winter 
2012), available at http://www.cpoc.org/assets/Realignment/issuebrief2.pdf [hereinafter 
Mandatory Supervision]; California Realignment Dashboard, supra note 14. 
 112. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170(h)(5)(A) (also allowing judges to sentence 
individuals convicted of low-level felonies to serve their full terms in jail, with absolutely no 
post-release supervision). 
 113. Id. 
 114. See id. § 17.5(a). 
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drawing on cooperation among public health and social service 
agencies and non-governmental community organizations.115 In stark 
contrast to the preceding decades of tough-on-crime politics and 
California’s existing harsh sentencing laws discussed above in Section 
I, the articulated legislative intent declared a new focus on 
rehabilitating rather than just punishing those convicted only of non-
serious, non-violent offenses.116  
The formal legislative findings and declarations state that, 
“[c]riminal justice policies that rely on building and operating more 
prisons to address community safety concerns are not sustainable, and 
will not result in improved public safety.”117 The legislation urges 
counties to employ “evidence-based strategies” and “community-based 
punishment”118 for low-level, non-violent offenses rather than relying 
primarily on incarceration in state prisons or county jails.119 And the 
 115. Id. § 1170(h)(5)(A). 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. 
 118. See id. §§ 17.5(a), 1170(h), 1230.1(d) (explicitly providing that, “[c]onsistent with 
local needs and resources, the [Realignment implementation] plan may include 
recommendations to maximize the effective investment of criminal justice resources in 
evidence-based correctional sanctions and programs, including, but not limited to, day 
reporting centers, drug courts, residential multiservice centers, mental health treatment 
programs, electronic and GPS monitoring programs, victim restitution programs, counseling 
programs, community service programs, educational programs, and work training 
programs.”); id. § 1203.018 (authorizing counties to offer electronic monitoring for inmates 
being held in lieu of bail in county jail); id. § 3450 (authorizing a range of incarceration 
alternatives). Section 17.5 defines “community-based punishment” as “correctional 
sanctions and programming encompassing a range of custodial and noncustodial responses 
to criminal or noncompliant offender activity.” Examples of community-based punishment 
include: intensive community supervision; home detention with non-GPS electronic 
monitoring (such as telephone check-ins) or GPS monitoring; mandatory community 
service; restorative justice programs such as mandatory victim restitution and victim-
offender reconciliation; work, training, or education in a furlough program, or work, in lieu 
of confinement, in a work release program; day reporting; residential or nonresidential 
substance abuse treatment programs; mother-infant care programs; and community-based 
residential programs offering structure, supervision, drug treatment, alcohol treatment, 
literacy programming, employment counseling, psychological counseling, mental health 
treatment, or any combination of these and other interventions. 
 119. See THE PEW CENTER ON THE STATES, STATE OF RECIDIVISM APRIL  
2011: THE REVOLVING DOOR OF AMERICA’S PRISONS 26 (Apr. 2011), available at 
http://www.pewtrusts.org/uploadedFiles/wwwpewtrustsorg/Reports/sentencing_and_correcti
ons/State_Recidivism_Revolving_Door_America_Prisons percent20.pdf (table comparing 
state recidivism rates); CAL. PENAL CODE § 17.5 (“California must reinvest its criminal 
justice resources to support community-based corrections programs and evidence-based 
practices . . . . Realigning low-level felony offenders who do not have prior convictions for 
serious, violent, or sex offenses to locally run community-based corrections programs, 
which are strengthened through community-based punishment, evidence-based practices, 
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Legislature further acknowledged that, “[d]espite the dramatic increase 
in [state] corrections spending over the past two decades, re-
incarceration rates . . . remain unchanged or have worsened . . . .”120 
Indeed, California’s state prison recidivism rate—61 percent as of 
January 2014121—is among the highest in the nation.122 Prior to 
Realignment’s enactment, more than 10,000 people completed their 
sentences and were released from state prison each month in 
California.123 However, another approximately 10,000 people each 
month replaced them.124 California’s prisons had all but turned the 
metaphorical “revolving door” into a literal one. 
The stated intent of Realignment is to interrupt this cycle by 
preventing crime, limiting future victims, and more effectively 
allocating resources.125 The legislation urges counties to “manage and 
allocate criminal justice populations more cost-effectively, generating 
savings that can be reinvested in evidence-based strategies that increase 
public safety while holding offenders accountable.”126 It encourages 
counties to use “evidence-based strategies” that are demonstrated to 
reduce recidivism rates, often dramatically,127 and “community-based 
punishment” to reduce crime.128 It is primarily focused on reducing re-
improved supervision strategies, and enhanced secured capacity, will improve public safety 
outcomes among adult felons and facilitate their reintegration back into society. Community 
based corrections programs require a partnership between local public safety entities and the 
county to provide and expand the use of community-based punishment for low-level 
offender populations. Each county’s Local Community Corrections Partnership . . . should 
play a critical role in developing programs and ensuring appropriate outcomes for low-level 
offenders.”).  
 120. Id. 
 121. See CAL. DEP’T OF CORR. & REHAB., 2013 OUTCOME EVALUATION REPORT 11–12 
(Jan. 2014), available at
http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/Adult_Research_Branch/Research_Documents/Outcome_Evaluatio
n_Report_2013.pdf. 
 122. Id.; see also THE PEW CENTER ON THE STATES, supra note 119, at 10–11. 
 123. In 2010, the last full year before realignment was implemented, 62,003 inmates 
were released on their first parole, 58,716 were released on re-parole, and 2,537 were 
discharged from CDCR facilities. Thus, on average, over 10,000 inmates were released from 
a California state prison each month. CAL. DEP’T OF CORR. & REHAB., MOVEMENT OF 
PRISON POPULATION CALENDAR YEAR 2010, at 3 (Jan. 2011),  
available at 
http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/Reports_Research/Offender_Information_Services_Branch/Annual/
Move5/Move5d2010.pdf. 
 124. Id. 
 125. CAL. PENAL CODE § 17.5(a). 
 126. Id. 
 127. See THE PEW CENTER ON THE STATES, supra note 119, at 26. 
 128. Section 17.5 defines “community-based punishment” as “correctional sanctions and 
programming encompassing a range of custodial and noncustodial responses to criminal or 
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offending by individuals already involved in the criminal justice 
system—those who have been or who are at risk of walking through 
that revolving door. Realignment aims to “improve public safety 
outcomes among adult felons and facilitate their reintegration back into 
society.”129 
C. Realignment’s Limitations 
Remarkable and ambitious as Realignment’s potential may be, the 
results thus far have been decidedly mixed. As we discuss below in 
Section V, after nearly three years and a constitutional amendment to 
increase funding for its implementation, it is now clear that 
Realignment, in its current form, will never be enough to reduce the 
state prison population sufficiently to comply with the Plata 
mandate.130 In this Section we examine, and propose solutions to, four 
related and significant problems that have limited Realignment’s 
effectiveness in reducing the prison population and its potential to 
usher in a new criminal justice paradigm.  
1. Realignment Left Individual Counties Too Much Discretion to 
Incarcerate 
Realignment left individual counties too much discretion to 
incarcerate persons convicted of “realigned” offenses in local jails, 
rather than utilize alternatives to incarceration. The prison 
overcrowding problem cannot be separated from the problem of 
overcrowded county jails. Given that the State’s primary response to 
the Plata order is to divert tens or hundreds of thousands of people–
who would previously have been sent to state prison–to county 
correctional systems, Realignment cannot succeed unless there is room 
noncompliant offender activity.” Examples of community-based punishment include: 
intensive community supervision; home detention with non-GPS electronic monitoring 
(such as telephone check-ins) or GPS monitoring; mandatory community service; restorative 
justice programs such as mandatory victim restitution and victim-offender reconciliation; 
work, training, or education in a furlough program, or work, in lieu of confinement, in a 
work release program; day reporting; residential or nonresidential substance abuse treatment 
programs; mother-infant care programs; and community-based residential programs offering 
structure, supervision, drug treatment, alcohol treatment, literacy programming, employment 
counseling, psychological counseling, mental health treatment, or any combination of these 
and other interventions. 
 129. CAL. PENAL CODE § 17.5(a). 
 130. See Defendant’s Motion to Vacate or Modify Population Reduction Order, supra 
note 5 at 2. See Declaration of Jeffrey Beard, Ph.D., In Support of Defendants’ Motion to 
Vacate or Modify Population Reduction Order at 7, Plata v. Brown, 922 F. Supp. 2d 1004 
(E.D. Cal. 2013) (No. 01-1351). 
 
HOPPER FINAL 8/21/2014 4:04 PM 
2014] CA CRIMINAL JUSTICE REALIGNMENT 557 
at the county-level to absorb these prisoners. County jails throughout 
the state, however, were themselves overcrowded when Realignment 
was enacted.131 Since then, overcrowding has persisted or gotten worse 
in many counties.132 In addition, many of the same counties that 
historically sent disproportionately more people to state prison for low-
level felony offenses are demanding additional funding to expand jail 
capacity in order to implement Realignment, rather than expanding the 
rehabilitative alternatives the Legislature intended to encourage.133 
County officials are clearly crucial to making Realignment 
successful. As Santa Clara Law Professor W. David Ball has noted: 
California is one state; it is also fifty-eight counties. When it comes 
to criminal justice and the state prison population, localities are 
where the action is. County criminal justice budgets are much 
larger than prison budgets, county officials make most of the key 
decisions, and county responses to crime–not crime itself–drive 
new felon admission rates.134 
 And yet there is an inherent tension between the legislative intent 
articulated in the Realignment legislation135 and the stated goal of 
Realignment: to “[p]rovide as much flexibility as possible to the level 
of government providing the service.”136 Although it makes sense for 
the state to provide counties with some amount of discretion over how 
they implement Realignment in their respective jurisdictions, the 
legislation—with its lack of mandates, accountability mechanisms, or 
funding incentives—sacrifices Realignment’s full potential in the name 
of county autonomy and flexibility.137 
 131. At least twenty counties already operate under court-ordered population caps. See 
CAL. BD. OF CORR., JAIL PROFILE SURVEY ANNUAL REPORT 2004 7 (2004), available at 
http://www.bdcorr.ca.gov/fsod/jail%20profile%20summary/2004/2004_annual_report/2004
_JPS_Annual_Report.pdf [hereinafter JPS] (“According to the JPS [Jail Population Survey], 
of the current 62 jurisdictions, 24 have court-ordered population caps. Those 24 jurisdictions 
operate 67 facilities of which 58 have population caps. The 58 facilities with population 
caps house 66.5% of the state’s ADP [or average daily state prison population].”). 
 132. Id. 
 133. See CAL. PENAL CODE §17.5(a). 
 134. W. David Ball, Tough on Crime (on the State’s Dime): How Violent Crime Does 
Not Drive California Counties’ Incarceration Rates—And Why It Should, 28 GA. ST. U. L. 
REV. 987, 1078 (2012). 
 135. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 17.5(a) (codifying realignment’s legislative intent; 
recognizing that “building and operating more prisons to address community safety 
concerns [is] not sustainable, and will not result in improved public safety” and that 
“California must reinvest its criminal justice resources to support community-based 
corrections programs and evidence-based practices”). 
 136. See GOVERNOR’S BUDGET, supra note 98, at 72. 
 137. Regarding the broad discretion Realignment grants to counties, see ABARBANEL, 
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For Realignment to succeed, the state must more effectively 
oversee county Realignment programs and incentivize counties to 
implement Realignment in a manner consistent with the legislative 
intent and objectives underlying the legislation. Because counties have 
largely been allowed to make their own decisions about whether to 
embrace Realignment’s evidence-based approach and alternatives to 
incarceration, many counties continue to rely upon incarceration as the 
primary response to low-level, non-violent crime.138 
2. The State Failed to Include Sufficient Evaluation and 
Accountability Mechanisms 
The Realignment legislation lacks sufficient standardized data 
collection and reporting requirements. The legislature tasked a state 
agency, the Board of State and Community Corrections (“BSCC”), 
with overseeing the implementation of Realignment, but left its specific 
role and duties largely undefined.139 Although the BSCC’s broad 
supra note 4 (“Not only did AB 109 transfer an unprecedented amount of responsibility to 
counties; it also gave them an unprecedented amount of discretion. The bill puts few limits 
on how counties can spend their money, and it does not require them to report any results to 
the state or to measure the outcomes of their programs. There are two explanations for this 
grant of discretion: (1) It may have been necessary to get law enforcement buy-in to the bill, 
and (2) There is some evidence that counties may be better situated to make decisions about 
how to handle offenders in their jurisdictions.”). See 
also REBECCA SULLIVAN SILBERT, SENIOR LEGAL POLICY ASSOCIATE, THE CHIEF 
JUSTICE EARL WARREN INSTITUTE ON LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY, UNIVERSITY OF 
CALIFORNIA, BERKELEY, SCHOOL OF 
LAW, THINKING CRITICALLY ABOUT REALIGNMENT IN CALIFORNIA (Feb. 2012), available 
at https://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/bccj/Thinking_Critically_3-14-2012.pdf (“ 
[R]ealignment legislation contains no requirement that counties offer community 
supervision, treatment, reentry services, or any other alternative. There is no state oversight 
of realignment funding, and the money is unrestricted beyond the fact that it must be used 
for realignment-related expenses. The hope of many is that counties will take advantage of 
this opportunity to explore noncustodial options and community programs that keep people 
from committing new crimes, thus creating better communities for all Californians. . . . 
[H]owever, nothing in the state legislation stops counties from relying solely on increased 
jail construction, which would be an opportunity wasted."). 
 138. See generally ACLU OF CAL., PUBLIC SAFETY REALIGNMENT: CALIFORNIA AT A 
CROSSROADS app. A (2012), available at 
https://www.aclunc.org/docs/criminal_justice/public_safety_realignment_california_at_a_cr
ossroads.pdf [hereinafter CROSSROADS]; ANGELA MCCRAY ET AL., REALIGNING THE 
REVOLVING DOOR? AN ANALYSIS OF CALIFORNIA’S COUNTIES’ AB 109 IMPLEMENTATION 
PLANS (DRAFT) 7–8 (Jan. 2012), available at 
http://www.law.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/child-
page/183091/doc/slspublic/Realigning_the_Revolving_Door.pdf. 
 139. MAC TAYLOR, LEG. ANALYST’S OFFICE, THE 2012–13 BUDGET: THE 2011 
REALIGNMENT OF ADULT OFFENDERS—AN UPDATE 13 (Feb. 22, 2012), available at 
http://www.lao.ca.gov/analysis/2012/crim_justice/2011-realignment-of-adult-offenders-
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mission is to collect and disseminate data and information, provide 
technical assistance to counties, and offer leadership in the area of 
criminal justice policy, there is nothing in the Realignment legislation 
specifying how the BSCC is to function, what data it is to collect, or 
how it is to compel counties’ to report these data.140 Without mandated 
data collection, policy-makers are unable to monitor which policies are 
working to reduce recidivism and reliance on incarceration, and then to 
base future policy and budget decisions accordingly.  
There have been some encouraging developments over the past 
two years toward creating a more effective data collection, monitoring, 
and dissemination role for the BSCC. In 2012, the state’s Legislative 
Analyst’s Office recommended that the Legislature direct the BSCC to 
create a working group “made up of representatives of the state, 
counties, and the broader research community,” to focus on: 
“(1) identifying the handful of key outcome measures that all counties 
should collect, (2) clearly defining these measures to ensure that all 
counties collect them uniformly, and (3) developing a process for 
counties to report the data and for BSCC to make the data available to 
the public.”141  
 In 2013, the legislature enacted AB 1050, which requires the 
BSCC to work with relevant stakeholders such as probation chiefs, the 
Administrative Office of the Courts, and state sheriffs to develop 
“definitions of specified key terms in order to facilitate consistency in 
local data collection, evaluation, and implementation of evidence-based 
programs.”142 Additionally, the Budget Act of 2013143 appropriated 
$7,900,000 for the BSCC to allocate to counties that submitted, by 
December 15, 2013, a report providing the BSCC information about 
the county’s implementation of its local realignment plan, including 
“progress in achieving outcome measures as identified in the plan or 
otherwise available.”144 In the same year, the BSCC also announced a 
022212.pdf [hereinafter THE 2011 REALIGNMENT OF ADULT OFFENDERS]. 
 140. Id. 
 141. THE 2011 REALIGNMENT OF ADULT OFFENDERS, supra note 139, at 19. 
  142. Legislative Analyst’s Digest, A.B. 1050, 2013–2014 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2013), 
available at http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/13-14/bill/asm/ab_1001-
1050/ab_1050_bill_20130909_chaptered.pdf. 
 143. A.B. 110, 2013–2014 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2013), available at 
http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/13-14/bill/asm/ab_0101-
0150/ab_110_bill_20130627_chaptered.pdf. 
 144. BD. FOR STATE AND CMTY. CORR., 2011 PUBLIC SAFETY REALIGNMENT ACT: 
REPORT ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF COMMUNITY CORRECTIONS PARTNERSHIP PLANS 1 
(June 2013), available at 
http://www.bscc.ca.gov/download.php?f=/Report_on_the_Implementation_of_Community_
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collaborative research project with the Public Policy Institute of 
California (“PPIC”). PPIC is working with ten counties and state 
agencies to develop an individual-level data tracking system and help 
build capacity at the BSCC and the counties to identify effective local 
criminal justice system practices.145 
In spite of these encouraging steps, however, the state’s continued 
failure to adequately monitor and report on county-level 
implementation is significantly undermining Realignment’s 
effectiveness. In a 2013 report, the LAO noted continued deficiencies 
in the BSCC’s data collection and reporting: 
The Legislature gave BSCC the mission of providing technical 
assistance to counties with the goal of encouraging evidence–based 
programs that improve criminal justice outcomes cost–effectively. . 
. . BSCC has not yet played an active role in facilitating the 
adoption of evidence–based programs. . . . [W]e believe more is 
required in order to fulfill the Legislature’s intent when giving 
BSCC its technical assistance mission, which was to proactively 
encourage and facilitate the adoption of evidence–based practices 
across the state. . . . [W]hile BSCC’s existing survey data provide 
some useful, basic statistics about jail populations, the data are 
otherwise incomplete. The surveys do not collect much information 
on local agencies’ outcomes, such as completion rates for treatment 
programs or offender recidivism rates. In addition, the survey 
addendum related to realignment is limited because it does not 
collect the full range of caseload information that would help to 
assess realignment’s effects. . . . We are also concerned that BSCC 
has not yet developed a longer–term plan to fulfill its data 
collection mission.146 
Corrections_Partnership_Plans.pdf. 
 145. According to testimony provided by PPIC Research Fellow Ryken Grattet, “PPIC 
researchers will work with the BSCC staff and 10 counties to gather the kind of data that 
will allow us to take a very close look at the evolving realigned population. Beyond 
anything that can be done now, this project will allow the state to see what is working and 
what isn’t and why.” The Need for Public Safety Data Collection: Hearing before the 
California Senate Budget and Fiscal Review Subcommittee No. 5 on Corrections, Public 
Safety, and The Judiciary (Mar. 20, 2013), available at 
http://www.ppic.org/main/testimony.asp?i=1339.  
 146. MAC TAYLOR, LEG. ANALYST’S OFFICE, THE 2013–14 BUDGET: GOVERNOR’S 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROPOSALS (Feb. 15, 2013), available at: 
http://www.lao.ca.gov/analysis/2012/crim_justice/2011-realignment-of-adult-offenders-
022212.pdf. See also Brian Goldstein, Big Government Must Embrace Big Data, CTR. ON 
JUVENILE AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE (Nov. 19, 2013), available at 
http://www.cjcj.org/news/6956 (noting problems with the BSCC’s data collection and 
reporting concerning juvenile justice block grant funds). 
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As Republican state Assemblywoman Melissa Melendez stated at 
an April 2014 PPIC-sponsored panel discussion that also included 
Senate President Pro Tem Darrell Steinberg and Matthew Cate, head of 
the California State Association of Counties and former Secretary of 
the CDCR, “We have a lot of programs out there. Nobody seems to be 
able to tell me do they work. There has been no analysis.”147 
3.  The State’s Realignment Funding Formula Failed to 
Sufficiently Incentivize Counties to Rely Less on Incarceration  
The BSCC noted in a June 2013 report that, “[t]he passage of 
Proposition 30 in 2012 established a dedicated revenue stream to fund 
public safety services realigned to local government. In fiscal year 
2011–12 and fiscal year 2012–13 respectively, counties received 
$354,300,000 and $842,900,000 statewide for community corrections 
programs to support the implementation of public safety realignment. 
In fiscal years 2011–12 and 2012–13, $7,850,000 was allocated to 
counties to support each local Community Corrections Partnership’s 
(CCP) efforts in developing a local plan for the implementation of 
realignment.”148 
However, the state has not implemented a system for allocating 
these Realignment funds that incentivizes counties to reinvest resources 
into alternatives to incarceration and to reduce rates of recidivism.149 
Instead, it has distributed Realignment implementation funds in a way 
that rewards those counties that have historically relied most heavily on 
incarceration.150 Rather than allocate funding based on the county’s 
 147. Brad Branan, California Lawmakers Want More Data on Prison Realignment, 
SACRAMENTO BEE CAPITOL ALERT (Apr. 21, 2014), available at 
http://blogs.sacbee.com/capitolalertlatest/2014/04/california-lawmakers-want-more-data-on-
prison-realignment.html#storylink=cpy.  
 148. BD. FOR STATE AND CMTY. CORR., 2011 PUBLIC SAFETY REALIGNMENT ACT: 
REPORT ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF COMMUNITY CORRECTIONS PARTNERSHIP PLANS, 
supra note 144, at 1.  
 149. See LEG. ANALYST’S OFFICE, PUBLIC SAFETY REALIGNMENT FUNDING 
ALLOCATION (May 12, 2014) at 4-5, available at 
http://budgettrack.blob.core.windows.net/btdocs2014/481.pdf [hereinafter PUBLIC SAFETY 
REALIGNMENT FUNDING ALLOCATION] (“[T]he current allocation method does not 
necessarily provide an incentive for counties to achieve outcomes that are consistent with 
legislative priorities.” The funding formula “impacts the success or failure of the 
realignment of felony offenders, as well as the state’s ability to achieve certain policy goals 
(such as reducing recidivism among realigned offenders and complying with the federal 
court ordered prison population cap).”). 
 150. See DEAN MISCZYNSKI, RETHINKING THE STATE-LOCAL RELATIONSHIP: 
CORRECTIONS 27–28 (Aug. 2011), available at 
http://www.ppic.org/content/pubs/report/R_811DMR.pdf. See also CAL. DEP’T OF 
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overall crime rates and public safety needs, or upon counties’ 
demonstrated willingness and ability to employ cost-effective 
alternatives to incarceration, the state’s funding allocation formula has 
been based predominately on the rate at which each individual county 
historically sent people to state prison for low-level, non-violent 
felonies.151 Thus, the higher the past incarceration rate, the higher that 
county’s piece of the funding pie. 
In the first fiscal year of Realignment, sixty percent of each 
county’s funding allocation was based on the county’s historical 
average daily state prison population (“ADP”) of persons convicted of 
low-level, non-violent offenses from the particular county; thirty 
percent was based on the population of each county; and only ten 
percent was based on each county’s demonstrated success at improving 
the outcomes of individuals on probation.152 In the second and third 
years of Realignment, fiscal year 2012–13 and 2013–14, counties were 
given the best result among three options in which funding was based 
on: 1) the county’s adult population ages 18 to 64; 2) the status quo 
formula of fiscal year 2011–12; or 3) weighted ADP.153 Over a quarter 
of counties benefited from the new weighted ADP option, in some 
cases almost doubling what they would have received had their 
allocation been based on county population.154 
The funding formula for year one, and that for years two and 
three, provided proportionally more dollars to those counties—such as 
FINANCE, 2011–2012 STATE BUDGET 2 (June 30, 2011), available at http://2011-
12.archives.ebudget.ca.gov/pdf/Enacted/BudgetSummary/FullBudgetSummary.pdf. 
 151. CAL. STATE ASS’N OF COUNTIES, AB 109 ALLOCATIONS: RECOMMENDED 
APPROACH FOR 2012–13 AND 2013–14 10 (May 14, 2012), available at 
http://www.csac.counties.org/sites/main/files/file-attachments/12.05.15_ab_109_allocation-
051412_briefing_on_yrs_2_and_3_formula.pdf [hereinafter AB 109 ALLOCATIONS]; 
PUBLIC SAFETY REALIGNMENT FUNDING ALLOCATION supra note 149 at 2-3.  
 152. See THE 2011 REALIGNMENT OF ADULT OFFENDERS, supra note 139, fig.5. The 
last component of the formula refers to Senate Bill 678, also known as the California 
Community Corrections Performance Incentives Act, which in 2009 created a fiscal 
incentive for counties to improve probation outcomes. See S.B. 678, 2009–2010 Leg., Reg. 
Sess. (Cal. 2009); CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1228, 1233.4; CHIEF PROBATION OFFICERS OF 
CAL., SB 678 IMPLEMENTATION GUIDE 1 (Oct. 2009), available at 
http://www.cpoc.org/assets/QuickLinks/sb678guide.pdf [hereinafter SB 678 
IMPLEMENTATION GUIDE] ; PUBLIC SAFETY REALIGNMENT FUNDING ALLOCATION supra 
note 149 at 2. 
 153. See AB 109 ALLOCATIONS, supra note 151, at 10; PUBLIC SAFETY REALIGNMENT 
FUNDING ALLOCATION supra note 149 at 3. 
 154. Recommended AB 109 Allocation Years 2 and 3, CAL. STATE ASS’N OF COUNTIES, 
http://www.csac.counties.org/sites/main/files/file-
attachments/12.05.16_attachments_1_and_2_for_5-14-12_caoac_briefing.pdf [hereinafter 
Recommended AB 109 Allocation].  
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Fresno, Kern, Kings, San Bernardino, Shasta, and Tulare—that have 
historically sent higher rates of people convicted of low-level, non-
violent offenses to state prison.155 Counties that had historically relied 
more on local alternatives to incarceration—such as Alameda, Contra 
Costa, Sacramento, San Diego, and San Francisco—received 
proportionately less funding.156 In effect, this funding formula 
rewarded those county criminal justice policy choices that contributed 
most to the state prison overcrowding crisis in the first place. In fiscal 
year 2011–12, for example, San Francisco, with a population of about 
805,000, received about $5.2 million while Tulare, with a population of 
about half of San Francisco’s (442,000), received more Realignment 
funding than San Francisco, about $5.9 million.157 Similarly, Fresno, 
with about 930,000 people, received over $9 million compared to 
Contra Costa, with over a million people, which received about half as 
much Realignment money, approximately $4.7 million.158 
While the funding formula for years two and three somewhat 
limited the extent to which counties could capitalize on prior years’ 
ADP, significant disparities still exist.159 These allocation differences 
serve to underfund the counties that have contributed less to prison 
overcrowding by implementing more evidence-based practices. For 
example, in fiscal year 2012–13, San Diego, with a population of 
3,140,069, received $59.1 million, while San Bernardino, with two-
thirds the population of San Diego, received $54.9 million.160 
 155. See id.; BD. FOR STATE AND CMTY. CORR., 2011 PUBLIC SAFETY REALIGNMENT 
ACT: REPORT ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF COMMUNITY CORRECTIONS PARTNERSHIP 
PLANS, supra note 144, at app.  
 156. Id.; Ball, supra note 134.  
 157. See State and County QuickFacts, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Mar. 14, 2013), 
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/06000.html; CAL. DEP’T OF CORR. & REHAB., 2011–
12 AB 109 ALLOCATIONS, available at http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/realignment/docs/BASE-
REALIGNMENT-FUNDING.pdf; MCCRAY ET AL., supra note 138, app. 1. 
 158. Id. 
 159. AB 109 ALLOCATIONS, supra note 151; Recommended AB 109 Allocation, supra 
note 154. See also BD. FOR STATE AND CMTY. CORR., 2011 PUBLIC SAFETY REALIGNMENT 
ACT: REPORT ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF COMMUNITY CORRECTIONS PARTNERSHIP 
PLANS, supra note 144, at app. 
  160. AB 109 ALLOCATIONS, supra note 151; Recommended AB 109 Allocation, supra 
note 154; Annual Estimates of the Resident Population for Counties and County-
Equivalents: April 1, 2010 to July 1, 2011, 2011 Population Estimates, United States Census 
Bureau, Population Division (Apr. 2012), available at 
https://www.census.gov/popest/data/counties/totals/2011/files/CO-EST2011-Alldata.csv. 
See BD. FOR STATE AND CMTY. CORR., 2011 PUBLIC SAFETY REALIGNMENT ACT: REPORT 
ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF COMMUNITY CORRECTIONS PARTNERSHIP PLANS, supra note 
144, at app. 
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Similarly, among smaller counties, Imperial received $3.1 million 
while Kings, with a nearly identical countywide population and violent 
crime rate, received twice as much—$5.9 million.161 
This is problematic because a county’s historical ADP is a 
reflection of the county’s past reliance upon incarceration in state 
prison, instead of utilizing alternatives to incarceration like those 
encouraged by Realignment. Professor Ball has conducted an extensive 
analysis of the rates at which California counties have historically sent 
people to state prison for felony convictions, and developed a ranking 
of counties comparing county violent crime rates to the rates at which 
they sent people to prison over a ten year period.162 The counties Ball 
denotes as “high use” counties have a greater disparity than other 
counties between their violent crime rate and imprisonment rate; that 
is, “high use” counties sent people to prison at higher rates than other 
counties with comparable violent crime rates.163 In other words, it is 
not a simple matter of counties with more violent crime sending more 
people to prison, nor is it that counties achieve lower violent crime 
rates by sending more people to prison. For example, Ball notes that 
Alameda and San Bernardino Counties have similar population levels 
and similar violent crime levels.164 Yet, over the past ten years, San 
Bernardino sent more than twice the number of people to state prison 
as Alameda County.165 As Professor Ball points out, “California’s 
prison overcrowding is due in large part to county decisions about how 
to deal with crime . . . California’s counties use state prison resources 
at dramatically different rates . . . .”166 It therefore does not make sense 
to continue rewarding counties for maintaining unnecessarily bloated 
custodial populations, rather than incentivizing smart-on-crime policies 
that focus on alternatives to incarceration and recidivism reduction. 
It might be argued that the counties who have used state prison at 
higher rates for the Realignment class of offenses need more state 
funding assistance to implement Realignment, both because these 
counties have more people to supervise on PRCS and because these 
 161. See Recommended AB 109 Allocation, supra note 154; CAL. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
CRIMES AND CRIME RATES, 2001–2010 (KINGS) (2010), available at 
http://oag.ca.gov/crime/cjsc-stats/2010/table1; CAL. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CRIMES AND CRIME 
RATES, 2001–2010 (IMPERIAL) (2010), available at http://oag.ca.gov/crime/cjsc-
stats/2010/table1. 
 162. Ball, supra note 134, at 1014. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. at 994–95. 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. at 987. 
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counties have less pre-existing non-carceral infrastructure and 
programming in place. There are at least two problems with this 
argument. First, the PRCS load on the counties resulting from their pre-
Realignment state prison ADP will be a temporary burden, since the 
maximum terms of post-release supervision for these offenses is three 
years.167 Second, this argument would be more persuasive if Ball’s 
“high use” counties had used significant portions of the state 
Realignment funding they have received thus far to start building their 
capacity to provide alternatives to incarceration. But this has not been 
the case. Instead, these counties have spent far higher proportions on 
expanding jail capacity, and correspondingly lower proportions for 
non-carceral alternatives, than their sister counties.168 A review of the 
counties’ first year Realignment budgets showed that of the twenty-five 
counties receiving the most state Realignment dollars, ten were among 
Ball’s “high use” counties.169 Those ten counties spent an average of at 
least thirty percent of their Realignment funds to expand jail 
capacity.170 
Rather than relying upon prior years’ ADP to drive so much of the 
state Realignment funding allocation decisions, the state could create a 
funding scheme that better incentivizes counties to reduce their 
 167. CAL. PENAL CODE § 3451. 
 168. See generally CROSSROADS, supra note 138, app. A; MCCRAY ET AL., supra note 
138. 
 169. Those 10 counties are Fresno, Kern, Orange, Placer, Riverside, San Bernardino, 
Santa Barbara, Santa Clara, Kings and Shasta. Kings County plans to spend an astonishing 
70 percent of its entire AB 109 allocation on expanding jail capacity, and is also seeking 
additional state funds under AB 900 for additional jail construction. CROSSROADS, supra 
note 138, app. A. See also ABARBANEL, supra note 4. 
 170. This thirty percent figure almost certainly underestimates the amounts being spent 
to expand jail capacity, because it is based upon specific amounts explicitly identified in the 
county Realignment plans; many of the plans, however, do not provide specific budgeted 
amounts for jail capacity expansion despite clear indications in the plans that such expansion 
is indeed in the works. The thirty percent figure does not include any amount from Orange 
County’s plan, for instance, but that plan allocates to the Sheriff $13.6 million of its overall 
$23 million (or about fifty-nine percent) without specifying how much of this will go to 
expand jail capacity. The plan does note, however, that two facilities are currently partially 
closed due to a low jail census and ongoing repair work, and it is anticipated that all jail 
facilities will need to be fully operational within six to twelve months, which will require 
additional jail staffing and resources. Orange County’s plan also contemplates applying for 
AB 900 funding to support the construction of approximately 750 new jail beds. See CMTY 
CORR. P’SHIP EXEC. COMM., ORANGE COUNTY PUBLIC SAFETY REALIGNMENT AND 
POSTRELEASE COMMUNITY SUPERVISION 2011 IMPLEMENTATION PLAN (Oct. 2011), 
available at http://calrealignment.org/component/docman/doc_download/79-orange-county-
plan.html?Itemid. 
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recidivism rates.171 For instance, the California Community 
Corrections Performance Incentives Act of 2009 created a fiscal 
incentive for counties to improve probation outcomes.172 The statute 
created a funding stream under which counties received funding for 
probation based on their success in reducing the percentage of 
probationers sent to state prison compared to a baseline percentage that 
each sent to prison between 2006 and 2008.173 Although the statute 
gave broad discretion to each county as to how to best implement 
evidence-based practices to decrease the number of probationers sent to 
state prison, counties were incentivized to improve their probation 
outcome in order to get increased funding.174 
The state could similarly revise the Realignment allocation 
formula to incentivize counties to reduce recidivism and increase use of 
cost-effective alternatives to incarceration. Once county-level outcome 
data is collected and reported throughout the state on a regular and 
uniform basis, the funding formula could be based upon these data, 
thereby creating incentives for counties to adopt the policies and 
programs that are demonstrated to work best. 
Unfettered discretion, lack of formal mechanisms for 
accountability, and lack of incentives have resulted in uneven 
Realignment implementation across the state. Some counties have 
begun taking the evidence-based path that will reduce recidivism and 
improve public safety.175 However, many others continue to rely 
almost exclusively on incarceration, increasing their jail capacities 
rather than reducing population through strategies like pretrial release 
and alternative sanctions contemplated under Realignment, such as 
split sentencing with a mandatory supervision tail, electronic 
monitoring of sentenced defendants and other community supervision 
options for both pretrial and sentenced individuals.176 Because many 
counties are not pursuing evidence-based alternatives to custody, the 
 171.  See PUBLIC SAFETY REALIGNMENT FUNDING ALLOCATION supra note 149 at 5. 
 172. See S.B. 678, 2009–2010 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2009); CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1228, 
1233.4; SB 678 IMPLEMENTATION GUIDE, supra note 152, at 1; THE 2011 REALIGNMENT OF 
ADULT OFFENDERS, supra note 139, at 15. 
 173. Id.  
 174. Id. 
 175. See County Realignment Dashboard, CHIEF PROBATION OFFICERS OF CAL., 
http://www.cpoc.org/assets/Realignment/dashboard_county.swf (last updated Apr. 8, 2014). 
 176. Id. For example, the statewide split sentencing rate was only 27.7 percent in from 
October 2012 through September 2013. See California Realignment Dashboard, supra note 
14. Very few counties have allocated Realignment funds to start pretrial release programs 
and very few have begun to make good use of electronic monitoring for both pretrial and 
sentenced individuals. See CROSSROADS, supra note 138, app. A. 
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total number of people incarcerated in the state is much higher than it 
could be.177 
While California’s prison population has fallen by nearly 25,000 
since the enactment of Realignment, the state has awarded counties 
$1.7 billion178 to expand jail capacity and counties have added 
thousands of new beds to their jails.179 In addition, there are current 
efforts underway to spend $500 million more to further expand 
counties jails.180 This explosion of jail expansion flies in the face of the 
express legislative intent of Realignment: to implement proven 
recidivism-reducing policies, focusing on alternatives to 
incarceration.181 There are a number of potential ramifications of the 
shift of the overcrowding problem from the state to the counties. 
Counties with incarceration-focused Realignment plans, many of which 
are already under court-ordered population caps, are in danger of 
facing mini-Plata lawsuits.182 Another pressing concern is that jails 
 177. See County Realignment Dashboard, supra note 175; CROSSROADS, supra note 
138; MCCRAY ET AL., supra note 138. 
 178. In AB 900 authorized the state to grant $1.2 billion to counties to expand jail 
capacity. A.B. 900, 2007–2008 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2007). In 2012, the Legislature 
allocated another $500 million to counties to further expand their jail capacity. S.B. 1022, 
2011–2012 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2012). 
 179. See CROSSROADS, supra note 138, at 12; CAL. BD. OF CORR., AB 900 PHASE II 
COUNTY JAIL CONSTRUCTION OR EXPANSION APPLICATION SUMMARIES JANUARY 11, 
2012 (updated Sept. 2012), available at 
http://www.bscc.ca.gov/download.php?f=/AB_900_Project_Status_Update_for_BSCC_web
_082213.pdf; CAL. CORR. STANDARDS AUTHORITY, AB 900 PHASE I JAIL CONSTRUCTION 
FUNDING AWARDS, UPDATED DECEMBER 9, 2013 (Dec. 9, 2013), available at 
http://www.bscc.ca.gov/download.php?f=/AB_900_Phase_I_Awards_2013-12-09.pdf; CAL. 
BD. OF CORR., AB 900 PHASE II – JAIL CONSTRUCTION FUNDING AWARDS UPDATED 
JANUARY 16, 2014 (Jan. 16, 2014), available at 
http://www.bscc.ca.gov/download.php?f=/AB_900_Phase_II_Awards_2014-01-16.pdf; 
CAL. BD. OF CORR., SB 1022 ADULT CRIMINAL JUSTICE FACILITIES, PROPOSALS RECEIVED 
BY OCTOBER 24, 2013 (Nov. 13, 2013), available at 
http://www.bscc.ca.gov/download.php?f=/SB-1022_Proposal_Summary.pdf; CAL. BD. OF 
CORR., SB 1022 ADULT CRIMINAL JUSTICE FACILITIES, SB 1022 ADULT LOCAL CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE FACILITIES CONSTRUCTION FUNDING AWARDS (Mar. 13, 2014), available at 
http://www.bscc.ca.gov/download.php?f=/SB_1022_Conditional_Award_List_(2).pdf. 
 180. In the Governor’s current 2014–15 Budget Summary, he proposes “that another 
$500 million be authorized for SB 1022-type facilities.” EDMUND G. BROWN JR., 2014–15 
GOVERNOR’S BUDGET SUMMARY, To the California Legislature, Regular Session 2013–14 
(Jan. 10, 2014) at 84, available at http://www.ebudget.ca.gov/2014-
15/pdf/BudgetSummary/FullBudgetSummary.pdf. 
 181. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 17.5(a). 
 182. In December 2011, the Prison Law Office filed a class action lawsuit against the 
Fresno Sheriff on behalf of jail inmates denied mental health care and medical treatment for 
life-threatening illnesses. As in Plata, the plaintiffs alleged cruel and unusual conditions in 
violation of their rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Complaint, Hall v. 
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were never designed for long-term incarceration. As a result, many 
inmates receive inadequate access to exercise, rehabilitation 
programming, medical and mental health care, and family visits. In 
addition, county jails may not be sufficiently equipped to meet the 
ADA needs that come with increased populations. As such, they may 
face a plethora of lawsuits.183 As one commentator has warned: 
The ever-present risk of realignment is that it could turn the Plata/
Coleman court order into a shell game instead of a solution to 
California’s incarceration conditions problem. Medical and mental 
health care in California’s prisons was indisputably horrendous, but 
population reduction is finally allowing the other substantive parts 
of the remedies to work. This achievement would be far less 
significant if the order turned out to dump on the counties not just 
population, but the unconstitutional conditions that, in California’s 
prisons, accompanied population. Call this the potential hydra 
problem: chopping the head off of unconstitutional prison 
conditions could cause many of the 58 counties to in turn develop 
unconstitutional conditions of jail confinement.184 
4. The Realignment Legislation Does Not Address the Pretrial 
Detention Problem 
It is clear that Realignment’s success is inextricably tied to the 
capacity of county criminal justice systems to meet their new 
obligations. Critics of Realignment have argued that many county jails 
Mims, No. 1:11-cv-02047-LJO-BAM, 2012 WL 1498893 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 13, 2011). 
Similarly, in the 1970s and 80s, when the Fifth Circuit found Texas prisoners’ Eighth 
Amendment rights were violated and ordered remedial measures be taken to reduce the 
prison population, these actions led to increased crowding in Texas county jails. See, e.g., 
Alberti v. Sheriff of Harris Cnty., Tex., 937 F.2d 984, 987-88 (5th Cir. 1991) (describing 
how a proposed remedy to the Texas prison overcrowding crisis required convicted felons 
sentenced to the state’s prison system to stay longer in county jail while they awaited 
transfer to prison, thereby leading to dangerously overcrowded county jails); see also Ruiz v. 
Estelle, 679 F.2d 1115 (1982) (requiring the state to take remedial measures to reduce prison 
overcrowding). 
 183. See, e.g., Armstrong v. Wilson, 942 F. Supp. 1252 (N.D. Cal. 1996), aff’d 124 F.3d 
1019 (9th Cir. 1997) (finding that the CDCR was violating the Americans with Disabilities 
Act and the Rehabilitation Act and issuing an injunction requiring the CDCR to improve 
access to prison programs for prisoners with physical disabilities at all of California’s 
prisons and parole facilities). See, e.g., Complaint at 1, Legal Servs. for Prisoners with 
Children v. Ahern, No. RG12656266, (Cal. Super. Ct., Nov. 15, 2012) (alleging systemic 
and long-term discrimination against persons with disabilities housed at Santa Rita Jail has 
resulted in unequal treatment of and severe harm to those inmates). 
 184. Margo Schlanger, Plata v. Brown And Realignment: Jails, Prisons, Courts, And 
Politics 48 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV., (forthcoming Jan. 2013) (manuscript at 44–49); see 
also Alberti, 937 F.2d 984; Ruiz, 679 F.2d 1115. 
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are themselves overcrowded, and therefore unable to absorb newly 
sentenced defendants who would previously have been sent to state 
prison.185 County jails, however, are not full of individuals who have 
been convicted of crimes, or even individuals deemed to present a high 
public safety risk to the community. Most people in county jails have 
not been convicted of the charges against them. Instead, more than 
sixty-three percent of the 82,000 Californians held in county jails on 
any given day are awaiting their day in court.186 A substantial amount 
of them remain incarcerated pending trial or other case disposition not 
because they pose a significant risk to public safety, but because they 
simply cannot afford bail.187 
High rates of pretrial detention are a threat to public safety and 
civil liberties. People with financial resources are able to get out of jail 
and return to their jobs, families, and communities. People who are 
unable to pay for bail or raise the necessary collateral, however, must 
stay in jail awaiting a trial date that could be months away. Or, they 
may more readily decide to accept a plea bargain as a means of getting 
out of jail. New research also indicates defendants detained for the 
entire pretrial period are much more likely to be sentenced to jail and 
 185. See Kurtis Alexander, Fresno County Demands More State Funds for Housing 
Prisoners, FRESNO BEE (Dec. 2, 2012), 
http://www.fresnobee.com/2012/12/02/3086872/valley-counties-seek-more-prison.html; 
Letter from thirteen Central Valley legislators to the Honorable Jerry Brown (Dec. 5, 2012), 
available at http://news.fresnobeehive.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/Realignment-
Coalition-Letter-Central-Valley.pdf; Kurtis Alexander, Valley Lawmakers Ask Governor for 
More Prison Money, FRESNO BEE (Dec. 8, 2012), 
http://news.fresnobeehive.com/archives/731. 
 186. See CAL. BD. OF CORR., JAIL PROFILE SURVEY, SECOND QUARTER CALENDAR 
YEAR 2013 7 (2013), available at  
http://www.bscc.ca.gov/download.php?f=/2013_2nd_Qtr_JPS_full_report.pdf. 
 187. Trial judges are required to evaluate defendants’ suitability for bail and to order 
held without bail those deemed to present too great a risk to public safety. This makes sense: 
if someone is deemed a public safety risk, the mere fact that they may be able to come up 
with money for bail does not mitigate that risk. By setting bail for a defendant, a judge is 
indicating that releasing that defendant pending trial does not present an unreasonable public 
safety risk. A substantial and increasing number of defendants held in jail pending trial have 
had bail set but cannot afford to post it. They therefore remain in jail not because they pose a 
threat to public safety but rather because they cannot afford bail. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1275; 
see PRETRIAL JUSTICE INST., RATIONAL AND TRANSPARENT BAIL DECISION MAKING: 
MOVING FROM A CASH-BASED TO A RISK-BASED PROCESS 1, 3 (2012), available at 
http://www.pretrial.org/Featured%20Resources%20Documents/Rational%20and%20Transp
arent%20Bail%20Decision%20Making.pdf; see also JOHN CLARK, THE IMPACT OF MONEY 
BAIL ON JAIL BED USAGE, AMERICAN JAILS 47–48 (July/Aug., 2010), available at 
http://www.pretrial.org/wp-content/uploads/filebase/pji-
reports/AJA%20Money%20Bail%20Impact%202010.pdf. 
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prison and are also likely to receive longer sentences.188 These results 
have nothing to do with public safety. They have everything to do with 
wealth and poverty. People with money are able to buy their freedom 
while poor people cannot.  
One contributor to California’s high rate of pretrial detention is 
the State’s reliance on money-bail.189 This reliance on money-bail is in 
contrast to other jurisdictions which have more expansive presumptions 
in favor of own recognizance (“O.R.”) release and in which non-
financial release, rather than money-bail, is the default.190 Another 
 188. See CHRISTOPHER T. LOWENKAMP, MARIE VANNOSTRAND AND ALEXANDER 
HOLSINGER, INVESTIGATING THE IMPACT OF PRETRIAL DETENTION ON SENTENCING 
OUTCOMES (Nov. 2013), available at 
http://www.arnoldfoundation.org/sites/default/files/pdf/LJAF_Report_state-
sentencing_FNL.pdf. 
 189. See PRETRIAL JUSTICE INSTITUTE, RATIONAL AND TRANSPARENT BAIL DECISION 
MAKING: MOVING FROM A CASH-BASED TO A RISK-BASED PROCESS 1,3 (Mar. 2012), 
available at 
http://www.pretrial.org/download/featured/Rational%20and%20Transparent%20Bail%20De
cision%20Making.pdf (“The data indicates that money bail is for many defendants the cause 
for pretrial detention. In 1990, money bonds were being set in 53 percent of felony cases. By 
2006, that figure had jumped to 70 percent. As the use of money bonds has gone up, pretrial 
release rates have gone down. In 1990, 65 percent of felony defendants were released while 
awaiting trial, compared to 58 percent in 2006.” (citations omitted); also noting citing 
figures showing that seven out of ten felony defendants nationwide are required to post a 
money bond to be released pending trial). California’s pretrial population is at 63% of total 
jail population, or 82,000 persons and from 2002 to 2012, county bail levels for the most 
frequently committed felony offenses increased by an inflation-adjusted 22 percent. See 
SONYA M. TAFOYA, PUB. POL’Y INST. OF CAL., ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF BAIL ON 
CALIFORNIA’S JAIL POPULATION at 15 (June 2013), available at 
http://www.ppic.org/content/pubs/report/R_613STR.pdf. The latest Bureau of Justice 
Statistics report shows that 69 percent of the pretrial detainees in Los Angeles County are 
held in lieu of bail, 68 percent are held in lieu of bail in Orange, 48 percent are held in lieu 
of bail in San Bernardino, and 59 percent are held in lieu of bail in Ventura. See THOMAS H. 
COHEN & TRACY KYCKELHAHN, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, FELONY DEFENDANTS 
IN LARGE URBAN COUNTIES, 2006 25, 37 (2010), available at 
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/fdluc06.pdf. A study of felony defendants in 
America’s 75 largest urban counties showed that in 1990, release on recognizance accounted 
for 42 percent of releases, compared to 25 percent released on surety bond. By 2006, the 
proportions had been reversed: surety bonds were used for 43% of releases, compared to 25 
percent for release on recognizance. So it is clear that the majority of pretrial release 
involves money-bail. See Conference of State Court Administrators, 2012-2013 Policy 
Paper Evidence-Based Pretrial Release, available at 
http://www.colorado.gov/ccjjdir/Resources/Resources/Ref/EBPre-TrialRelease_2012.pdf 
(citing THOMAS H. COHEN AND KYCKELHAHN, T., WASHINGTON D.C.: US DEPARTMENT 
OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUSTICE PLANNING, BUREAU OF JUSTICE, STATISTICS FELONY 
DEFENDANTS IN LARGE URBAN COUNTIES, 2006, at 2).  
 190. See CONFERENCE OF STATE COURT ADMINISTRATORS, 2012–2013 POLICY PAPER 
EVIDENCE-BASED PRETRIAL RELEASE, available at 
http://www.colorado.gov/ccjjdir/Resources/Resources/Ref/EBPre-TrialRelease_2012.pdf 
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contributor is California’s system of fixed bail schedules, under which 
the superior court in each county is required to create and adopt a 
county-wide bail schedule for all bailable felony offenses and all 
misdemeanor and infractions.191 Bail schedules by their very nature are 
based primarily on the seriousness of the offense charged and do not 
reflect any individual assessment concerning probability of appearance 
or risk to public safety. Although California law mandates an 
individualized determination in setting, reducing or denying bail,192 
California’s reliance on these money-based bail schedules has warped 
into a presumptive bail system.  
All the while, there is no evidence that defendants’ ability to 
afford bail correlates to their risk of committing a new crime while out 
on bail, or even their likelihood of appearing in court. Instead there are 
demonstrated other means by which a court can fulfill its job of 
ensuring a defendant’s appearance at a next court appearance and 
protecting public safety. For example, pretrial risk assessment research 
over the past thirty years indicates that there are common factors, such 
as prior failure to appears, prior convictions and whether the defendant 
has a pending case at the time of arrest, that can help predict court 
(Explaining that “[t]welve states, the District of Columbia, and the federal government have 
enacted a statutory presumption that defendants charged with bailable offenses should be 
released on personal recognizance or unsecured bond unless a judicial officer makes an 
individual determination that the defendant poses a risk that requires more restrictive 
conditions or detention” and citing the federal statute and D.C. code and statutes from 
Washington D.C., Delaware, Iowa, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Maine, Nebraska, North 
Carolina, Oregon, South Carolina, Tennessee and Wisconsin; Also noting that “[s]ix other 
states have adopted this presumption by court rule,” citing rules from Arizona, Minnesota, 
New Mexico, North Dakota, D.C. and Wyoming). California’s statute contains a 
presumption of OR release only for misdemeanants. Although the statute permits a court to 
release others on their own recognizance there is no encouragement to do so, nor guidelines 
suggesting least restrictive methods of release. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1270(a) (“Any 
person who has been arrested for, or charged with, an offense other than a capital offense 
may be released on his or her own recognizance by a court or magistrate who could release a 
defendant from custody upon the defendant giving bail, including a defendant arrested upon 
an out-of-county warrant. A defendant who is in custody and is arraigned on a complaint 
alleging an offense which is a misdemeanor, and a defendant who appears before a court or 
magistrate upon an out-of-county warrant arising out of a case involving only 
misdemeanors, shall be entitled to an own recognizance release unless the court makes a 
finding on the record, in accordance with Section 1275, that an own recognizance release 
will compromise public safety or will not reasonably assure the appearance of the defendant 
as required. Public safety shall be the primary consideration. If the court makes one of those 
findings, the court shall then set bail and specify the conditions, if any, whereunder the 
defendant shall be released.”). 
 191. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1269b(c).  
 192. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1275. 
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appearance and/or likelihood of re-arrest while awaiting trial.193 These 
factors can be assessed through the application of an evidence-based 
risk assessment tool, which many jurisdictions currently use as part of 
the process of assessing defendants and making release 
recommendations to the court.194 This assessment can assist the court 
in making a determination as to whether a defendant should be released 
on O.R. with no supervision, released on O.R. with some supervision 
and conditions, or in limited circumstances remain incarcerated—all 
without reliance on the charge-based bail schedule. Many jurisdictions 
using risk assessment tools and pretrial programs to assess and release 
defendants on non-financial terms have shown great success as 
measured by high court appearance rates and low rates of re-arrest.195 
The bottom line is that a focus on money-bail rather than any 
meaningful assessment of the defendant or evaluation of potential risk 
means that many people who present little-to-no public safety or 
“failure to appear” danger remain unnecessarily behind bars pending 
trial. U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder recently agreed, noting in 
2011 that “[a]lmost all of these [non-sentenced, pretrial] individuals 
could be released and supervised in their communities—and allowed to 
pursue or maintain employment, and participate in educational 
opportunities and their normal family lives—without risk of 
 193. See MARIE VANNOSTRAND AND CHRISTOPHER T. LOWENKAMP, ASSESSING 
PRETRIAL RISK WITHOUT A DEFENDANT INTERVIEW (Nov. 2013), available at 
http://www.arnoldfoundation.org/sites/default/files/pdf/LJAF_Report_no-
interview_FNL.pdf. The list factors include things such as: whether the defendant had a 
pending case at the time of arrest; whether the defendant had an active warrant for failure to 
appear at the time of arrest or a history of failure to appear; and whether the defendant had 
prior misdemeanor, felony or violent crime convictions. Some jurisdictions around the 
country also look at factors such as residence stability; employment stability; community 
ties; and history of substance abuse. However, the recent VanNostrand and Lowenkamp 
research indicates that the dynamic factors in an assessment, such as employment and 
residence, may be less predictive or not predictive at all. Id. 
 194. See, e.g., CAFWD: PARTNERSHIP FOR COMMUNITY EXCELLENCE, PRETRIAL 
DETENTION & COMMUNITY SUPERVISION: BEST PRACTICES AND RESOURCES FOR 
CALIFORNIA COUNTIES 14–18 (Sept. 2012), available at 
http://caforward.3cdn.net/7a60c47c7329a4abd7_2am6iyh9s.pdf; Report on Status of 
Pretrial Program Santa Cruz County, dated September 12, 2013, presented to the Board of 
Supervisors (Sept. 24, 2013), available at http://sccounty01.co.santa-
cruz.ca.us/bds/Govstream/BDSvData/non_legacy/agendas/2013/20130924/PDF/025.pdf; 
CRIME AND JUSTICE INSTITUTE AT COMMUNITY RESOURCES FOR JUSTICE, YOLO COUNTY 
ASSESSMENT REPORT OF REALIGNMENT PLAN STRATEGIES (May 2013), available at 
http://www.yolocounty.org/home/showdocument?id=22762. 
 195. See, e.g., CAFWD: PARTNERSHIP FOR COMMUNITY EXCELLENCE, supra note 194; 
Report on Status of Pretrial Program Santa Cruz County, supra note 194; CRIME AND 
JUSTICE INSTITUTE AT COMMUNITY RESOURCES FOR JUSTICE, supra note 194. 
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endangering their fellow citizens or fleeing from justice.”196 In order 
for California to meaningfully address its jail overcrowding problem, 
especially in light of the additional burdens Realignment places on 
local criminal justice systems, counties must transition away from the 
unfair and ineffective money-based bail system. 
Examples of sensible state law reforms include amending pretrial 
detention laws to expand the presumption of O.R. release that currently 
exists for misdemeanors to those charged with non-violent, non-serious 
felonies and mandating greater use of non-financial release across-the-
board. County-based reforms should include creating comprehensive 
pretrial release programs that use evidence-based criminal justice 
practices and validated risk assessment tools to assist the court in 
making fair and informed pretrial release decisions, and provide 
supervision and services to releasees where appropriate.197 Reforms 
should also ensure that defendants are represented by counsel at initial 
appearance when release determinations are made, provide adequate 
staffing and training and mandate data collection and analysis to 
evaluate the effectiveness of the programs.  
IV. AFTER REALIGNMENT: SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENTS IN 
THE THREE YEARS SINCE REALIGNMENT WAS ENACTED  
The State itself was eventually forced to acknowledge that 
Realignment alone could never reduce the prison population to the 
levels mandated by the Plata court.198 In early 2013, with the two-year 
 196. Attorney General Eric Holder, Remarks at the National Symposium on Pretrial 
Justice (June 1, 2011), available at 
http://www2.americanbar.org/sections/criminaljustice/CR203800/Pages/pretrialjustice_hold
er.aspx. 
 197. Examples of successful pretrial programs include the Allegheny County bail 
agency and the D.C. Bail Project. See PRETRIAL JUSTICE INST., PRETRIAL JUSTICE 
INSTITUTE GUIDES INNOVATIVE REFORMS, HELPING JUSTICE TRUMP TRADITION: NEW 
AGENCY IN ALLEGHENY COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA INCREASES PRETRIAL FAIRNESS AND 
SAFETY, CASE STUDIES FALL 2008 at 3, available at 
http://pretrial.org/Success/Case%20Study%201%20Allegheny%20County.pdf (“With 
technical assistance from the Pretrial Justice Institute, the agency has established one of the 
nation’s most innovative pretrial programs.”); PRETRIAL JUSTICE INST., THE D.C. PRETRIAL 
SERVICES AGENCY: LESSONS FROM FIVE DECADES OF INNOVATION AND GROWTH, CASE 
STUDIES FALL 2008 at 1, available at 
http://www.pretrial.org/Reports/PJI%20Reports/Case%20Study%202%20-
%20DC%20Pretrial%20Services.pdf (“The agency is also a model nationally for 
demonstrating that the vision for pretrial justice outlined in the standards of the American 
Bar Association and the National Association of Pretrial Services  
Agencies can be achieved.”).  
 198. See, e.g., Defendant’s Response to October 11, 2012 Order to Develop Plans to 
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Supreme Court deadline approaching, the State had reduced the prison 
population by about 23,000, bringing it to about 150 percent of design 
capacity.199 But the initially steep drop-off in prisoner population had 
plateaued.200 
Nonetheless, the State asked the three-judge court to end federal 
oversight of its prisons.201 The State argued that the CDCR could 
provide constitutionally adequate medical care at 149.6 percent of 
design capacity202 and claimed that improvements in prisoner medical 
services had rectified any previous constitutional deficiencies.203 The 
State further argued that all California prisons were at least 
“moderately” adhering to the policies and procedures on which the 
Achieve Required Prison Population Reduction, supra note 25, at 1; Defendant’s Motion to 
Vacate or Modify Population Reduction Order, supra note 5, at 1. See also Three-Judge 
Court Updates, supra note 25. See Declaration of James Austin in Support of Plaintiffs’ 
Statement in Response to October 11, 2012 Order Regarding Population Reduction, supra 
note 18, at 2. 
 199. See Defendant’s Motion to Vacate or Modify Population Reduction Order, supra 
note 5, at 8 (“As of December 26, 2012, 119,327 inmates were housed in the State’s 33 adult 
institutions, which amounts to 149.6% of design bed capacity.”); Declaration of Jeffrey 
Beard, Ph.D., In Support of Defendants’ Motion to Vacate or Modify Population Reduction 
Order, supra note 130, at 3. 
 200. See Declaration of James Austin in Support of Plaintiffs’ Statement in Response to 
October 11, 2012 Order Regarding Population Reduction, supra note 18, at 2–3 (figures 
illustrate that the impact of Realignment has hit a plateau); see also Plaintiffs’ Statement in 
Response to October 11, 2012 Order Re Population Reduction at 2, Plata v. Brown, 922 F. 
Supp. 2d 1004 (E.D. Cal. 2013) (No. 01-1351). 
 201. See Defendant’s Motion to Vacate or Modify Population Reduction Order, supra 
note 5, at 21. 
 202. The State moved to vacate the Court’s order to reduce the prison population to 
137.5 percent of design capacity. See Defendant’s Motion to Vacate or Modify Population 
Reduction Order, supra note 5, at 8; Declaration of Jeffrey Beard, Ph.D., In Support of 
Defendants’ Motion to Vacate or Modify Population Reduction Order, supra note 130, at 3. 
But cf. Receiver’s Respo§nse to Defendants’ Objections to Receiver’s 22nd Report at 5, 
Plata v. Brown, 922 F. Supp. 2d 1004 (E.D. Cal. 2013) (No. 01-1351) (according to J. Clark 
Kelso, the federal receiver overseeing healthcare at the CDCR, “[t]he bottom one-third of 
the institutions—the institutions which the Receiver’s QMC [Quality Management 
Committee] has determined have the greatest need for improvement—had an average 
population density of 155%. These numbers make it clear that overcrowding is still having a 
direct impact upon the ability to deliver quality healthcare.”); see also id., Exhibit 1 
(summarizing performance improvements and targeted support by institution); id., Exhibit 2 
(demonstrating population by CDCR facility). 
 203. See Defendants’ Motion to Vacate or Modify the Population Reduction Order at 16, 
Plata v. Brown, 922 F. Supp. 2d 1004 (E.D. Cal. 2013) (No. 01-1351) (concluding that all 
CDCR prisons are meeting the Inspector General’s “moderate adherence standard” for 
constitutional medical care and over half of the institutions are meeting the “high 
adherence” standard). See also Declaration of Jeffrey Beard, Ph.D., In Support of 
Defendants’ Motion to Vacate or Modify Population Reduction Order, supra note 130, at 4–
5. 
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Plata court’s injunction is based, and over half had met the Inspector 
General’s “high adherence” standard.204 According to the State, any 
additional steps beyond those already implemented to reduce the prison 
population were impossible without significantly endangering public 
safety.205 The State therefore requested that the court rescind its 
population cap order.206  
At a press conference on January 8, 2013, Governor Edmund G. 
Brown Jr. repeated publicly the assertions that the State had made in its 
recent court filing, dramatically proclaiming that “the prison 
emergency is over in California” and rescinding previous Governor 
Arnold Schwarzenegger’s declaration of a state of emergency.207  
Despite the State’s legal arguments and the Governor’s theatrics, 
in April 2013, the Plata three-judge court refused to increase the 137.5 
percent cap. The court did, however, grant the State a six-month 
extension to December 2013 to meet the population target.208 Under 
 204. Id. 
 205. Defendant’s Motion to Vacate or Modify Population Reduction Order, supra note 
5, at 2. See Declaration of Jeffrey Beard, Ph.D., In Support of Defendants’ Motion to Vacate 
or Modify Population Reduction Order, supra note 130, at 7 (“Continued enforcement of the 
137.5 percent number—in addition to being unnecessary—would also come at a significant 
cost to the State, and to public safety. Realignment implemented the safest prisoner-
reduction measures by shifting lower level offenders to local control, while leaving more 
serious offenders in prison. The further reductions needed to reach the 137.5% level cannot 
be achieved without the early release of inmates convicted of violent or serious felonies.”) 
(emphasis added); Defendants’ Motion to Vacate or Modify the Population Reduction 
Order, supra note 203, at 20. 
 206. Id.  
 207. See Governor Jerry Brown on State Prisons, THE CAL. CHANNEL (Jan. 8, 2013), 
http://www.calchannel.com/governor-jerry-brown-on-state-prisons/ (video of Governor 
Brown calling for end to federal court monitoring, waving his Proclamation for assembled 
reporters and pointing to a nearby table piled high with legal filings from the litigation); 
California Challenges Federal Oversight of Prisons, KQED (Jan. 9, 2013), 
http://www.kqed.org/a/forum/R201301090900 (audio file of Forum program hosted by 
Michael Krasny with Guests: Governor Jerry Brown, Joan Petersilia, criminologist and co-
director of the Stanford Criminal Justice Center; Rebekah Evenson, staff attorney with the 
Prison Law Office; and Terri McDonald, undersecretary of the California Department of 
Corrections and Rehabilitation; includes statement of Governor Brown asserting, “We’ve 
gone from serious constitutional problems to one of the finest prison systems in the United 
States.”); Prison Overcrowding State of Emergency Proclamation, supra note 96; 
Proclamation Terminating the Prison Overcrowding Proclamation, supra note 96; Allen 
Hopper, Despite Declaration, Prison Crisis Not Over Yet, DAILY J. (Jan. 23, 2013) (photo of 
Governor Brown holding up the proclamation he signed declaring the end to the prison 
overcrowding emergency). 
 208. See Opinion and Order Denying Defendants’ Motion to Vacate or Modify 
Population Reduction Order, supra note 95, at 2 (the order gives the state a six-month 
extension; the State now has until December 31, 2013 to meet the 137.5 percent population 
cap). 
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protest, the State submitted a “population reduction plan” as ordered by 
the three-judge court,209 setting out several additional steps the State 
could take to get closer to the 137.5 percent cap. The three-judge court 
affirmed its prior orders requiring the State to meet the 137.5 percent 
population cap by the end of 2013, and added specific steps the State 
was required to take, including sending more prisoners to firefighting 
camps, increasing good-time credits for nonviolent individuals, and 
paroling geriatric prisoners.210 The order also permitted the State to 
lease cells at county jails and continue housing inmates in private out-
of-state prisons.211 The three-judge court further ordered the State to 
develop a list of the lowest risk prisoners who could be released if the 
State’s other population-reduction measures failed to reduce the prison 
population to the 137.5 percent ceiling by December 31, 2013.212 The 
State appealed this ruling to the U.S. Supreme Court and applied for a 
stay of injunctive relief pending final disposition of the appeals.213 The 
Supreme Court denied the stay, and subsequently denied the State’s 
petition for review, leaving the December 2013 deadline in place.214  
A. The Enactment of SB 105 
In late August 2013, with little time remaining to meet the three-
judge court’s December 2013 deadline, the Governor, with the support 
of Assembly Democrats, introduced Senate Bill 105 as the state’s new 
plan to supplement Realignment and reduce prison overcrowding 
enough to meet the Plata requirements. The original terms of SB 105 
would have allowed the state to increase prison capacity by 12,500 
beds through contracts with out-of-state and private in-state facilities 
and suspended the closure of the California Rehabilitation Center.215 
This would all have come with a price tag to taxpayers of over $715 
 209. See Amended Defendants’ Response to April 11, 2013 Order Requiring List of 
Proposed Population Reduction Measures; Court-Ordered Plan at 5–28, Plata v. Brown, 922 
F. Supp. 2d 1004 (E.D. Cal. 2013) (No. 01-1351); Opinion and Order Requiring Defendants 
to Implement Amended Plan at 48, Plata v. Brown, 922 F. Supp. 2d 1004 (E.D. Cal. 2013) 
(No. 01-1351). 
 210. See Opinion and Order Requiring Defendants to Implement Amended Plan, supra 
note 209. 
 211. Id. 
 212. Id. 
 213. See Notice of Appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States at 2–3, Plata v. 
Brown, 922 F. Supp. 2d 1004 (E.D. Cal. 2013) (No. 01-1351); Application for Stay of 
Injunctive Relief Pending This Court’s Final Disposition of Appeals Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 
1253, Plata v. Brown, 922 F. Supp. 2d 1004 (E.D. Cal. 2013) (No. 01-1351). 
 214. Brown v. Plata, 134 S. Ct. 1 (2013). 
 215. See S.B. 105, supra note 11 (introduced Aug. 27, 2013). 
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million over two years,216 which would have been inconceivable in 
2011 when the Supreme Court had issued its Plata ruling.217 However, 
it was feasible in 2013, when improvements in the state’s fiscal 
situation resulted in an estimated budget surplus of $2.4 billion.218 
Under the legislation, authority for these contracts would sunset in 
January 2017; however, the Governor’s stated plan was to enter into 
these contracts only through June 2015.219 Among other concerns, the 
Legislative Analyst’s Office found that this plan was extremely costly 
and would likely result in short term compliance with the court order 
but would fail to create a durable solution to the prison overcrowding 
crisis. 220  
Approximately a week after SB 105 was introduced, a competing 
bill authored by Senate President pro Tem Darrell Steinberg was 
introduced as the Senate Democrats’ alternative to the Governor’s 
plan.221 Steinberg’s bill, AB 84, proposed to seek a settlement with 
plaintiffs’ attorneys that would have included a three-year extension to 
meet the population cap, established a grant program incentivizing 
counties to reduce probation revocations to state prison by increasing 
local programming, and created an advisory commission on public 
safety that would advise the Legislature and the Governor on durable 
strategies for reaching and maintaining the mandated population cap.222 
On September 9, 2013, the Governor and Senator Steinberg 
announced they reached a compromise,223 and a few days later the 
Governor signed into law an amended version of SB 105.224 The 
approved legislation cut the originally proposed allocation to CDCR 
 216. See id.; ADDRESSING THE FEDERAL COURT PRISON POPULATION CAP, supra note 
11, at 2. 
 217. See 2011–12 GOVERNOR’S BUDGET SUMMARY, supra note 8. 
 218. See MAC TAYLOR, LEG. ANALYST’S OFFICE, THE 2013–14 BUDGET (Nov. 2013) at 
7-8, available at http://www.lao.ca.gov/reports/2013/bud/spending-plan/spending-plan-
073013.pdf [hereinafter LEG. ANALYST’S OFFICE, THE 2013–14 BUDGET]. 
 219. See ADDRESSING THE FEDERAL COURT PRISON POPULATION CAP, supra note 11, 
at 2. 
 220. Id. at 3–6.  
 221. A.B. 84, 2013–2014 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2013) (introduced Sept. 3, 2013) 
(noting, “Governor’s Plan Addresses Short-Term, But Not Long-Term Problem”). 
 222. See id.; ADDRESSING THE FEDERAL COURT PRISON POPULATION CAP, supra note 
11 at 7. 
 223. See, e.g., Chris Megerian, Deal brokered on plan to ease California prison 
crowding, LA TIMES (Sept. 9, 2013), http://articles.latimes.com/2013/sep/09/local/la-me-
legislature-prisons-20130910. 
 224. S.B. 105, supra note 11; CAL. GOV’T. CODE §§ 19050.2, 19050.8; CAL. PENAL 
CODE. §§ 1233.1, 1233.3, 1233.4, 1233.9, 2910, 2915, 6250.2, 11191, 13602; 2012 Cal. 
Stat. § 15, ch. 42 (Cal. 2013).  
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from $715 million to $315 million and requires that the department 
spend the funds only to the extent needed to avoid early release of 
prisoners under the Plata order. Any amounts from this $315 million 
not encumbered by June 30, 2014 are to be transferred to a new 
Recidivism Reduction Fund.225 SB 105 also authorized the CDCR to 
enter into contracts for prisoner housing with out-of-state and privately 
run in-state prisons, allowed for the involuntary transfer of prisoners to 
out-of-state facilities, and created incentives for counties to implement 
local programs that reduce probation revocations to prison.226 
Following the passage of SB 105 and the Supreme Court’s refusal 
to hear the State’s request to do away with the 137.5 percent population 
cap,227 the State asked the three-judge court for a three-year extension 
to reduce the prison population.228 The three-judge court ordered the 
State and plaintiffs to work together to reach an agreement about the 
extension and temporarily extended the population reduction deadline 
to January 27, 2014.229 When the parties were unable to reach 
agreement,230 the State requested another two-year extension to reduce 
the prison population;231 the plaintiffs’ opposed the request.232 
 225. Id. Any money in the Recidivism Reduction fund may be transferred to the State 
Community Corrections Performance Incentives Fund, which provides money to counties to 
incentivize them to send fewer people to state prison. Id. 
 226. S.B. 105, supra note 11; CAL. GOV’T. CODE §§ 19050.2, 19050.8; CAL. PENAL 
CODE. §§ 1233.1, 1233.3, 1233.4, 1233.9, 2910, 2915, 6250.2, 11191, 13602; 2012 Cal. 
Stat. § 15, ch. 42 (Cal. 2013). 
 227. Brown v. Plata, 134 S. Ct. 1 (2013). 
 228. See Defendants’ Request for an Extension of December 31, 2013 Deadline and 
Status Report in Response to June 30, 2011, April 11, 2013, June 20, 2013, and August 9, 
2013 Orders at 5, Plata v. Brown, 922 F. Supp. 2d 1004 (E.D. Cal. 2014), (No. 01-1351) 
(“Defendants respectfully request that that Court extend the December 31, 2013 deadline to 
reduce the prison population to 137.5% of design capacity by three years to December 31, 
2016.”). 
 229. See Order to Meet and Confer at 2–3, Plata v. Brown, 922 F. Supp. 2d 1004 (E.D. 
Cal. 2014) (No. 01-1351) (“It is hereby ordered that the parties shall meet and confer, 
beginning immediately, regarding defendants’ pending request. . . . The meet-and-confer 
process shall explore how defendants can comply with this Court’s June 20, 2013 Order, 
including means and dates by which such compliance can be expedited or accomplished and 
how this Court can ensure a durable solution to the prison crowding problem.”). 
 230. See Order to File Proposed Orders Re: Defendants’ Request to Extend Population 
Reduction Deadline at 1, Plata v. Brown, 922 F. Supp. 2d 1004 (E.D. Cal. 2014) (No. 01-
1351) (“This Court has repeatedly extended the meet-and-confer process, and by virtue 
thereof the date for the State’s compliance, in hopes that the parties could reach agreement 
on how this Court can best ensure a durable solution to the prison population problem . . . It 
now appears that no such agreement will be reached.”). 
 231. See Defendants’ Amended Application and [Proposed] Order Granting Defendants’ 
Request for an Extension of April 18, 2004 Deadline at 3, Plata v. Brown, 922 F. Supp. 2d 
1004 (E.D. Cal. 2014), (No. 01-1351); Defendants’ Order Granting Defendants’ Request for 
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B.  The Three–Judge Court Gets Serious: New Enforcement 
Mechanisms, a Compliance Monitor, and No Further State 
Appeals 
On February 10, 2014 the three-judge court issued an order 
granting the State’s request for a two-year extension to meet the 137.5 
percent cap.233 The new order requires the State to reduce the prison 
population in three stages, or “benchmarks:” June 30, 2014, February 
28, 2015, and finally February 28, 2016.234  
For the first time the order provides for the appointment of a 
Compliance Officer who will monitor whether the State meets these 
benchmarks.235 If the State fails to successfully meet a benchmark 
within thirty days of its expiration, the Compliance Officer will direct 
the release of the number of inmates necessary to bring the State into 
compliance with the mandated population reduction level.236 
Furthermore, in exchange for the two-year extension, the State has 
agreed that it will not appeal the order granting the extension, 
subsequent related orders, or any order issued by the Compliance 
Officer.237  
an Extension of April 18, 2004 Deadline at 1, Plata v. Brown, 922 F. Supp. 2d 1004 (E.D. 
Cal. 2014) (No. 01-1351). 
 232. See Objections to Defendants’ Jan. 23, 2014 Proposed Order Re Extension of 
Crowding Reduction Deadline at 2, Plata v. Brown, 922 F. Supp. 2d 1004 (E.D. Cal. 2014) 
(No. 01-1351); Plaintiffs’ Proposed Order Submitted in Response January 13, 2014 Order at 
1, Plata v. Brown, 922 F. Supp. 2d 1004 (E.D. Cal. 2014) (No. 01-1351). 
 233. See Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Defendants’ Request for Extension 
of December 31, 2013 Deadline, supra note 20, at 2. 
 234. Id. (the state must reduce the population to 143 percent of design capacity by June 
30, 2014, 141.5 percent of design capacity by February 28, 2015, and 137.5 percent design 
capacity by February 28, 2016). 
 235. Id. at 4; Opinion Re: Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Defendants’ 
Request for Extension of December 31, 2013 Deadline, supra note 20, at 3. Consistent with 
the role of this new Compliance Officer, the court made a point in stating that the release of 
prisoners may not impair public safety: “Since 2009, more and more states have come to 
recognize that, properly handled, the release of prisoners held past the time necessary to 
serve the purposes of their incarceration will not result in danger to the community, but 
rather may actually benefit both the prisoners and their communities.” Opinion Re: Order 
Granting in Part and Denying in Part Defendants’ Request for Extension of December 31, 
2013 Deadline, supra note 20, at 2. On April 9, 2014, the three-judge court appointed 
Elwood Lui, a former associate justice of the California Court of Appeal, as the new 
Compliance Officer. See Order Appointing Compliance Officer at 1, Plata v. Brown, 922 F. 
Supp. 2d 1004 (E.D. Cal. 2014), (No. 01-1351); Sam Stanton, Judges Appoint Prison 
Population Oversight Chief, SACRAMENTO BEE, Apr. 23, 2014, available at 
http://www.sacbee.com/2014/04/09/6311041/judges-appoint-prison-population.html. 
 236. Id. 
 237. Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Defendants’ Request for Extension of 
December 31, 2013 Deadline, supra note 20, at 3–4 (“[D]efendants have represented to this 
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The order stated that in order to meet these benchmarks, the State 
agreed to develop “comprehensive and sustainable prison population-
reduction reforms, including considering the establishment of a 
commission to recommend reforms of state penal and sentencing 
laws.”238 The State also agreed to immediately implement the 
following population reduction measures:  
(a) Prospectively increase good-time credits for non-violent 
second-strike offenders to 33 percent and minimum 
custody prisoners to two-for-one;  
(b) Implement a new parole determination process making 
second-strikers eligible for parole after serving 50 percent 
of their sentence;  
(c) Parole inmates who have already been granted parole but 
have future parole dates;  
(d) Expand parole for medically infirm prisoners; 
(e) Expand parole for elderly inmates who are sixty years of 
age or older and have served a minimum of twenty-five 
years of their sentence; 
(f) Activate new reentry hubs at thirteen designated prisons; 
(g) Pursue the expansion of county-level reentry programs; 
(h) Expand the alternative custody program for female 
prisoners.239  
Court that, if a two year extension is granted, they will not appeal or support an appeal of the 
order granting the extension, or of any of its provisions; nor will they appeal or support the 
appeal of any subsequent order necessary to implement the extension order or any of its 
provisions, nor any order issued by the Compliance Officer pursuant to the authority vested 
in him by the extension order; nor will they move or support a motion to terminate any relief 
provided for or extended by the extension order or any of its provisions until at least two 
years after the date of the extension order and such time as it is firmly established that 
compliance with the 137.5% design capacity benchmark is durable.”). 
 238. Id. at 3. 
 239. Id.; see Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Defendants’ Request for 
Extension of December 31, 2013 Deadline, supra note 20, at 3 (“Defendants shall also 
immediately implement the following measures: (a). . . Non-violent second-strikers will be 
eligible to earn good time credits at 33.3% and will be eligible to earn milestone credits for 
completing rehabilitative programs. Minimum custody inmates will be eligible to earn 2-for-
1 good time credits to the extent such credits do not deplete participation in fire camps . . . ; 
(b) Create and implement a new parole determination process through which non-violent 
second-strikers will be eligible for parole consideration by the Board of Parole Hearings 
once they have served 50% of their sentence; (c) Parole certain inmates serving 
indeterminate sentences who have already been granted parole by the Board of Parole 
Hearings but have future parole dates; (d) In consultation with the Receiver’s office, finalize 
and implement an expanded parole process for medically incapacitated inmates; (e) Finalize 
and implement a new parole process whereby inmates who are 60 years of age or older and 
have served a minimum of twenty-five years of their sentence will be referred to the Board 
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In addition, despite the authorization granted under SB 105, the 
order prohibits the State from increasing the population of out-of-state 
prisoners above the current level of approximately 8,900 prisoners.240 
This means that prisoners may still be transferred to other states to 
replace other out-of-state prisoners who are released or returned to 
California, but the total number of California prisoners housed in out-
of-state prisons shall not increase. 
Though many of these new population reduction measures 
announced in the February 2014 order focus on reducing the number of 
prisoners,241 the State is also still very obviously focused on increasing 
capacity wherever it can, as evinced by the new funding and 
authorizations contained in SB 105,242 discussed above. In a March 
2014 status report, the State informed the three-judge panel that its 
prison population was about 502 inmates above the upcoming June 30 
benchmark.243 The State indicated that it anticipated getting below the 
143 percent mark before the deadline by utilizing some of the contract 
prison cells SB 105 authorized.244 
In its February 2014 order, the three-judge court appeared 
optimistic that the State “belated as it may be” is ready to move toward 
a durable solution to the prison overcrowding crisis.245 In addition, the 
language used by the three-judge court is more forceful than in any 
previous order in the case: 
We recognize that these measures should have been adopted much 
earlier, that plaintiffs’ lawyers have made unceasing efforts to 
obtain immediate relief on behalf of their clients, and that 
California prisoners deserve far better treatment than they have 
received from defendants over the past four and a half years. 
of Parole Hearings to determine suitability for parole; (f) Activate new reentry hubs at a 
total of 13 designated prisons to be operational within one year from the date of this order; 
(g) Pursue expansion of pilot reentry programs with additional counties and local 
communities; and (h) Implement an expanded alternative custody program for female 
inmates.”). 
 240. Id. at 2. 
 241. See Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Defendants’ Request for Extension 
of December 31, 2013 Deadline, supra note 20; Opinion Re: Order Granting in Part and 
Denying in Part Defendants’ Request for Extension of December 31, 2013 Deadline, supra 
note 20.  
 242. See S.B. 105, supra note 11. 
 243. Status Report at Exhibit B at 1, Plata v. Brown, 922 F. Supp. 2d 1004 (E.D. Cal. 
2014) (No. 01-1351), available at http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/News/docs/3JP-March-
2014/March-2014-Status-Report.pdf. 
 244. Id. 
  245. Opinion Re: Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Defendants’ Request for 
Extension of December 31, 2013 Deadline, supra note 20, at 3. 
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Similarly, California’s citizens have incurred far greater costs, both 
financial and otherwise, as a result of defendants’ heretofore 
unyielding resistance to compliance with this Court’s orders. 
Finally, we recognize that this Court must also accept part of the 
blame for not acting more forcefully with regard to defendants’ 
obduracy in the face of its continuing constitutional violations. 
Nevertheless, resolving the conditions in California prisons for the 
long run, and not merely for the next few months, is of paramount 
importance to this Court as well as to the people of this State.246 
C. The State’s Continued Stinginess with Rehabilitative Credits 
As noted above, in exchange for the two-year extension to comply 
with the population cap, the State agreed to file no further appeals, 
develop “comprehensive and sustainable prison population-reduction 
reforms,” and implement immediate population reduction measures, 
including, prospectively increasing good-time credits for non-violent, 
second-strike and minimum custody prisoners.247 This change, along 
with other increases to prisoners’ credit-earning potential, could 
significantly decrease the length of stay for non-violent felonies. For 
instance, the Legislature could increase the total number of weeks of 
credit a prisoner can earn for participation in programs. In 2009, the 
Legislature allowed the CDCR to grant six weeks of credit per year 
prisoner for every program completed.248 While the granting of such 
credits is consistent with the practices of other states and the 
recommendations given to the CDCR and the Legislature by a panel of 
corrections experts, the amount of credits awarded is far lower than the 
three-to-twelve months of credit allowed by most states and the four-
to-six months recommended by an expert panel appointed by CDCR.249 
 246. Id. at 4. 
 247. Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Defendants’ Request for Extension of 
December 31, 2013 Deadline, supra note 20, at 2-3; Opinion Re: Order Granting in Part and 
Denying in Part Defendants’ Request for Extension of December 31, 2013 Deadline, supra 
note 20, at 3. 
 248.  See S.B. 18, 2009-2010 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2009); CAL. PENAL CODE § 
2933.05. 
 249.  In response to the California Budget Act of 2006-2007, the CDCR created a panel 
of nationally recognized corrections experts to: (1) complete an assessment of California’s 
adult prison and parole programs designed to reduce recidivism and (2) provide 
recommendations for improving programming in California’s prison and parole system. In 
addition, the expert panel offered suggestion on how the CDCR could meet the benchmarks 
established by AB 900, the Public Safety and Offender Rehabilitation Services Act of 2007. 
See A ROADMAP FOR EFFECTIVE OFFENDER PROGRAMMING IN CALIFORNIA, CAL. DEP’T 
OF CORRS. & REHABILITATION 12, 92–93 (Jun. 30, 2007), available at 
http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/News/Press_Release_Archive/2007_Press_Releases/Press20070629
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The State could not only expand program credits for eligible prisoners, 
but could also grant more prisoners the opportunity to participate in 
credit-eligible programming. In addition, the State could apply the 
expanded credits retroactively to prisoners who have already completed 
programs. This would have an immediate, significant, and ongoing 
impact on the prison population numbers.  
In light of the limited program resources available in CDCR 
facilities,250 the State could also provide credits to low risk prisoners 
who maintain a good conduct record and maintain a work assignment if 
one is available, even if they do not complete eligible programs. As the 
expert panel’s report pointed out, requiring low risk prisoners to 
participate in unnecessary rehabilitative programs can increase their 
recidivism rates.251 It would therefore improve public safety to provide 
low risk prisoners with additional credits for good behavior, rather than 
requiring counter-productive program completion. Such a reform 
would also free space in rehabilitative programs for those prisoners 
who are more likely to benefit. 
Expanding and refining the use of rehabilitative programming 
credits can be an important tool to regulate the prison population and 
encourage prisoners to participate in meaningful risk reduction 
programs.252 In pleadings submitted in the Plata litigation, the State 
identified several categories of reforms that would further reduce the 
137.5 percent cap.253 These include the extension of some good time 
.html [hereinafter ROADMAP]. 
 250.  See CAL. DEP’T OF CORRS. & REHABILITATION, THE FUTURE OF CALIFORNIA 
CORRECTIONS: A BLUEPRINT TO SAVE BILLIONS OF DOLLARS, END FEDERAL COURT 
OVERSIGHT, AND IMPROVE THE PRISON SYSTEM 21 (April 23, 2012) Appendix, available at 
http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/2012plan/docs/plan/complete.pdf. 
 251.  See ROADMAP, supra note 249, at 23. 
 252.  Risk reduction programs are “intended to reduce risk factors associated with 
antisocial behavior of offenders, and thus make them less likely to commit further criminal 
offenses. . . . Risk reduction programs are those programs that would be judged successful, 
or not, based on their impact on recidivism by participants.” JESSE JANNETTA, CALIFORNIA 
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AND REHABILITATION RECIDIVISM REDUCTION PROGRAM 
INVENTORY 2 (Apr. 30, 2007), available at 
http://ucicorrections.seweb.uci.edu/files/CDCR%20Recidivism%20Reduction%20Program
%20Inventory.pdf. 
 253.  See Amended Defendants’ Response to April 11, 2013 Order Requiring List of 
Proposed Population Reduction Measures; Court-Ordered Plan, supra note 209; Defendants’ 
Response to October 11, 2012 Order to Develop Plans to Achieve Required Prison 
Population Reduction at 8, Plata v. Brown, 922 F. Supp. 2d 1004 (E.D. Cal. 2013) (No. 01-
1351). See also California Files Court-Ordered Prison Plan, Vows Supreme Court Appeal, 
CDCR TODAY (May 2, 2013), http://cdcrtoday.blogspot.com/2013/05/california-files-court-
ordered-prison.html (quoting CDCR Secretary Jeff Beard’s statement that the State’s 
population reduction plan was submitted under protest).  
 
HOPPER FINAL 8/21/2014 4:04 PM 
584 SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol: 54 
credits that the state was ordered to implement by the three-judge 
court.254 According to its own estimates, the State could reduce the 
prison population by 1,578 persons if it expanded the rate at which 
prisoners could earn credits and the populations of prisoners eligible to 
earn credits.255 However, the State has not implemented the two-for-
one credit-earning reforms for minimum security prisoners that are 
mandated by the three-judge court.256 
 
V. BEYOND REALIGNMENT: SHIFTING THE PARADIGM WILL 
REQUIRE SENTENCING REFORM TO REDUCE THE NUMBER 
OF NON-SERIOUS, NON-VIOLENT OFFENSES PUNISHED AS 
FELONIES, AND THE LENGTH OF SENTENCES IMPOSED FOR 
THEM 
 Realignment does not adequately address a fundamental cause of 
the prison overcrowding crisis: California’s excessive sentences, 
especially for non-serious, non-violent crimes. Realignment did not 
change the length of sentences that can be imposed for the “realigned” 
offenses, the applicability of sentencing enhancements, or the fact that 
these offenses remain felonies. Even under Realignment, anyone 
previously convicted of a serious or violent felony, no matter how long 
ago, will still be sent to prison, not jail, when sentenced to a period of 
incarceration for any new felony, no matter how minor. Under 
California’s harsh three strikes laws, the “realigned” non-serious and 
 254.  Amended Defendants’ Response to April 11, 2013 Order Requiring List of 
Proposed Population Reduction Measures; Court-Ordered Plan, supra note 209; Order 
Granting in Part and Denying in Part Defendants’ Request for Extension of December 31, 
2013 Deadline, supra note 20, at 2-3; Opinion Re: Order Granting in Part and Denying in 
Part Defendants’ Request for Extension of December 31, 2013 Deadline, supra note 20, at 3. 
 255.  CDCR estimates show that the expansion of “two-for-one” credits to minimum 
custody prisoners will reduce the population by 257 individuals. Extending the credit-
earning cap from six to eight weeks for violent, serious, and second-strike offenders would 
reduce the population by an additional 554 prisoners. Furthermore, if the credit-earning 
capacity for violent and second-strike felons was increased to thirty-four percent, from their 
current caps of fifteen percent and twenty percent respectively, the State estimates that the 
prison population will be reduced by 767 prisoners. Id. at 9–11, 22–23. 
 256.  According to the May 15, 2014 Status Report to the three-judge court, the State has 
thus far refused to increase the prospective credit earning rates of minimum custody 
prisoners to the three-judge court mandated level. See Defendants’ May 2014 Status Report 
in Response to February 10, 2014 Order at Exhibit B, Plata v. Brown, 922 F. Supp. 2d 1004 
(E.D. Cal. 2014), (No. 01-1351) (“With respect to two-for-one credit earning for minimum 
custody inmates, the State continues to evaluate this population reduction tool in light of fire 
camp participation rates.”). 
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non-violent felonies can still trigger long prison sentences.257 
Moreover, the Legislature purposefully excluded fifty-nine non-
serious, non-violent crimes the Brown Administration originally 
proposed to realign; many continue serving sentences for these crimes 
in state prison.258 Even those sent to jail instead of prison under 
Realignment are still subject to the same excessive sentences and 
enhancements as existed before Realignment, which can result in 
sentences of ten years or more served in jails never designed to house 
prisoners for such extended periods of incarceration, raising serious 
constitutional concerns and further exacerbating overcrowding in 
county jails.259 
The State’s acknowledgement that Realignment alone can never 
sufficiently reduce the prison population,260 in conjunction with the 
extraordinary new Plata enforcement mechanisms,261 could provide 
unprecedented impetus for sentencing reform. The Compliance 
Monitor can order prisoners released early if the population 
 257. Even after the enactment of the 2012 Prop. 36 ballot initiative, the second-strike 
provision of the Three Strikes law still requires double length sentences for defendants 
convicted of any new felony, who have one prior serious or violent felony conviction. See 
CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 667(d)(1), (e)(1); infra Section V.A.1.  
 258. See SENATE BILL 105 INTERIM REPORT, supra note 21, at 14. The Report states 
that concerns from law enforcement were a significant factor in the legislature not realigning 
these crimes. Id.; see also AB 109 Crime Exclusions List, supra note 15 (listing crimes that 
are not defined in the Penal Code as serious or violent offenses, yet still must be served in 
state prison, rather than in local custody, after the implementation of Realignment). 
 259. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 667.5(b) (enhancement adding to sentences for new 
offenses based on prior convictions resulting in prison sentences); CAL. PENAL CODE § 
11370.4 (enhancements adding to sentences for controlled substance offenses based upon 
weight of controlled substance involved in offense). These are but two examples of many. 
According to a 2007 report from the Little Hoover Commission, “Today, there are more 
than 1,000 felony sentencing laws and more than 100 felony sentence enhancements across 
21 separate sections of California law.” LITTLE HOOVER COMM'N, supra note 75, at 34. See 
also JOAN PETERSILIA, ET. AL., VOICES FROM THE FIELD, supra note 90, at 120 (“Realigned 
felonies carry longer sentences than misdemeanors and are subject to enhancements that 
may add up to sentences of a decade or more. In Los Angeles County one inmate has been 
sentenced to 42 years in county jail 
. . . . The longest jail sentence imposed in Riverside County to date is 12 years and two 
months.”). 
 260. See, e.g., Defendant’s Response to October 11, 2012 Order to Develop Plans to 
Achieve Required Prison Population Reduction, supra note 25 at 1; Defendant’s Motion to 
Vacate or Modify Population Reduction Order, supra note 5, at 1. See also Three-Judge 
Court Updates, supra note 25; See Declaration of James Austin in Support of Plaintiffs’ 
Statement in Response to October 11, 2012 Order Regarding Population Reduction, supra 
note 18, at 2. 
  261. Opinion Re: Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Defendants’ Request for 
Extension of December 31, 2013 Deadline, supra note 20, at 3. 
 
HOPPER FINAL 8/21/2014 4:04 PM 
586 SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol: 54 
benchmarks are not met on time,262 a result the State is highly 
motivated to avoid. 
On the other hand, the state coffers are in much better shape now 
than in 2011.263 As SB 105 demonstrates, the state now has money and 
a willingness to spend it to increase prison capacity.264 The fight 
between Senate Democrats and Governor Brown over AB 84 and SB 
105 was in essence about choices for how to comply with Plata: AB 84 
focused more on providing new funding to further Realignment’s 
stated intent to rehabilitate rather than punish for non-violent, non-
serious offenses, thereby reducing recidivism and the number of people 
being sent to prison.265 The Governor’s plan focused more on building 
additional capacity so the State can decrease the prison population to 
137.5 percent of design capacity without significantly further reducing 
the numbers of prisoners.266 SB 105 represents a compromise between 
these different approaches;267 those seeking to increase capacity appear 
to have gotten the better end of the deal.  
 Almost entirely absent from the SB 105 debate, however, was 
any discussion about broader sentencing reforms.268 A largely 
overlooked provision of AB 84 would have established the California 
Public Safety Commission, a permanent, advisory state government 
agency.269 The Commission would have been tasked with providing 
information and developing recommendations for the Legislature and 
the Governor, 
to assist with prison population management options consistent 
with public safety, to assist with effective correctional practices and 
the effective allocation of public safety resources, to develop 
recommendations for the Legislature and the Governor to consider 
regarding criminal sentences and evidence-based programming for 
criminal offenders, and to develop recommendations for the 
Legislature and the Governor to consider sentencing credits.270 
 262. See Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Defendants’ Request for Extension 
of December 31, 2013 Deadline, supra note 20, at 2; Opinion Re: Order Granting in Part 
and Denying in Part Defendants’ Request for Extension of December 31, 2013 Deadline, 
supra note 20, at 3. 
 263. See, e.g., LEG. ANALYST’S OFFICE, THE 2013–14 BUDGET, supra note 218. 
 264. See S.B. 105, supra note 11.  
 265. A.B. 84, supra note 221. 
 266. S.B. 105, supra note 11 (introduced Aug. 27, 2013). 
 267. S.B. 105, supra note 11 (approved by the Governor Sept. 12, 2013). 
 268. Id. 
 269. A.B. 84, supra note 221. 
 270. Id. (emphasis added). 
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This language was consistent with the statement in the Plata three-
judge court’s February 2014 order that, among the steps the State had 
agreed to take was, “considering the establishment of a commission to 
recommend reforms of state penal and sentencing laws.”271 Similarly, 
when Governor Brown vetoed a bill in late 2013 that would have 
reduced low-level drug possession offenses to wobblers instead of 
felonies, his veto message stated, 
Under SB 105, we are going to examine in detail California's 
criminal justice system, including the current sentencing structure. 
We will do so with the full participation of all necessary parties, 
including law enforcement, local government, courts and treatment 
providers. That will be the appropriate time to evaluate our existing 
drug laws.272  
SB 105, however, contains no provision requiring the state to, 
“examine in detail California's criminal justice system, including the 
current sentencing structure.” Quite the contrary, SB 105 eliminated 
the sentencing commission that would have been created under SB 
84.273 Instead, according to the Legislative Counsel’s Digest for SB 
105, it requires “the administration to assess the state prison system, 
including capacity needs, prison population levels, recidivism rates, 
and factors effecting crime levels, and to develop recommendations on 
balanced solutions that are cost effective and protect public safety.”274  
SB 105 says nothing explicit about a sentencing commission or 
sentencing reform.275 The bill did, however, require the DOF to submit 
the administration’s interim report about SB 105 implementation to the 
Legislature by April 1, 2014, and to submit a final report to the 
Legislature not later than January 10, 2015.276 The first Interim Report 
reveals much about the Brown Administration’s priorities when it 
comes to implementing SB 105 and complying with Plata.277 The only 
mention of sentencing reform in this report—which largely focuses on 
descriptions of the prison population and efforts underway to increase 
prison capacity278—occurs near the end, in a long list of items 
 271. Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Defendants’ Request for Extension of 
December 31, 2013 Deadline, supra note 20, at 3. 
 272. Veto Message for S.B. 649, infra note 361 (emphasis added); see further discussion 
of SB 649 in Section V.B.1.c., infra. 
 273. S.B. 105, supra note 11; A.B. 84, supra note 221. 
 274. S.B. 105, supra note 11. 
 275. Id. 
 276. Id. 
 277. SENATE BILL 105 INTERIM REPORT, supra note 21. 
 278. Id. at 19 (the report provides the following details about steps taken and planned to 
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suggested by various stakeholders the DOF interviewed for the 
report.279 This list is characterized as, “topics that require further 
discussion.”280 The interviewed stakeholders suggested several 
sentencing reform-related topics, including: review the current felony 
sentencing structure; examine the statewide variation in the use of split 
sentences; determine the impact of stacking terms during sentencing; 
examine the impact of second-strike sentences on the prison 
population; review existing drug laws and retroactive changes to drug 
laws; and review the number of offenders in prison for non-violent and 
drug crimes.281 In the Section immediately following entitled, “Efforts 
Currently Underway,” the report says only that, “The Legislature and 
Governor have already begun addressing some of these issues and the 
Administration has several proposals before the Legislature that are 
consistent with some of the topics raised.”282  
In other words, neither the Governor nor the Legislature has yet 
taken any concrete steps to consider, much less enact, substantive 
sentencing reform to reduce any penalties or sentence lengths.  Indeed, 
there are serious discussions underway in Sacramento to roll back 
Realignment by creating new exemptions to send more people to state 
prison.283 As noted earlier, even those sent to jail instead of prison for 
non-serious, non-violent offenses are still subject to the same excessive 
sentences and enhancements as existed before Realignment, which can 
result in sentences of ten years or more served in jails.284 In 2012, State 
Senator Bill Emerson, in collaboration with District Attorney Paul 
Zellerbach of Riverside County introduced legislation to require all 
increase capacity: “The state’s current design capacity is for 81,574 inmates. The activation 
of the DeWitt Nelson Correctional Annex in the spring of 2014 will add 1,133 beds, 
increasing the capacity to 82,707. An additional 2,376 beds will be activated in early 2016, 
when the three dormitory infill projects are complete at Mule Creek State Prison and 
Richard J. Donovan Correctional Facility, increasing the capacity to 85,083. The 
Department has 4,480 fire camp beds that are not included in the prison capacity noted 
above. Applying the court‑imposed population cap of 137.5 percent of design capacity will 
allow the state to house 116,989 inmates in its prisons in February 2016. The Department’s 
total adult inmate population as of March 12, 2014, was 134,801, of which 117,153 were 
housed in the Department’s adult institutions, and the remaining 17,648 were housed in fire 
camps or contract beds.”). 
 279. Id. at 27–29. 
 280. Id. 
 281. Id. at 28. 
 282. Id. at 29. 
 283. S.B. 1441, 2011–2012 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2012); see also, e.g., A.B. 601, 2013–
2014 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2014) (introduced Feb. 10, 2014); A.B. 2590, 2013–14 Leg., 
Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2014) (introduced Feb. 21, 2014). 
 284. See supra note 259; see also CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170(h) (West 2014). 
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sentences of three years or more to be served in state prison rather than 
county jail.285 The bill failed but Zellerbach is determined to 
reintroduce it.286 Others have proposed similar legislation to send those 
sentenced to long terms–because of weight-based enhancements for 
drug crimes–to state prison instead of jail.287 Governor Brown has also 
recently suggested amending Realignment to allow persons with these 
long sentences to once again be sent to prison instead of jail.288 No one 
appears to be asking the obvious question: Why are we incarcerating 
people for such lengthy periods for non-serious, non-violent offenses, 
especially people who have never committed a violent or serious 
offense? Only such persons can be sent jail instead of prison under 
current Realignment law, since anyone with any prior conviction for a 
serious or violent felony is not eligible for a jail sentence instead of 
state prison.289 
In October 2012 the State bluntly told the Plata three-judge court 
that the 137.5 percent cap “cannot be achieved unless the Court alters 
state law.”290 This statement is only half true. State sentencing laws 
must be changed. But the State’s assertion that only the federal courts 
have the power to do so is false. The Legislature and the Governor can 
enact legislation to reform California sentencing laws, including 
reducing the penalties for low-level, non-violent drug and property 
 285.  S.B. 1441, supra note 283.  
 286. JOAN PETERSILIA, ET. AL., VOICES FROM THE FIELD, supra note 90, at 120. 
 287.  Id. (“Assistant District Attorney Karen Meredith of Alameda County also advocates 
legislation to limit jail sentences, but suggests doing so by diverting drug offenders subject 
to weight clause enhancements to prison, citing this group as a major source of excessive jail 
terms.”). 
 288.  Don Thompson, Counties tell Gov. Brown They Need Money for Jail Realignment, 
ASSOCIATED PRESS, Apr. 19, 2014, available at 
http://www.scpr.org/news/2014/04/19/43615/counties-tell-gov-brown-they-need-money-for-
jail-r/ (“In Kern County, Sheriff Donny Youngblood worries that county jails built to hold 
criminals for no more than a year are now housing inmates for a decade or more. Brown has 
proposed modifying his realignment law so that inmates sentenced to more than 10 years 
would again serve their time in state prisons, but Youngblood thinks the sentence length 
should be shorter. ‘Three years, from my standpoint, might be reasonable,’ he said.”). 
 289. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170(h)(3) (West, 2014). 
 290. See Defendant’s Response to October 11, 2012 Order to Develop Plans to Achieve 
Required Prison Population Reduction, supra note 25, at 1–2 ; Defendant’s Motion to 
Vacate or Modify Population Reduction Order, supra note 5, at 2. See also Three-Judge 
Court Updates, CAL. DEP’T OF CORR. & REHAB., 
http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/News/3_judge_panel_decision.html (compiling updated figures). 
This stark admission that Realignment alone is not sufficient to meet the court’s population 
cap requirement confirmed what the plaintiffs’ experts had already known to be true. See 
Declaration of James Austin in Support of Plaintiffs’ Statement in Response to October 11, 
2012 Order Regarding Population Reduction, supra note 18, at 2. 
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crimes. In the following Section, we propose specific reforms and 
describe the dramatic impact they would have on prison and jail 
populations.  
A. Specific Sentencing Reform Proposals  
1. The Legislature or the Voters Could Extend Proposition 36–
Like Reforms to Second-Strikers 
The stated intent of California’s 1994 Three Strikes laws was the 
assurance of “longer prison sentences and greater punishment for those 
who commit a felony and have previously been convicted of serious 
and/or violent felony offenses.”291 This goal is achieved primarily 
through long mandatory sentences for those with prior serious felony 
convictions when convicted of any new felony. Individuals convicted 
of any new felony with two or more prior “serious”292 or violent felony 
convictions, were sentenced to an indeterminate term of life 
imprisonment with a minimum term calculated as the greater of: three 
times the usual sentence; twenty-five years; or the term pursuant to 
California Penal Code § 1170, including any applicable sentencing 
enhancements.293 The triggering offense could be any felony, including 
simple drug possession or petty theft.294 Admissible prior offenses 
included out-of-state felonies295 and juvenile convictions.296 There was, 
moreover, no requirement that the previous offense be one for which 
 291. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 667(b), 1170.12. 
 292. “Serious” felonies range anywhere from purse-snatching to murder under the 
definition provided in the California Penal Code. Id. § 1192.7(c). 
 293. Id. § 667(e)(2)(A). 
 294. There are vast examples of minor triggering offenses. See, e.g., Ewing v. 
California, 538 U.S. 11 (2003) (stealing golf clubs); Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63 
(2003) (shoplifting 5 video tapes). 
 295. See 1994 Cal. Stat. ch. 12, § 1 (AB 971) (the “Three Strikes” legislation that 
enacted CAL. PENAL CODE § 667); Proposition 184. CALIFORNIA BALLOT PAMPHLET, 
GENERAL ELECTION (Nov. 8, 1994) (the original “Three Strikes” ballot initiative). See also 
People v. Warner, 139 P.3d 475 (Cal. 2006) (prosecution must prove that the out-of-state 
offense contains all the elements to qualify as serious or violent in California); People v. 
Hazelton, 926 P.2d 423 (Cal. 1996) (holding that the same applies for Section 1170.12). 
 296. See 1994 Cal. Stat. ch. 12, § 1 (AB 971); Proposition 184. CALIFORNIA BALLOT 
PAMPHLET, GENERAL ELECTION (Nov. 8, 1994). To be counted as a strike, the statute 
requires that the offender had been 16 or older at the time of the juvenile offense; that the 
offense is listed under Section 707(b) of the Welfare Institutions Code; that the offender had 
been found fit and proper under the juvenile court law; and that the offender was adjudicated 
a ward of the juvenile court. The use of prior juvenile convictions has been upheld for three-
strike purposes even though juvenile adjudications do not afford the defendant a jury trial. 
People v. Nguyen, 209 P.3d 946 (Cal. 2009). 
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the defendant had served a sentence in a state prison.297 
In November 2012, voters in California—by a two-to-one 
margin—passed Proposition 36, the “Three Strikes Reform Act of 
2012,” which revises the state’s 1994 Three Strikes scheme.298 
Proposition 36 precludes minor, non-violent crimes—like drug 
possession or low-level property crimes—from counting as third strikes 
and triggering life sentences.299 Proposition 36 does nothing, however, 
to address the much larger population of second strikers who are also 
serving disproportionate sentences for non-serious, non-violent 
triggering offenses.300 The original Three Strikes law mandates that 
defendants convicted of any new felony, with one prior serious or 
violent felony conviction,301 must receive a sentence twice that for the 
usual felony conviction.302  
According to the April 1, 2014 S.B. 105 DOF Interim report to the 
Legislature, as of June 2013, there were a total of 34,699 offenders 
serving a second‑ strike sentence in state prison.303 Of that total, 
14,460 inmates were serving sentences for non-serious, non-violent, 
and non-sex offenses, with the two of the three most common 
controlling offenses being Possession of a Controlled Substance 
(1,817) and Possession of a Controlled Substance for Sale (1,698).304 
The DOF report also notes that, since Realignment went into effect, 
some counties are now sending significantly more people to state 
prison on second-strike sentences than before.305 In the eight months 
prior to Realignment, total second strike admissions were 5,026, while 
 297. See 1994 Cal. Stat. ch. 12, § 1 (AB 971); Proposition 184. CALIFORNIA BALLOT 
PAMPHLET, GENERAL ELECTION (Nov. 8, 1994). 
 298. Prop. 36, supra note 67. Prior to Proposition 36, a third strike offense did not need 
to be serious or violent, and, instead, could be any felony including simple drug possession 
or petty theft. Now, as modified by Proposition 36, only violent felonies count as a third 
strike, under which a 25-years-to-life sentence may be imposed. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 
667(e)(2)(A)(ii), 1170.12(c)(2)(A)(ii). See also David Mills & Michael Romano, The 
Passage and Implementation of the Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012 (Proposition 36), 25 
FEDERAL SENTENCING REPORTER 265 (2013). 
 299. See Prop. 36, supra note 67; CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 667(e)(2)(A)(ii), 
1170.12(c)(2)(A)(ii). 
 300. Id. 
 301. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(d)(1) (defining these felonies). Prior convictions for 
these purposes are violent felonies defined under § 667.5(c) or serious felonies defined 
under § 1192.7(c). These offenses include: murder, mayhem, various sexual crimes, arson, 
kidnapping, robbery, etc. 
 302. Id. § 667(e)(1). 
 303. SENATE BILL 105 INTERIM REPORT, supra note 21, at 4. 
 304. Id. 
 305. Id. 
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second strike admissions were 6,059 during an eight month period two 
years later, representing a 20 percent increase.306 Among the more 
significant second strike admission increases were a 55 percent 
increase for Possession of a Controlled Substance.307 
Reforming the second-strike provision in a manner similar to the 
third-strike reforms of Proposition 36 would require either a two-thirds 
majority vote of both houses of the Legislature or another voter 
initiative.308 For the first time since 1883, California democrats have a 
super majority in both houses and could, theoretically, change the 
Three Strikes law.309 However, it appears extremely unlikely they will 
do so given, as discussed below, the Legislature’s rejection of other 
much more modest sentencing reforms.310 
2. The Governor and Attorney General Could Expedite and 
Assist Review of Current Prisoners’ Cases Eligible for 
Retroactive Application of Proposition 36 
Proposition 36 also includes a limited retroactive resentencing 
provision that allows any already-sentenced prisoner serving an 
indeterminate life sentence for a non-serious, non-violent third-strike to 
 306. Id. 
 307. Id. 
 308. See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 667(j), 1170.12(g). A critically important aspect of the 
Three Strikes ballot initiative for our purposes is its specific provision (section 4) that allows 
it to be amended or repealed only by a two-thirds legislative supermajority or another voter 
initiative. See Erik G. Luna, Foreword: Three Strikes in a Nutshell, 20 T. JEFFERSON L. 
REV. 1, 9 (1998).  
 309. See Senators, CAL. STATE SEN., http://senate.ca.gov/senators; MEMBERS, CAL. 
STATE ASSEMB. http://assembly.ca.gov/assemblymembers. See also Rick Orlov and Andrew 
Edwards, California’s Democratic Supermajority Promises Not to Abuse New Power, LA 
DAILY NEWS (Dec. 4, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/12/04/california-
democratic-supermajority_n_2237991.html.  
 310. As the time this article was submitted for publication, a new sentencing reform 
ballot initiative had been issued a title and summary by the Attorney General for circulation 
to gather signatures to qualify for inclusion in the 2014 election. See Initiatives and 
Referenda Cleared for Circulation, CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, available at 
http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/ballot-measures/cleared-for-circulation.htm (showing that 
initiative 13-0060: “Criminal Sentences. Misdemeanor Penalties. Initiative Statute” received 
title and summary from the Attorney General and was cleared for circulation). The 
proponents are San Francisco District Attorney and former Police Chief George Gascon and 
former San Diego Police Chief William Lansdowne. Id. The initiative would reduce the 
felonies and wobblers discussed above, as well as some others, to misdemeanors for most 
defendants, excluding only those defendants with specified serious prior felonies. Id. In 
addition, the legislative analyst found that the fiscal impact would result in criminal justice 
savings in the low hundreds of millions of dollars annually at both the state and county 
levels. Id. 
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petition for a recall of his or her sentence.311 The original sentencing 
court will conduct a hearing to determine whether to retroactively 
impose a new sentence consistent with the prospective sentencing rules 
created by Proposition 36.312 
Under this retroactive resentencing provision, currently 
incarcerated eligible third-strikers are entitled to file petitions within 
two years of the implementation of Proposition 36.313 As of April 2014, 
1,613 prisoners had been released from custody under Proposition 
36.314 Approximately 1,500 additional prisoners were eligible for relief 
under Proposition 36 and waiting to have their cases reviewed in 
county courts.315 In Los Angeles County alone, 651 cases of inmates 
eligible for relief under Proposition 36 had yet to be processed.316 
Prisoners released under Prop. 36 have thus far demonstrated they pose 
little threat to public safety. According to a report from Stanford 
University, “CDCR data shows that the recidivism rate of prisoners 
released under Proposition 36 is 1.3 percent. By comparison, the 
recidivism rate of all other inmates released from prison over the same 
period of time is over 30 percent. … Those released pursuant to 
Proposition 36 have a better recidivism rate than any other comparable 
cohort of prisoners released from CDCR custody.”317 The same report 
found that Proposition 36 has already saved California over $30 million 
dollars in prison costs, and is likely to save taxpayers over $750 million 
over the next ten years.318 Facilitated implementation of Proposition 
36’s retroactivity provision could expedite the release of eligible 
prisoners. This could be achieved by, for instance, having the Attorney 
General’s office review the relevant files and recommend release even 
 311. Prop. 36, supra note 67, § 6; CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.126. 
 312. Id. 
 313. Id. 
 314. See Proposition 36 Progress Report: Over 1,500 Prisoners Released, Historically 
Low Recidivism Rate, STANFORD LAW SCHOOL THREE STRIKES PROJECT, NAACP LEGAL 
DEFENSE AND EDUCATION FUND (Apr. 2014), available at 
http://www.threestrikesproject.org. 
 315. See id. at 3. 
 316. See id. at 1. Prisoners released under Prop. 36 have thus far demonstrated they pose 
little threat to public safety. According to a report from Stanford University, “The 
recidivism rate of prisoners released under Proposition 36 to date is well below state and 
national averages. Fewer than 2 percent of the prisoners released under Proposition 36 have 
been charged with new crimes, according to state and county records. By comparison, the 
average recidivism rate over a similar time period for non-Proposition 36 inmates leaving 
California prisons is 16 percent. Nationwide, 30 percent of inmates released from state 
prisons are arrested for a new crime within six months of release.” Id. at 1–2. 
 317. Id. at 1–2. 
 318. Id. at 3. 
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in the absence of, or prior to filing of, a petition from the prisoner.319 
Of course, the Governor could also order these prisoners released under 
his constitutional power to commute sentences.320  
 319. See Declaration of James Austin in Support of Plaintiffs’ Statement in Response to 
October 11, 2012 Order Regarding Population Reduction, supra note 18. 
 320. CAL. CONST. art. V, § 8. 
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Table 2. Primary Offense Sentenced Under the 2 and 3 
Strikes Law as of August 2011 CDCR Prison Population 
Source: CDCR 
Crime 2nd Striker 3rd Striker 
 Prisoners % Prisoners % 
Totals 28,384 100% 8,576 100% 
Violence 10,783 38% 2,996 35% 
 Homicide 986 3% 133 2% 
 Robbery 5,589 20% 2,004 23% 
 Assault & battery 3,401 12% 609 7% 
 Rape/sex crime 412 1% 161 2% 
 Other Crimes 
Person 395 1% 89 1% 
Property 6,838 24% 2,585 30% 
 Burglary 3,602 13% 1,481 17% 
 Larceny 906 3% 338 4% 
 PT w/ priors 883 3% 363 4% 
 Other property 1,447 5% 403 5% 
Drugs 4,773 17% 1,271 15% 
 Drug Sale/
Manufacture 2,092 7% 368 4% 
 Drug Possession 2,681 9% 903 11% 
Other Crimes 5,990 21% 1,724 20% 
 Weapons 1,225 4% 429 5% 
 Neglect children 1,162 4% 176 2% 
 MV-Fleeing 
Accident 1,022 4% 393 5% 
 Bigamy/incest 1,012 4% 363 4% 
 Sex offender-
registration 409 1% 139 2% 
 DUI 279 1% 53 1% 
 Obscene matter 19 0% 5 0% 
 Indecent 
exposure 28 0% 25 0% 
 Crime against 
dependent adult 72 0% 4 0% 
 Crime against 
public peace 17 0% 9 0% 
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 Threat to 
government  139 0% 25 0% 
 Criminal threats 606 2% 103 1% 
 
3. The Legislature Could Reclassify Some Non-Serious, Non-
Violent Wobblers and Felonies as Misdemeanors 
As noted above, reforming the second-strike provision of the 
original Three Strikes law would require either a two-thirds majority 
vote of both houses of the Legislature or another voter initiative.321 
However, the Legislature could reduce some felony and wobbler 
crimes to misdemeanors by simple majority vote. This would 
significantly reduce the second-strike prison population and reduce 
local jail populations.  
As noted above, once a person has suffered one conviction for a 
serious or violent felony, any new felony conviction, even if not 
serious or violent, triggers a double-length sentence (second-strike).322 
Historically, many of California’s long second- and third-strike 
sentences are triggered by felony convictions for minor low-level drug 
or property crimes that are either currently punishable as felonies or as 
“wobblers”—crimes which prosecutors have discretion to charge either 
as a felony or as a misdemeanor.323 Examples of wobblers that can lead 
to a felony conviction and trigger an increased sentence are simple 
possession of amphetamines, methamphetamine or hashish, some types 
of forgery,324 vandalism,325 writing bad checks,326 some minor theft 
crimes,327 and many other non-serious, non-violent crimes.328 
 321. See supra note 277; CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 667(j), 1170.12(g). 
 322. See supra note 277; CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 667(e)(1), 1170.12(c)(1). 
 323. See supra Table 2. 
 324. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 470, 473. 
 325. Id. § 594(b)(1). 
 326. Id. § 476a(a). 
 327. See, e.g., id. §§ 487, 666 (defining grand theft). Section 487b may also be 
considered a minor theft crime, though it is punishable only as a felony. The offense has a 
low threshold: the conversion of real property $250 or more in value. 
 328. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11377(a) (West 2007); CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 
470, 473, 476a(a), 487, 594(b)(1) 666. Other non-serious, non-violent wobblers include 
California Penal Code Section 460 (burglary in the second degree, or commercial burglary), 
California Vehicle Code Section 10851(a) (vehicle theft), and California Penal Code Section 
470b (possession of forged driver’s license or identification card). Although the offenses 
under California Penal Code Section 1320(b) (willful failure to appear in connection with a 
felony after release on own recognizance) and Section 1320.5 (willful failure to appear in 
connection with a felony after release on bail) are codified as felonies, both are punishable 
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 If the Legislature reduced any of the non-serious, non-violent 
offenses that have historically triggered lengthy second- or third-strike 
sentences to misdemeanors, those convictions would no longer invoke 
the second-strike provision of the Three Strikes law,329 thereby 
reducing the prison population. In 2013, there were a total of 34,699 
serving a second-strike sentence in California state prisons, of which 
14,460 had triggering felonies that were non-serious, non-violent, and 
non-sex offenses.330  
It is worth noting that even the federal government charges simple 
possession of controlled substances as a misdemeanor, not a felony.331 
Moreover, the federal Department of Justice has acknowledged the 
problems associated with long sentences for petty drug crimes and has 
recently taken steps to reduce mandatory minimums and otherwise 
lessen some of the long prison terms these offenses.332 Similarly, the 
California Legislature has acknowledged that the wobblers are 
relatively minor crimes not worthy of felony status and state prison 
sentences. Wobblers can be charged as misdemeanors, subject to the 
discretion of the prosecutor.333 Moreover, all of these wobblers and 
low-level felonies are non-serious, non-violent crimes that the 
Legislature has now “realigned,” under AB 109, meaning sentences 
will be served in county jails rather than state prison (provided that 
defendants have no prior convictions for serious, violent, or sex 
offenses).334 It would be a relatively modest additional step for the 
Legislature to change the status of these offenses to misdemeanors.335 
by either imprisonment in the county jail for not more than one year or imprisonment 
pursuant to subdivision (h) of California Penal Code Section 1170–the typical sentencing 
structure for a wobbler. 
 329. Since the implementation of Proposition 36, these non-serious, non-violent felonies 
no longer trigger the third-strike provision of the law. See supra note 267. 
 330. See SENATE BILL 105 INTERIM REPORT, supra note 21, at 4. 
 331. 21 U.S.C.A. § 844 (West 2014).  
 332. See DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, ATTORNEY GENERAL HOLDER 
URGES CHANGES IN FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES TO RESERVE HARSHEST 
PENALTIES FOR MOST SERIOUS DRUG TRAFFICKERS (Mar. 13, 2014), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2014/March/14-ag-263.html. 
 333. See BERWICK, LINDENBERG & ROO, supra note 71, at 4 (defining wobblers as 
felonies which may be reduced to a misdemeanor under the discretion of a prosecutor, 
judge, or magistrate). 
 334. See J. Couzens and Bigelow, supra note 15, at 6–8 (listing the non-violent, non-
serious felony offenses that are excluded from county jail sentences under Realignment). 
 335. Public support for such sentencing reform appears to be both broad and intense, 
according to public opinion research conducted by Tulchin Research. According to data 
from a Tulchin Research survey conducted in May 2012, nearly three-quarters (seventy 
percent) of likely California voters support reducing the penalty for simple possession of a 
small amount of drug for personal use from a felony to a misdemeanor. Memorandum from 
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The impact of this proposed sentencing reform is illustrated by 
considering the current number of state prisoners incarcerated for these 
low-level, non-serious, non-violent offenses. Over 25 percent of the 
state prison population (33,678) is currently serving a prison term for a 
non-serious and non-violent crime.336 Of this total, 11,471 inmates also 
do not have a conviction for a prior serious or violent crime (8 percent 
of the total prison population).337 
B. Political Obstacles to Reform 
The State’s argument, in their Plata briefing, explaining why it is 
unacceptable to divert additional prisoners, convicted of drug 
possession, from state prison to local jails is telling. Rather than 
speaking in terms of statutory or constitutional impediments, the State 
said this: 
The prison population could be reduced further if additional 
felonies, which are currently punishable by state prison (including 
drug possession, petty theft, second degree burglary, vehicle theft, 
and forgery), were instead treated as punishable by incarceration in 
county jail only. Assuming sentencing laws were changed and 
made effective after June 2013, the population could be reduced by 
228 inmates by December 2013. 
 This is another poor choice because counties are still working to 
implement their additional responsibilities under realignment. If 
any changes are implemented that require county jail incarceration, 
they should not be imposed by a federal court, but instead 
considered by the state Legislature, which can address the various 
stakeholders’ concerns and determine whether these changes serve 
sound public safety and criminal justice objectives.338 
Perhaps there is some merit to the State’s assertion that sentencing 
Tulchin Research to Interested Parties 1 (May 21, 2012), available at 
https://www.aclunc.org/issues/criminal_justice/asset_upload_file19_10808.pdf. The 
pollsters found that “an overwhelming majority of voters support reducing personal drug 
possession charges for drugs such as ‘heroin, cocaine or methamphetamine’ from a felony 
charge to a misdemeanor charge.” Id. at 3. Moreover, forty-three percent strongly support 
the proposal, twenty-seven percent somewhat support, and twenty-seven percent oppose, 
with just three percent undecided on the matter. Id. Support for reform is extraordinarily 
widespread, encompassing solid majorities of Democrats (seventy-eight percent), 
independents (seventy-two percent), and Republicans (fifty-seven percent), as well as 
majorities of voters in every corner of the state. Id. at 4. 
 336. SENATE BILL 105 INTERIM REPORT, supra note 21, at 6. 
 337. Id. 
 338. Amended Defendants’ Response to April 11, 2013 Order Requiring List of 
Proposed Population Reduction Measures, supra note 209, at 8 (emphasis added). 
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reforms like these would be more appropriately enacted via the 
legislative process than imposed by federal judicial fiat. But the federal 
courts have been forced to step in to address the State’s overcrowded 
prisons precisely because the political process has repeatedly failed.  
In their January 2013 pleadings in the Plata litigation, the State 
asserted that further reductions in the prison population necessary to 
meet the court-imposed cap were impossible without amending the 
state constitution or changing state law.339 They further argued that no 
additional reductions were possible without significantly threatening 
public safety: 
The further prison population reductions that would be needed to 
satisfy the Court’s population cap cannot be achieved unless the 
Court alters state law, dictates the adoption of risky prison policies, 
and orders the early release of inmates serving prison terms for 
serious and violent felonies. The Court itself would need to take 
these actions because Defendants are barred from adopting new 
population-reduction measures by state law and the state 
constitution. Some of these prohibitions can only be changed by a 
supermajority of the Legislature or by voter initiative.340 
Similarly, Governor Brown has stated in press interviews that he 
“wants to respect the law of California, what the people have enacted 
or the Legislature.”341 These assertions, though, cloak policy decisions 
in the false mantle of constitutional and statutory imperative. It is true 
that reforms like those proposed in this Article to change some 
wobblers and non-serious, non-violent felonies to misdemeanors would 
require changing existing statutes. And, as noted previously, directly 
extending reforms like those accomplished by Proposition 36’s 
amendment of the Three Strikes laws to second-strikers as well would 
indeed require a constitutional amendment. 
Yet it is also true that Realignment itself required hundreds of 
amendments to the California Penal Code, and another ballot initiative 
authored, financed, and championed by the Brown administration 
(Proposition 30, enacted by voters in the November 2012 election) was 
required to provide constitutionally-protected funding.342 Sentencing 
 339. Id. 
 340. Id. 
 341. California Challenges Federal Oversight of Prisons, KQED, supra note 207. 
 342. See Text of Proposed Laws: Proposition 30, at sec. 3(d), CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, 
available at http://vig.cdn.sos.ca.gov/2012/general/pdf/text-proposed-laws-
v2.pdf#nameddest=prop30 (“This measure gives constitutional protection to the shift of 
local public safety programs from state to local control and the shift of state revenues to 
local government to pay for those programs.”); CAL. CONST. art. XIII, §§ 36(b)–(c) (Section 
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reform would also be possible if the political leadership in Sacramento 
pushed as hard in the Legislature and with the public as they did to 
enact and fund Realignment. The choice not to do so is just that: a 
political choice, not an externally imposed mandate. As we 
demonstrate in the next Section, all too often in Sacramento such 
political choices are dictated by powerful law enforcement interests 
perennially opposed to sentencing reform. 
1. Tales from the Legislative Trenches: Two Modest Sentencing 
Reform Proposals Defeated by Law Enforcement 
a. SB 1506 To Reduce the Penalty for Personal Possession 
of Small Amounts of Controlled Substances 
In the 2011–2012 legislative session, Senator Mark Leno (D-San 
Francisco) introduced Senate Bill 1506, which proposed to add 
California to the list of thirteen states,343 the District of Columbia, and 
the federal government currently treating possession of drugs for 
personal use as a misdemeanor rather than a felony or a wobbler.344 
Longer sentences have never been demonstrated to effectively deter or 
limit drug abuse.345 Instead, research conducted by the Justice Policy 
Institute shows that states, and the District of Columbia, charging drug 
possession as a misdemeanor have higher rates of treatment admissions 
and slightly lower rates of illicit drug use than states charging it as a 
felony.346 This bill would have saved state and county governments a 
36 was added on November 6, 2012 by initiative proposition 30).; Marisa Lagos and Wyatt 
Buchanan, Much More Rides on Prop. 30 than Schools, SF CHRON. (Nov. 3, 2012), 
available at http://www.sfgate.com/news/article/Much-more-rides-on-Prop-30-than-schools-
4006526.php; Kevin Yamamura, Funding Fight On if Prop. 30 Fails, SACRAMENTO BEE 
(Oct. 23, 2012), available at http://www.sacbee.com/2012/10/23/4930852/funding-fight-on-
if-prop-30-fails.html. 
 343. Delaware, Iowa, Maine, Massachusetts, Mississippi, New York, Pennsylvania, 
South Carolina, Tennessee, Vermont, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. See DEL. 
CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 4763 (West 2014); IOWA CODE ANN. § 124.401(5) (West 2014); ME. 
REV. STAT. tit. 17-A, §§ 1107-A (C-F), 1252 (West 2014); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 
94C, § 34 (West 2014); MISS. CODE. ANN. § 41-29-139(c) (West 2014); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 
220.03 (McKinney 2014); 35 PA. STAT. ANN. §§ 780-113(a)(1), (b) (West 2014); S.C. CODE 
ANN. § 44-53-370(c) (West 2014); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 39-17-418(a), (c) (West 2014); 
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 4231-4235a (West 2014); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 60A-4-401(c) 
(West 2014); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 961.41(3g) (West 2014); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 35-7-
1031(c)(1) (West 2014). 
 344. See D.C. CODE § 48-904.01(d)(1) (West 2014); 21 U.S.C.A. § 844 (West 2014). 
 345. See JUSTICE POLICY INST., SUBSTANCE ABUSE TREATMENT AND PUBLIC SAFETY 7 
(Jan. 2008), available at 
http://www.justicepolicy.org/images/upload/08_01_REP_DrugTx_AC-PS.pdf. 
 346. Id. at 2. Unlike California where the punishment for possession of drugs, other than 
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billion dollars over five years347 and allowed communities to preserve 
jail space for people who pose a risk to public safety.348 The 
Legislative Analyst’s Office estimated that SB 1506 would have 
resulted in “an annual savings of nearly $160 million for counties and 
just over $64 million for the state.”349 It also would have reduced “the 
average daily state prison population by about 2,200 people and the 
average daily county jails population by 2,000 people.”350 Finally, SB 
1506 would have reduced recidivism by eliminating the lifetime 
barriers to employment, housing, and education that accompany felony 
convictions.351 
marijuana, is typically a felony, 13 states, the District of Columbia, and the federal 
government treat all drug possession as a misdemeanor. See C.R.S. §§ 18-18-404, 18-18-
403.5, 18-1.3-501, 18-1.3-401, An Act Concerning Reduction of Sentences for Particular 
Drug Crimes, and, in connection therewith, Creating a Drug Offender Treatment Fund, S.B. 
03-318, Session Laws of 2003, First Regular Session of the 64th General Assembly, ch. 424 
§ 1; DEL. CODE tit. 11, § 4206, DEL. CODE tit. 16, §§ 4763, 4767, An Act to Amend Titles 
10, 11, 16 and 21 of the Delaware Code Relating to Drug-Involved Offenses, H.B. 19, 
Second Regular Session of the 146th General Assembly ch. 13 (2011); IOWA CODE §§ 
124.401(5), 903.1; 17-A M.R.S. §§ 1101, 1103, 1107-A, 1252; MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 94c § 
34, MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 274 § 1; MISS. CODE § 41-29-139(c)(1); N.Y. PENAL CODE §§ 
70.70, 220.03, 220.06, 220.09; 35 PA. STAT. § 780-113(a)(1), (b); S.C. CODE §§ 44-53-
370(c), (d); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 39-17-418, 39-17-419, 40-35-11; VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, 
§§ 4231, 4233; VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 1; W. VA. CODE §§ 60A-4-401(c), 60A-4-407, 
60A-4-408; WIS. STAT. § 961.41(3g); WYO. STAT. §§ 35-7-1030, 35-7-1031, 35-7-1032, 
35-7-1033, 35-7-1038; MD. CODE, CRIM. LAW §§ 5-601(c), 5-614(a); N.C.G.S. § 90-95(d), 
15A-1340.17, O.R.C. §§ 2925.11(C), 2925.01(D), 2929.14(A)(5); V.T.C. HEALTH & 
SAFETY CODE §§ 481.115, 481. 102, V.T.C. PENAL CODE § 12.35; D.C. CODE § 48-
904.01(d)(1), (e); 21 U.S.C. §§ 844(a), 841, 18 U.S.C. § 3607. Moreover, drug crime is not 
higher in those states. See SUBSTANCE ABUSE AND MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES ADMIN., 
STATE REPORTS ON ALCOHOL, TOBACCO, AND ILLEGAL DRUG USE (2007), available at 
http://oas.samhsa.gov/statesList.cfm. 
 347. See Letter from Mac Taylor, Legislative Analyst, to Mark Leno, California State 
Sen. (Feb. 28, 2012) (on file with the office of Sen. Leno); see also Leno Bill Revises 
Penalty for Simple Drug Possession, CAL. STATE SEN. MARK LENO (Feb. 27, 2012), 
http://sd11.senate.ca.gov/news/2012-02-27-leno-bill-revises-penalty-simple-drug-possession 
[hereinafter Leno Bill]. 
 348. S.B. 1506, 2011–2012 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2012). 
 349. See Wyatt Buchanan, Calif. Bill would ease drug possession penalties, SF GATE 
(Apr. 18, 2012), http://www.sfgate.com/news/article/Calif-bill-would-ease-drug-possession-
penalties-3490103.php#ixzz2KbheUqXn; see also Leno Bill, supra note 347 (“The 
Legislative Analyst’s Office estimates reducing penalties for drug possession will save 
counties about $159 million annually, in addition to yearly savings for the State totaling 
$64.4 million.”). 
 350. Id. 
 351. See CHRISTY VISHER, SARA DEBUS & JENNIFER YAHNER, JUSTICE POLICY CTR., 
EMPLOYMENT AFTER PRISON: A LONGITUDINAL STUDY OF RELEASES IN THREE STATES, 
(Oct. 2008), available at 
http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/411778_employment_after_prison.pdf (study 
indicating that inmates who were employed and earning higher wages after release were less 
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b. SB 210: Reforming Pre-Trial Detention Practices to 
Allow More Individuals Charged with Non-Violent, Non-
Serious Offenses to Be Released From Jail While 
Awaiting Their Day in Court 
SB 210, introduced in the 2011–2012 legislative session by 
Senator Loni Hancock (D-Oakland), would have provided a framework 
whereby pretrial detainees, whom the court determines present a 
minimal risk to public safety, could be released to community 
supervision while they await trial—instead of taking up jail space 
because they cannot afford bail.352 As discussed above, the vast 
majority of people in county jails statewide on any given day are being 
held pretrial.353 A significant portion of these individuals remain in jail 
awaiting their day in court, not because they present a risk to public 
safety, but because they cannot afford to pay bail.354 Notably, Latino 
and black defendants are more likely than white defendants to be held 
in jail because of an inability to post bail.355 SB 210 would have simply 
required judges to consider whether defendants were appropriate for 
community monitoring even if they could not afford bail.356 
Jurisdictions across the country—including some counties in 
California—have implemented similar reforms and, as a result, have 
been able to avoid or reduce jail overcrowding while protecting public 
safety and saving tax dollars.357 
2. Thwarting Reform: The Law Enforcement Lobby 
Opposition from the District Attorneys’, Sheriffs’, and Police 
Chiefs’ Associations defeated these bills.358 Sen. Leno reintroduced a 
likely to return to prison the first year out); see also CROSSROADS, supra note 138, app. C 
(explaining how research has demonstrated that employment is a key factor in reducing 
recidivism). 
 352. S.B. 210, 2011–2012 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2012). 
 353. Sixty-two percent of people in California jails are unsentenced. See JPS, supra note 
112. 
 354. Id. 
 355. Stephen Demuth, Racial and Ethnic Differences in Pretrial Release Decisions and 
Outcomes: A comparison of Hispanic, Black, and White Felony Arrestees, 41 
CRIMINOLOGY 873, 877 (2003). 
 356. S.B. 210, 2011–2012 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2012). 
 357. Id. 
 358. See, e.g., Senate Committee on Public Safety Bill Analysis for S.B. 1506, 2011–
2012 Reg. Sess. (Apr. 16, 2012), available at http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/11-
12/bill/sen/sb_1501-1550/sb_1506_cfa_20120416_121628_sen_comm.html;  Assembly 
Committee on Public Safety Bill Analysis for S.B. 210, 2011–2012 Reg. Sess. (July 2, 2012), 
available at http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/11-12/bill/sen/sb_0201-
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compromise version of SB 1506 in the 2013–2014 legislative session. 
The new bill, SB 649, would have reduced the felony drug possession 
offenses in the original bill to wobblers, rather than misdemeanors as 
proposed in SB 1506.359 The compromise version was again opposed 
by the District Attorneys’, Sheriffs’, and Police Chiefs’ 
Associations.360 This time, despite this opposition, SB 649 was 
approved by the Senate and the Assembly and sent to Governor Brown 
for his signature. The Governor, however, vetoed the bill.361  
Other commentators have thoroughly documented the ways in 
which this powerful law enforcement lobby has aggressively fought 
virtually any proposal to reform state sentencing laws over the past 
forty years.362 Throughout the country, law enforcement special 
interests and politicians have manipulated the public’s fear of crime to 
justify ever-harsher punishment, longer sentences, and more prisons 
and jails.363 California illustrates this dynamic perhaps better than any 
0250/sb_210_cfa_20120702_100001_asm_comm.html (not surprisingly, SB 210, the 
pretrial release reform bill, was also opposed by the private bail bond industry); Senate 
Committee on Public Safety Bill Analysis for S.B. 649, 2012–2013 Reg. Sess. (Apr. 17, 
2013), available at http://leginfo.ca.gov/pub/13-14/bill/sen/sb_0601-
0650/sb_649_cfa_20130422_095056_sen_comm.html. 
 359.  See S.B. 1506, 2011–2012 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2012). 
 360. See Senate Committee on Public Safety Bill Analysis for S.B. 649, supra note 327; 
Assembly Committee on Public Safety Bill Analysis for S.B. 649, 2013–2014 Reg. Sess. 
(June 12, 2013), available at http://leginfo.ca.gov/pub/13-14/bill/sen/sb_0601-
0650/sb_649_cfa_20130612_155938_asm_comm.html. 
 361. Veto Message for S.B. 649, 2012–2013 Reg. Sess. (Oct. 12, 2013), available at 
http://leginfo.ca.gov/pub/13-14/bill/sen/sb_0601-0650/sb_649_vt_20131012.html. 
 362. See, e.g., JOSHUA PAGE, THE TOUGHEST BEAT: POLITICS, PUNISHMENT, AND THE 
PRISON OFFICERS UNION IN CALIFORNIA 6 (2011) (describing the history of the California 
prison guards’ union (CCPOA) and the ways in which their political influence grew 
markedly with prison expansion, making them a powerful force in California politics able to 
repeatedly defeat attempts to reform state sentencing laws); FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING ET AL., 
PUNISHMENT AND DEMOCRACY: THREE STRIKES AND YOU’RE OUT IN CALIFORNIA 3–16 
(2001) (describing law enforcement lobby’s role in defeating numerous attempts to revise 
the most draconian elements of the state’s “Three Strikes” law shows); Michael C. 
Campbell, Politics, Prisons, and Law Enforcement: An Examination of the Emergence of 
“Law and Order” Politics in Texas, 45 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 631, 661–62 (2011) (describing 
how groups affiliated with law enforcement have emerged as some of the most active 
opponents of recent efforts by California to reduce overcrowding by releasing qualified 
inmates early). 
 363. See, e.g., BARKER, supra note 59, at 81–83 (The author describes how Crime 
Victims United of California (CVUC), a political action committee made up of crime 
victims groups, law enforcement organizations, and high-profile state officials such as the 
governor and attorney general led a successful campaign against Proposition 66, a 2004 
ballot initiative seeking to reform the state’s harsh Three Strikes law, “based on fear and 
loathing. They tapped into the public’s fear of random violence, its sense of victimization 
and insecurity about crime, moral outrage about child molesters and sex offenders. . . .”); see 
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other state. As one former state Senator stated in June 2011, “There’s a 
political paralysis here—people are afraid . . . of being labeled soft on 
crime, so they legislate by sound bite.”364 Michael Jacobson, the 
Executive Director of the Vera Institute of Justice,365 explained in 
2008: 
Meaningful prison reform has eluded the state for decades, already 
resulting in a federal takeover of the state prison’s medical system 
and a pending federal takeover of the rest of the system. Why the 
California correctional system has grown so fast and become so 
overcrowded and violent is the subject for another article. Suffice it 
to say that because the politics of crime in California are so 
difficult and involve so many powerful interest groups, including 
the state’s district attorneys, the California Correctional Peace 
Officers Association, victims’ rights groups, and police chiefs, 
along with a wide political split between Democratic and 
Republican legislators on matters of crime policy, achieving 
consensus on reform proposals has proven impossible. Add in all 
the public referenda toughening sentences over the last few years, 
and you end up with a toxic political mix, which has to date 
prevented any serious reform of this behemoth system.366 
Similarly, the Center for Juvenile and Criminal Justice explained in a 
2011 report on the influence of the law enforcement lobby on 
California incarceration rates: 
Both driving the decades long changes in incarceration rates and 
severity of the sentences handed out, and also seeking to take 
advantage of them, is a network of special interest groups, 
professional associations, and Sacramento-based lobbyists. Groups 
such as the California Correctional Peace Officers’ Association 
(CCPOA); the Police Chiefs Association; the Sheriffs Association; 
the District Attorneys Association (CDAA); Crime Victims United 
also SIMON, JONATHAN, GOVERNING THROUGH CRIME: HOW THE WAR ON CRIME 
TRANSFORMED AMERICAN DEMOCRACY AND CREATED A CULTURE OF FEAR 75–110 
(2007); Campbell, supra note 362, at 632. (“Law enforcement groups enjoy a privileged 
degree of public legitimacy, and, as the successful defeat of California’s attempts to revise 
the most draconian elements of the state’s “Three Strikes” law shows, are often unwilling to 
compromise on policies widely regarded as ineffective in dealing with crime.”). 
 364. Marisa Lagos, Political Will for Reform is Lacking: California Lags Behind in 
Reducing Incarceration, SF CHRON, June 13, 2011, at 1a. 
 365. The Vera Institute is an independent, nonpartisan, nonprofit center for justice policy 
and practice, with offices in New York City, Washington, DC, and New Orleans. Vera’s 
projects and reform initiatives, typically conducted in partnership with local, state, or 
national officials, are located across the United States and around the world. 
 366. Michael Jacobson, Crisis and Opportunity in California’s Prison System, 13 
BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 319, 320 (2008). 
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(CVU); and the Peace Officers Research Association of California 
(PORAC)—which puts out policy papers and other materials 
advocating for particular criminal justice changes—have spent 
millions of dollars over the years influencing elections, lobbying 
for and against specific policies, and, endorsing and donating to 
candidates who offer them favorable employment contracts and the 
chance to expand their membership roles.367 
While on the one hand, many county officials have decried the 
additional burdens Realignment places upon local criminal justice 
systems, elected Sheriffs, District Attorneys, and Police Chiefs from 
those same counties have, through their lobbyists in Sacramento, 
opposed the very reforms necessary to make Realignment work better 
and to reduce the pressures on local jails.368  
The statewide law enforcement associations are likely to continue 
to oppose sentencing reforms like those proposed in this Article. 
Indeed, without the external countervailing pressure on the State from 
the Plata litigation, it is unlikely that Realignment would ever have 
been enacted in the first place.  
C. Public Support for Reform 
Recent public opinion polls demonstrate that Californians across 
the state and across the political spectrum overwhelmingly support 
smart-on-crime policies, including alternatives to incarceration for 
many low-level offenses, and especially for people who are awaiting 
trial and who pose little risk to public safety.369 Nationally, nearly two-
thirds of Americans, across almost all demographic groups, support 
moving away from mandatory prison terms for non-violent drug 
crimes.370 California voters also strongly support the specific reforms 
 367. ABRAMSKY, supra note 46. 
 368. See, e.g., S.B. 210, 2011–2012 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2012); Senate Committee on 
Public Safety Bill Analysis for S.B. 1506, 2011–2012 Reg. Sess. (Apr. 16, 2012), available 
at http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/11-12/bill/sen/sb_1501-
1550/sb_1506_cfa_20120416_121628_sen_comm.html (demonstrating that District 
Attorneys, Police, and Sheriffs associations were opposed to the bill); Assembly Committee 
on Public Safety Bill Analysis for S.B. 210, 2011–2012 Reg. Sess. (July 2, 2012), available 
at http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/11-12/bill/sen/sb_0201-
0250/sb_210_cfa_20120702_100001_asm_comm.html (demonstrating that District 
Attorneys, Police, and Sheriffs associations were opposed to the bill). 
 369. See AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, REALIGNMENT ONE-YEAR ANNIVERSARY: AN 
AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION ASSESSMENT (Sept. 27, 2012), available at 
https://www.aclunc.org/issues/criminal_justice/asset_upload_file861_10684.pdf [hereinafter 
REALIGNMENT ONE-YEAR ANNIVERSARY]. 
 370. Carroll Doherty, Juliana Menasce Horowitz & Rob Suls, PEW RESEARCH CTR., 
America’s New Drug Policy Landscape, Two-Thirds Favor Treatment, Not Jail, for Use of 
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that died in the Legislature during the 2011–2012 and 2012–2013 
sessions. According to data from Tulchin Research surveys conducted 
in May and September 2012, 7 out of 10 likely voters favor allowing 
courts to require monitoring in the community instead of jail for those 
who cannot afford to post bail.371 Another seventy percent support 
reducing the penalty for simple possession of a small amount of drugs 
for personal use.372 
Californians are entirely more concerned with the state’s poor 
economic condition, lack of jobs, the state budget, and cuts to 
education than with crime and related issues. Barely 1 percent ranked 
crime, drugs, gangs, and violence combined as the state’s most serious 
problem.373 Nearly 4 out of 5 voters (78 percent) believe that our 
prisons and jails are overcrowded and we should look for alternatives, 
while only 15 percent disagree.374 When given a choice as to how to 
spend law enforcement dollars, voters overwhelmingly prefer investing 
in “more prevention and alternatives to jail for non-violent offenders” 
than building “more prisons and jails” (75 percent compared with only 
12 percent).375 
Additionally, as noted above, California voters demonstrated, for 
the first time in decades, widespread popular support for scaling back 
some of the state’s harsh sentencing laws when they overwhelmingly 
passed Proposition 36, revising the state’s 1994 Three Strikes 
scheme.376 Perhaps more remarkable than the overall margin of victory 
for Prop. 36 (69.3 percent to 30.7 percent) is the fact that it garnered a 
majority of votes in each of the state’s 58 counties; in most counties, 
the “yes” vote was close to or more than 60 percent.377 
When voters demonstrate such strong support for evidence-based 
public policy, elected officials must follow or be held accountable.378  
Heroin, Cocaine at 7–8 (Apr. 2, 2014), http://www.people-press.org/files/legacy-pdf/04-02-
14%20Drug%20Policy%20Release.pdf [hereinafter America’s New Drug Policy 
Landscape].  
 371. REALIGNMENT ONE-YEAR ANNIVERSARY, supra note 369. 
 372. Id.; America’s New Drug Policy Landscape, supra note 370, at 7–8.  
 373. See REALIGNMENT ONE-YEAR ANNIVERSARY, supra note 369. 
 374. Id. 
 375. Id. 
 376. See Prop. 36, supra note 67. 
 377. See CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, STATEMENT OF VOTE NOVEMBER 6, 2012, GENERAL 
ELECTION 68–69 (2012), available at http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/sov/2012-
general/sov-complete.pdf.  
 378. It’s Time to Revise Penalties for Simple Drug Possession, ACLU OF N. CAL., 
available at 
https://www.aclunc.org/issues/criminal_justice/it’s_time_to_revise_penalties_for_simple_dr
ug_possession.shtml. 
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CONCLUSION  
Much of this Article has focused upon Realignment in the context 
of the State’s attempts to comply with the population cap set by Plata. 
But even if the State can achieve the three-judge courts’ 137.5 percent 
population target through some combination of Realignment, SB 105, 
additional funding to further expand prison capacity, and prisoner 
release orders from the three-judge court’s Compliance Monitor, 
California prisons will still be overflowing. It is important to remember 
that the three-judge court set the 137.5 percent cap pursuant to the 
PLRA, which requires significant federal deference to states’ decisions 
about running their prison systems.379 The court-ordered reduction may 
well not be sufficient to end constitutionally prohibited cruel and 
unusual punishment.380 Even assuming that compliance with the Plata 
 379. See Plata, 131 S. Ct. at 1945 (noting the “strong evidence” that a population limit 
of 130% might be necessary to remedy the constitutional violations, while also 
acknowledging the three-judge court’s finding that some upward adjustment from 130% was 
warranted in light of “the caution and restraint required by the PLRA.”). 
 380. Id.; see also Coleman v. Schwarzenegger, 922 F. Supp. 2d 882, 960-963 (E.D. Cal. 
2009) (“Finding that plaintiffs’ request for a cap of 130% was “reasonable and finds 
considerable support in the record,” but also that there was “some evidence that a reduction 
in the population to a level somewhat higher than 130% of the system’s design capacity … 
might provide the relief from overcrowding necessary for the state to correct the 
constitutional violations at issue.” (Emphasis added). In fact, California prisons remain 
severely overcrowded, second only to Alabama’s. See Expert Declaration of Craig Haney at 
12, 15, Coleman v. Schwarzenegger, 922 F. Supp. 2d 1004 (E.D. Cal. 2013) (No. 90–0520). 
Specific prisons within the state continue to operate at extremely crowded levels—some at 
over 170 percent of design capacity. See id.; CDCR, WEEKLY INSTITUTION/CAMPS 
POPULATION DETAIL at 2 (May 7, 2014), available at 
http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/Reports_Research/Offender_Information_Services_Branch/Weekly
Wed/TPOP1A/TPOP1Ad140507.pdf. Moreover, even as the state prison system has 
dropped over the course of the Plata litigation from nearly 190% of design capacity to 
current levels, “there has been essentially no reduction in the overall mentally ill prisoner 
population.” Expert Declaration of Craig Haney at 15, Coleman v. Schwarzenegger, 922 F. 
Supp. 2d 1004 (E.D. Cal. 2013) (No. 90–0520); see also Declaration of Michael W. Bien in 
Support of Plaintiffs’ Response to Defendants’ Amended Application and [Proposed] Order 
at 2, Coleman v. Schwarzenegger, 922 F. Supp. 2d 1004 (E.D. Cal. 2014) (No. 90–0520) 
(“Reductions to date in CDCR’s prison population have failed to benefit the Coleman 
class.”). Prisoners are still suffering the symptoms and effects of crowding, including: 
shortages of clinicians and custody officers; shortages of treatment space, recreation space 
and specialized medical and mental health beds; and delays in access to care. See Expert 
Declaration of Craig Haney at 14-17, Coleman v. Schwarzenegger, 922 F. Supp. 2d 1004 
(E.D. Cal. 2013) (No. 90–0520); Declaration of Michael W. Bien in Support of Plaintiffs’ 
Response to Defendants’ Amended Application and [Proposed] Order at 1, Coleman v. 
Schwarzenegger, 922 F. Supp. 2d 1004 (E.D. Cal. 2014) (No. 90–0520). In addition, if, as 
currently planned, the State chooses to build or rent its way into compliance with the 137.5 
percent cap, it will end up with even more severe shortages of clinicians. See Plata, 131 S. 
Ct. at 1939 (finding that overcrowding does not just mean a shortage of beds, but a lack of 
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order will remedy the constitutional violations, this is a low bar.  
California will still have tens of thousands more incarcerated than the 
state’s prisons were designed to house. The standards for sound 
criminal justice policy, effective corrections management, and basic 
good government should be higher than simply meeting the bare 
minimum required by the constitution. Complying with Plata ought to 
be the beginning, not the end, of the conversation about reforming the 
state’s criminal justice policies.  
The public opinion research discussed above demonstrates that 
among California voters, the politics of fear are giving way to new 
demands for fiscal responsibility and effective government. 
Californians want their elected representatives to be smart on crime and 
are increasingly disenchanted with the billions spent each year 
incarcerating those who commit low-level, non-violent crimes at the 
expense of public health, college tuition, primary education, and the 
overall economic health of the state. Voters, when asked which 
candidate they would support for the legislature—a candidate who 
supports pretrial release versus a candidate who opposes pretrial 
release—prefer by a nearly 3-to-1 margin a candidate who supports this 
reform (63 percent to 23 percent).381 In addition, over half of all likely 
voters would be more likely to vote for a state representative who 
supported revising the penalty for simple possession of drugs from a 
felony to a misdemeanor.382 
Legislators who continue to cater to the law enforcement lobby 
risk more than just reelection. The state’s fiscal wellbeing and 
community safety are at stake. The overly punitive sentencing laws and 
prison expansion over the past decades are precisely what created the 
current constitutional and fiscal incarceration crisis and led California 
to its alarming recidivism rate.383 
The Plata litigation and Realignment have ignited the most 
significant criminal justice policy debate in California in decades. But 
resources necessary to address the fundamental needs of prisoners); Coleman, 922 F. Supp. 
2d at 954-55 (holding that merely adding beds will not address the principal effects of 
overcrowding). 
 381. REALIGNMENT ONE-YEAR ANNIVERSARY, supra note 369. 
 382. Id. 
 383. See supra Section III.B. Higher rates of incarceration and longer sentences do little, 
if anything, to reduce crime. See supra note 70. Indeed, imprisonment has a 
“criminogenic”—crime producing—effect, and the more time served the more likely one is 
to offend again. Craig Haney, Prison Effects of in the Age of Mass Incarceration, THE 
PRISON J. 15 (Jan. 25, 2012), available at 
http://tpj.sagepub.com/content/early/2012/09/11/0032885512448604.  
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thus far the practical impact has fallen fall short of the paradigm shift 
some predicted. Paradigm shifts never come without considerable 
disruption and often are hard-fought. Whether future historians will 
decide Realignment marked such a turning point in California criminal 
justice policies depends upon whether the state’s political leaders are 
willing to reform the harsh sentencing laws that caused the prison 
overcrowding in the§ first place.  
